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Classical and Physical Security of Symmetric Key Cryptographic Algorithms 2022 ed. [Kõva köide]

  • Formaat: Hardback, 288 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, kaal: 617 g, 78 Illustrations, color; 11 Illustrations, black and white; XII, 288 p. 89 illus., 78 illus. in color., 1 Hardback
  • Sari: Computer Architecture and Design Methodologies
  • Ilmumisaeg: 18-Dec-2021
  • Kirjastus: Springer Verlag, Singapore
  • ISBN-10: 9811665214
  • ISBN-13: 9789811665219
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Classical and Physical Security of Symmetric Key Cryptographic Algorithms 2022 ed.Suurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 288 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, kaal: 617 g, 78 Illustrations, color; 11 Illustrations, black and white; XII, 288 p. 89 illus., 78 illus. in color., 1 Hardback
  • Sari: Computer Architecture and Design Methodologies
  • Ilmumisaeg: 18-Dec-2021
  • Kirjastus: Springer Verlag, Singapore
  • ISBN-10: 9811665214
  • ISBN-13: 9789811665219
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9789811665219.html
Märksõnad:
This book consolidates several key aspects from the state-of-the-art research in symmetric key cryptography, which is among the cornerstones of digital security. It presents the content in an informative yet beginner-friendly, accompanied with toy examples and comprehensible graphics. In particular, it highlights the recent developments in tool-assisted analysis of ciphers. Furthermore, promising device-dependent attacks, such as fault attack and side channel attacks on symmetric key ciphers, are discussed in detail. One salient feature of this book is to present a detailed analysis of various fault countermeasures. The coverage of our book is quite diverse—it ranges from prerequisite information, latest research contribution as well as future research directions. It caters to students and researchers working in the field of cryptography. 
1 Introduction
1(12)
1.1 Context and Motivation
1(2)
1.2 Research Directions
3(3)
1.2.1 Cipher Design and Classical Cryptanalysis
3(2)
1.2.2 Realization/Mapping
5(1)
1.2.3 Physical Attack and Countermeasure
5(1)
1.3 Standardization of Ciphers
6(1)
1.4 Organization
7(3)
References
10(3)
2 Fundamentals of Symmetric Key Cryptography
13(46)
2.1 Building Blocks
13(6)
2.1.1 Boolean Function
13(1)
2.1.2 Substitution Box (SBox)
14(5)
2.1.3 Linear Layer
19(1)
2.2 Primitives
19(7)
2.2.1 (Un-keyed) Permutation
19(1)
2.2.2 Block Cipher
20(1)
2.2.3 Stream Cipher
21(1)
2.2.4 Hash Function
22(2)
2.2.5 Message Authentication Code (MAC)
24(1)
2.2.6 Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
25(1)
2.3 Cipher Families
26(4)
2.3.1 Substitution Permutation Network (SPN)
26(1)
2.3.2 Feistel Network
27(2)
2.3.3 Add--Rotation--XOR (ARX) Construction
29(1)
2.4 Description of Exemplary Ciphers
30(9)
2.4.1 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
30(3)
2.4.2 PRESENT-80
33(2)
2.4.3 GIFT-128
35(1)
2.4.4 CHASKEY
36(3)
2.5 Formidability of the Attacker
39(3)
2.5.1 Conventional Notions of Security
39(1)
2.5.2 Power of the Attacker
39(1)
2.5.3 Objective of the Attacker
40(2)
2.6 Major Classical Attacks
42(5)
2.6.1 Differential Attack
42(2)
2.6.2 Linear Attack
44(1)
2.6.3 Algebraic Attack
44(2)
2.6.4 Integral/Cube Attack
46(1)
2.6.5 Impossible Differential Attack
47(1)
2.7 Device Implementation
47(2)
2.8 Additional Topics
49(6)
2.8.1 Black Box--Grey Box--White Box Models
49(1)
