Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization 4th Revised ed. [Kõva köide]

  • Formaat: Hardback, 744 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 259x196x38 mm, kaal: 1429 g, Illustrations
  • Sari: Aspen Casebook
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Aug-2012
  • Kirjastus: Aspen Publishers Inc.,U.S.
  • ISBN-10: 145481361X
  • ISBN-13: 9781454813613
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • Kõva köide
  • Hind: 261,79 €*
  • * saadame teile pakkumise kasutatud raamatule, mille hind võib erineda kodulehel olevast hinnast
  • See raamat on trükist otsas, kuid me saadame teile pakkumise kasutatud raamatule.
  • Kogus:
  • Lisa ostukorvi
  • Tasuta tarne
  • Lisa soovinimekirja
  • Formaat: Hardback, 744 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 259x196x38 mm, kaal: 1429 g, Illustrations
  • Sari: Aspen Casebook
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Aug-2012
  • Kirjastus: Aspen Publishers Inc.,U.S.
  • ISBN-10: 145481361X
  • ISBN-13: 9781454813613
Teised raamatud teemal:
Allen (law and business, New York U.), Kraakman (law, Harvard Law School), and Subramanian (law and business, Harvard Law School) present cases and provide commentary in this introduction of the basics principles of business law in the United States. They first deal with the fundamentals of organizational law in a business setting, including agency law, the partnership form and its variants, and the corporate form. They then examine relationships among shareholders, corporations, and corporate creditors; the functioning of the voting system, including proxy rules; the duty of care; and the business judgment rule and other legal devices that insulated corporate officers from shareholder liability. Finally, they address more specialized issues, including self-dealing and other potential duty of loyalty issues, challenges of executive compensation, the law and practice of shareholder derivative suits, transactions in corporate control, the specialized legal treatment of fundamental corporate actions (especially mergers and acquisitions), conflicts for corporate control, and the regulation of transactions in shares on the public markets. Aspen Publishers is now Wolters Kluwer Law & Business. Annotation ©2012 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
Preface xxi
Acknowledgments xxv
Introduction 1(6)
1 Acting Through Others: The Law of Agency
1.1 Introduction to Agency
7(1)
1.2 Agency Formation, Agency Termination, and Principal's Liability
8(18)
1.2.1 Formation
8(1)
1.2.2 Termination
9(1)
1.2.3 Parties' Conception Does Not Control
9(1)
Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc.
9(4)
1.2.4 Liability in Contract
13(1)
1.2.4.1 Actual and Apparent Authority
13(1)
White v. Thomas
14(2)
1.2.4.2 Inherent Authority
16(1)
Gallant Ins. Co. v. Isaac
17(4)
1.2.5 Liability in Tort
21(1)
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin
21(2)
Hoover v. Sun Oil Co.
23(3)
1.2.6 Liability in Tort Under the Apparent Authority Doctrine
26(1)
1.3 The Governance of Agency (The Agent's Duties)
26(7)
1.3.1 The Nature of the Agent's Fiduciary Relationship
26(1)
1.3.2 The Agent's Duty of Loyalty to the Principal
27(1)
Tarnowski v. Resop
27(2)
1.3.3 The Trustee's Duty to Trust Beneficiaries
29(1)
In re Gleeson
29(4)
2 The Problem of Joint Ownership: The Law of Partnership and Related Entities
33(46)
2.1 Introduction to Partnership
34(9)
2.1.1 Why Joint Ownership?
35(1)
The Need To Assemble At-Risk Capital
35(3)
William Klein
John C. Coffee
2.1.2 The Agency Conflict Among Co-Owners
38(1)
Meinhard v. Salmon
39(4)
2.2 Partnership Formation
43(4)
Vohland v. Sweet
43(4)
2.3 Relations With Third Parties
47(5)
2.3.1 Partnership Creditors' Claims Against Departing Partners
48(1)
2.3.2 Third-Party Claims Against Partnership Property
48(2)
2.3.3 Claims of Partnership Creditors to Partner's Individual Property
50(2)
2.4 Partnership Governance and Issues of Authority
52(2)
National Biscuit Co. v. Stroud
52(2)
2.5 Termination (Dissolution and Dissociation)
54(10)
2.5.1 Accounting for Partnership's Financial Status and Performance
54(1)
Sample Partnership Balance Sheet
54(1)
Sample Partnership Income Statement
55(1)
Accounting for Partners' Capital
55(1)
Adams v. Jarvis
56(4)
2.5.2 Statutory Dissolution of a Partnership at Will
60(1)
2.5.3 The Duty of Loyalty and Opportunistic Dissolution
61(1)
Page v. Page
61(3)
2.6 Limited Liability Successors of the General Partnership
64(15)
2.6.1 The Limited Partnership
65(2)
2.6.2 The New (Past 40 Years) Limited Liability Kids on the Block
67(1)
2.6.2.1 The Limited Liability Partnership
67(1)
2.6.2.2 The Limited Liability Company
68(1)
2.6.2.2.1 Tax and the Rise of the LLC
68(1)
2.6.2.2.2 Contractual Flexibility and the LLC
69(1)
Pappas et al. v. Tzolis
70(6)
2.6.2.2.3 The Success of the LLC
76(2)
Contribution of U.S. Corporations to Total GDP, 1947-2011
78(1)
3 The Corporate Form
79(36)
3.1 Introduction to the Corporate Form
79(2)
3.2 Creation of a Fictional Legal Entity
81(16)
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
83(6)
3.2.1 A Note on the History of Corporate Formation
89(5)
3.2.2 The Process of Incorporating Today
94(1)
3.2.3 The Articles of Incorporation, or "Charter"
95(1)
3.2.4 The Corporate Bylaws
95(1)
3.2.5 Shareholders' Agreements
96(1)
3.3 Limited Liability
97(3)
Frank Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation
99(1)
3.4 Transferable Shares
100(2)
3.5 Centralized Management
102(13)
3.5.1 Legal Construction of the Board
104(1)
3.5.1.1 The Holder of Primary Management Power
104(1)
Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co., Ltd. v. Cunninghame
104(3)
3.5.1.2 Structure of the Board
107(1)
3.5.1.3 Formality in Board Operation
108(1)
3.5.1.4 A Critique of Boards
109(2)
3.5.2 Corporate Officers: Agents of the Corporation
111(1)
Jennings v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co.
