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Category Mistakes [Pehme köide]

(Balliol College, Oxford)
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 184 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 217x137x10 mm, kaal: 238 g
  • Sari: Oxford Philosophical Monographs
  • Ilmumisaeg: 19-May-2016
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198779267
  • ISBN-13: 9780198779261
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 184 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 217x137x10 mm, kaal: 238 g
  • Sari: Oxford Philosophical Monographs
  • Ilmumisaeg: 19-May-2016
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198779267
  • ISBN-13: 9780198779261
Teised raamatud teemal:
Category mistakes are sentences such as 'Green ideas sleep furiously', 'Saturday is in bed', and 'The theory of relativity is eating breakfast'. Such sentences strike most speakers as highly infelicitous but it is a challenge to explain precisely why they are so. Ofra Magidor addresses this challenge, while providing a comprehensive discussion of the various treatments of category mistakes in both philosophy of language and linguistics. The phenomenon of category mistakes is particularly interesting to both these fields because a plausible case can be (and has been) made for explaining it in terms of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics--making it a fruitful case for exploring the relations between and nature of these three fundamental realms of language. Category Mistakes follows this division. After an introduction which explains the aims and motivations for the project and provides a brief historical survey of the (modern) treatment of category mistakes in each of philosophy, linguistics, and computer science, Magidor discusses four approaches in turn: first, the syntactic approach, which maintains that category mistakes are syntactically ill-formed; then two semantic approaches, though ones that appeal to different semantic facets: the meaninglessness view, which maintains that category mistakes are meaningless, and the MBT view, according to which category mistakes are meaningful but truth-valueless; and finally the pragmatic approach, according to which category mistakes are syntactically well-formed, meaningful, truth-valued but nevertheless pragmatically inappropriate. Magidor argues that the first three approaches ought to be rejected, and in the final chapter addresses the main challenge by developing and defending a particular version of the pragmatic approach: a presuppositional account of category mistakes.

Arvustused

In place of the grand theoretical constructions and destructions of earlier eras, Magidor presents a careful, even-handed consideration of the four main explanations one might offer for what is wrong with cross-categorial sentences: that they are syntactically ill-formed, that they are semantically meaningless, that they have meaning but lack truth-values, and that they are pragmatically infelicitous. Along the way, she synthesizes discussions from linguistics, logic, and the philosophy of language, abstracting away from a host of potentially overwhelming details to present key ideas clearly and accurately. * Elisabeth Camp, Mind * Magidor's volume sets out a broad variety of accounts grappling with the phenomenon of category mistakes in a manner that should appeal to both philosophers and linguists interested in issues of semantics and its formal treatment...Magidor's lucid and well-structured characterization of approaches and her subsequent arguments in favour of a broadly presupposition-based framework offer an excellent basis for anyone who wishes to take the discussion further. * John A. Bateman, Philosophical Quarterly * excellent, short, clearly focused. * Manuel García-Carpintero, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *

Acknowledgements ix
1 Introduction
1(24)
§1 The Phenomenon of Category Mistakes
1(6)
§2 Category Mistakes in the Philosophical Literature
7(8)
§3 Category Mistakes in the Linguistics Literature
15(5)
§4 Category Mistakes in Computer Science
20(3)
§5 Conclusion
23(2)
2 The Syntactic Approach
25(18)
§1 The Syntactic Approach to Category Mistakes
25(5)
§2 Some Unsatisfactory Arguments Against the Syntactic Approach
30(1)
§2.1 The simplicity argument
30(2)
§2.2 The meaningfulness argument
32(1)
§2.3 The argument from universality
32(3)
§3 The Argument from Particularity
35(3)
§4 The Argument from Embedding
38(1)
§5 Interactions with Meanings
39(1)
§6 Interactions with Extra-Linguistic Facts
40(2)
§7 Interactions with Context
42(1)
3 The Meaninglessness View
43(37)
§1 The Meaninglessness View of Category Mistakes
43(3)
§2 The Argument(s) from Compositionality
46(12)
§2.1 Atomic category mistakes
46(2)
§2.2 Type-theoretic semantics to the rescue?
48(8)
§2.3 Conjunctions and quantifier phrases
56(2)
§3 The Argument from Synonymy
58(1)
§4 The Argument from Propositional Attitude Ascriptions
59(7)
§5 The Argument from Metaphor
66(8)
§6 Arguments in Favour of the Meaninglessness View?
74(6)
§6.1 The imagination motivation
75(1)
§6.2 The motivation from alternative theories of meaning
76(3)
§6.3 The nonsense motivation
79(1)
4 The MBT View
80(30)
§1 The MBT View
80(3)
§2 A General Argument Against the MBT View
83(8)
§3 Arguments in Favour of the MBT View
91(8)
§3.1 The infelicity argument
91(3)
§3.2 Routley's transfer argument
94(1)
§3.3 The arbitrariness argument
95(4)
§4 The Supervaluationist Treatment of Category Mistakes
99(11)
§4.1 The formal details
99(2)
§4.2 Validity and implication
101(5)
§4.3 The problem of complex category mistakes
106(4)
5 The Pragmatic Approach
110(49)
§1 The Pragmatic Approach
110(1)
§2 The Naive Pragmatic Approach
111(5)
§3 The Background Framework: Pragmatic Presuppositions
116(15)
§3.1 Tests for presupposition
117(7)
§3.2 Foundational issues
124(7)
§4 A Presuppositional Account of Category Mistakes
131(17)
§4.1 A basic example
131(9)
§4.2 Other cases
140(6)
§4.3 Characterizing category mistakes?
146(2)
§5 Merits of the Account
148(6)
§6 Postscript: Some Final Reflections on the Implications of the Account
154(5)
References 159(8)
Index 167
Ofra Magidor studied philosophy, mathematics, and computer science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and completed a BPhil (2004) and DPhil (2007) in philosophy at the University of Oxford. Between 2005 and 2007 she was a Junior Research Fellow at Queen's College, Oxford, and since 2007 she has held a tutorial fellowship and CUF lectureship in philosophy at Balliol College and the University of Oxford. Her research focuses on philosophy of logic and language, as well as related issues in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mathematics.