2.8.2 Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP)
50(1)
2.8.3 Machine Learning (ML)
51(3)
2.8.4 Competitions
54(1)
References
55(4)
3 Fault Attack
59(40)
3.1 Introduction
59(1)
3.2 Fault Models
60(2)
3.2.1 Precise Bit Flip
60(1)
3.2.2 Single/Multiple Fault Adversary
60(1)
3.2.3 Random/Deterministic Fault Model
61(1)
3.2.4 Information Theoretic View
61(1)
3.2.5 Other Aspects
61(1)
3.3 Data Alteration Methods
62(3)
3.3.1 Volatility
62(1)
3.3.2 Modification of Operation
62(1)
3.3.3 Modification of Operand
63(2)
3.4 Sources of Fault Injection
65(3)
3.5 Analysis Methods
68(13)
3.5.1 Difference-Based Fault Analysis
69(7)
3.5.2 Collision-Based Fault Analysis
76(1)
3.5.3 Statistics-Based Fault Analysis
77(3)
3.5.4 Others
80(1)
3.6 Generalized Fault Attack Automation Frameworks
81(1)
3.6.1 Cipher Level Approaches
81(1)
3.6.2 Implementation Level Approaches
82(1)
3.7 Countermeasures
82(7)
3.7.1 Detection
84(1)
3.7.2 Infection
85(1)
3.7.3 Prevention
86(1)
3.7.4 Re-keying, Tweak and Tweak-in-Plaintext, Masking Plaintext
86(1)
3.7.5 Attacks on Countermeasures
87(1)
3.7.6 Specialized Countermeasures Against Statistical Ineffective Fault Attack
88(1)
References
89(10)
4 Side Channel Attack
99(10)
4.1 Introduction and Background
99(2)
4.2 Power Analysis
101(3)
4.2.1 Simple Power Analysis
102(1)
4.2.2 Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
102(1)
4.2.3 Template Attack
103(1)
4.2.4 Correlation Power Analysis (CPA)
103(1)
4.2.5 Countermeasures
103(1)
4.3 Case Study: Side Channel Analysis of CHASKEY
104(3)
4.3.1 Practical Attack Setups
104(1)
4.3.2 Experimental Results
105(2)
References
107(2)
5 New Insights on Differential and Linear Bounds Using Mixed Integer Linear Programming
109(32)
5.1 Introduction
110(1)
5.2 Background
111(5)
5.2.1 Branch Number to Model SBox (Inscrypt' 11)
112(1)
5.2.2 Convex Hull to Model SBox---Active SBox Count (Eprint' 13)
113(2)
5.2.3 Convex Hull to Model SBox---Exact Bound (Eprint' 14)
115(1)
5.2.4 Redundant Constraints to Reduce Solution Time (Eprint' 19)
116(1)
5.3 Problem with Convex Hull Modelling
116(5)
5.4 Automated Bounds with MILP: Our Proposal
121(10)
5.4.1 Modelling
122(1)
5.4.2 Optimizations
123(3)
5.4.3 Results
126(5)
5.5 Conclusion
131(1)
5.6 Supplementary Discussion
132(7)
5.6.1 Detailed Description on MILP Modelling of XOR
132(1)
5.6.2 Illustration with MILP Model for 1-Round Differential Bound for GIFT-128
133(1)
5.6.3 Illustration with MILP Model of Previous Constraints for 4-Round Differential Bound for GIFT-128
133(6)
References
139(2)
6 Machine Learning-Assisted Differential Distinguishers for Lightweight Ciphers
141(22)
6.1 Introduction
142(2)
6.2 Background
144(3)
6.2.1 Markov Ciphers
144(2)
6.2.2 Gohr's Work on SPECK (CRYPTO' 19)
146(1)
6.3 Basic Description of the Ciphers
147(3)
6.3.1 GIMLI
147(2)
6.3.2 ASCON
149(1)
6.3.3 KNOT
149(1)
6.4 Machine Learning-Based Distinguishers
150(4)
6.4.1 Model 1: Multiple Input Differences
150(3)
6.4.2 Model 2: One Input Difference
153(1)
6.4.3 Comparison with Existing Models
154(1)
6.5 Results on Round-Reduced Ciphers
154(3)
6.5.1 GIMLI (Model 1)
154(2)
6.5.2 ASCON and KNOT (Model 1)
156(1)
6.5.3 CHASKEY (Model 2)
157(1)
6.6 Choice of Machine Learning Model
157(2)
6.7 Conclusion and Follow-Up Problems
159(2)
References
161(2)
7 Differential Paradox: How an SBox Plays Against Differential Fault Analysis
163(14)
7.1 Introduction
163(1)
7.2 Difference Distribution Table-Related Properties
164(3)
7.3 Characterizing SBoxes in View of DFA
167(7)
7.4 Implication of Our Analysis and Future Work
174(1)
References
175(2)
8 DEFAULT: Cipher-Level Resistance Against Differential Fault Attack
177(40)
8.1 Introduction
177(3)
8.2 Background
180(5)
8.2.1 DFA Models
180(1)
8.2.2 DFA Protection
181(1)
8.2.3 Feasibility of Cipher-Level Protection Against Faults
182(2)
8.2.4 Working Principle for DFA
184(1)
8.3 Construction of DFA-Resistant Layer/Cipher
185(6)
8.3.1 Ad-hoc DFA Protection to Any Cipher (DEFAULT-LAYER)
185(1)
8.3.2 Extension to a Full-Fledged Cipher (DEFAULT)
186(1)
8.3.3 Construction of DEFAULT-LAYER
187(2)
8.3.4 Construction of DEFAULT-CORE (and DEFAULT)
189(2)
8.4 Design Rationale
191(7)
8.4.1 Design Philosophy
191(2)
8.4.2 Structure of the DEFAULT PermBits
193(1)
8.4.3 Selection of the DEFAULT SBoxes
194(3)
8.4.4 Unbiased Linear Structures
197(1)
8.5 Security Analysis
198(6)
8.5.1 Protection Against Differential Fault Attack
199(2)
8.5.2 Protection Against Classical Cryptanalysis
201(2)
8.5.3 Protection Against Side Channels Attacks
203(1)
8.6 Automated Bounds for Differential and Linear Attacks
204(2)
8.7 Performance
206(2)
8.7.1 Hardware Benchmark
206(1)
8.7.2 Software Benchmark
207(1)
8.8 Conclusion
208(2)
8.9 Supplementary Discussion
210(4)
References
214(3)
9 To Infect or Not to Infect: A Critical Analysis of Infective Countermeasures in Fault Attacks
217(38)
9.1 Introduction
217(3)
9.2 Background
220(10)
9.2.1 Context of Differential Fault Analysis
220(1)
9.2.2 Early Countermeasures: Detection-Based
220(1)
9.2.3 Evolution of Infective Countermeasures
221(1)
9.2.4 Notations and Terminologies
222(4)
9.2.5 Necessity and Sufficiency of Randomness
226(1)
9.2.6 Scope and Applicability
226(3)
9.2.7 Connection with Side Channel Countermeasures
229(1)
9.3 Type I Constructions
230(7)
9.3.1 Multiplication-Based Constructions
230(1)
9.3.2 Derivative-Based Constructions
231(1)
9.3.3 New Type I Schemes
231(4)
9.3.4 Benchmarking Results for Type I Schemes
235(2)
9.4 Type II/Cipher-Level Constructions
237(12)
9.4.1 Critical Look at CHES' 14 Countermeasure
241(2)
9.4.2 Our Patch for Latin Crypt' 12 Countermeasure
243(6)
9.5 Conclusion
249(1)
References
250(5)
10 A Novel Duplication-Based Countermeasure to Statistical Ineffective Fault Analysis
255(22)
10.1 Introduction
255(3)
10.2 Fault Attack Preliminaries
258(1)
10.2.1 Differential Fault Attack (DFA)
258(1)
10.2.2 General Countermeasures Against Fault Attacks
258(1)
10.3 Statistical Ineffective Fault Attack (SIFA)
259(3)
10.3.1 Duplication-Based Countermeasures and Need for Specialization
259(2)
10.3.2 Existing SIFA Countermeasures
261(1)
10.4 Our Proposed Solution
262(10)
10.4.1 Adopting Inverted Logic to Symmetric Key Ciphers
265(3)
10.4.2 Benchmarks
268(1)
10.4.3 Evaluation
269(1)
10.4.4 Comparison with Existing Countermeasures
269(3)
10.4.5 Connection with Side Channel Countermeasures
272(1)
10.5 Conclusion
272(1)
References
273(4)
11 Concluding Remarks
277(6)
11.1 Synopsis
277(2)
11.2 Interesting Problems for Future Research
279(2)
References
281(2)
Index 283
Anubhab Baksi has finished PhD from the School of Computer Science and Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Prior to that, he finished a B. Sc. in Statistics and a B. Tech. in Computer Science & Engineering. Currently he is employed as a researcher at the Temasek Laboratories, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research mainly deals with classical and device dependent (fault and side channel) cryptanalysis on cryptographic primitives. He has (co-)authored various publications in acclaimed journals and conferences.