111(4)
4 The Protection of Creditors
115(38)
4.1 Mandatory Disclosure
116(1)
4.2 Capital Regulation
117(7)
4.2.1 Financial Statements
117(4)
4.2.2 Distribution Constraints
121(2)
4.2.3 Minimum Capital and Capital Maintenance Requirements
123(1)
4.3 Standard-Based Duties
124(20)
4.3.1 Director Liability
124(3)
4.3.2 Creditor Protection: Fraudulent Transfers
127(1)
4.3.3 Shareholder Liability
128(1)
4.3.3.1 Equitable Subordination
128(1)
Costello v. Fazio
129(5)
4.3.3.2 Piercing the Corporate Veil
134(1)
Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. The Pepper Source
135(5)
Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan
140(4)
4.4 Veil Piercing on Behalf of Involuntary Creditors
144(9)
Walkovszky v. Carlton
144(9)
5 Normal Governance: The Voting System
153(64)
5.1 The Role and Limits of Shareholder Voting
153(3)
5.2 Electing and Removing Directors
156(4)
5.2.1 Electing Directors
156(1)
5.2.2 Removing Directors
157(3)
5.3 Shareholder Meetings and Alternatives
160(1)
5.4 Proxy Voting and its Costs
161(4)
Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.
163(2)
5.5 Class Voting
165(1)
5.6 Shareholder Information Rights
166(2)
5.7 Techniques for Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights
168(20)
5.7.1 Circular Control Structures
168(1)
Speiser v. Baker
169(6)
5.7.2 Vote Buying
175(1)
Voting in Corporate Law
175(1)
Frank Easterbrook
Daniel Fischel
Schreiber v. Carney
176(7)
5.7.3 Controlling Minority Structures
183(1)
Cross-Ownership, And Dual Class Equity
184(4)
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Reinier Kraakman
George G. Triantis
Stock Pyramids
5.8 The Collective Action Problem
188(1)
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control
188(1)
Marcel Kahan
Edward B. Rock
5.9 General Judicial Superintendence of Shareholder Voting
189(2)
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.
190(1)
5.10 The Federal Proxy Rules
191(22)
5.10.1 Rules 14a-1 Through 14a-7: Disclosure and Shareholder Communication
192(3)
5.10.2 Rule 14a-8: Shareholder Proposals
195(11)
5.10.3 Rule 14a-9: The Antifraud Rule
206(1)
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg
207(6)
5.11 State Disclosure Law: Fiduciary Duty of Candor
213(4)
6 Normal Governance: The Duty Of Care
217(52)
6.1 Introduction to the Duty of Care
217(1)
6.2 The Duty of Care and the Need to Mitigate Director Risk Aversion
218(3)
Gagliardi v. TriFoods International, Inc.
219(2)
6.3 Statutory Techniques for Limiting Director and Officer Risk Exposure
221(6)
6.3.1 Indemnification
221(1)
Waltuch v. Conticommodity Services, Inc.
221(5)
6.3.2 Directors and Officers Insurance
226(1)
6.4 Judicial Protection: The Business Judgment Rule
227(9)
Kamin v. American Express Co.
228(3)
6.4.1 Understanding the Business Judgment Rule
231(1)
6.4.2 The Duty of Care in Takeover Cases: A Note on Smith v. Van Gorkom
232(2)
6.4.3 Additional Statutory Protection: Authorization for Charter Provisions Waiving Liability for Due Care Violations
234(2)
6.5 The Board's Duty to Monitor: Losses "Caused" by Board Passivity
236(29)
Francis v. United Jersey Bank
237(6)
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.
243(4)
In the Matter of Michael Marchese
247(5)
In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation
252(7)
In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation
259(6)
6.6 "Knowing" Violations of Law
265(4)
Miller v. AT&T
265(4)
7 Conflict Transactions: The Duty Of Loyalty
269(60)
7.1 Duty to Whom?
270(6)
7.1.1 The Shareholder Primacy Norm
270(3)
A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow
273(2)
7.1.2 Constituency Statutes
275(1)
7.2 Self-Dealing Transactions
276(5)
7.2.1 The Disclosure Requirement
277(1)
State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co.
277(3)
Self-interested Transactions in Corporate Law
280(1)
Melvin Eisenberg
7.3 The Effect of Approval by a Disinterested Party
281(14)
7.3.1 Early Regulation of Fiduciary Self-Dealing
282(1)
7.3.2 Judicial Review of Self-Dealing Today: The Limited Role of Safe Harbor Statutes
283(1)
Cookies Food Products v. Lakes Warehouse
284(5)
7.3.3 Judicial Review When Transaction Has Been Approved by A Disinterested Majority of the Board
289(1)
Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law
289(1)
Melvin Eisenberg
Cooke v. Oolie
290(2)
7.3.4 Approval by a Minority of Directors: Special Board Committees
292(1)
7.3.5 Shareholder Ratification of Conflict Transactions
292(1)
Lewis v. Vogelstein
293(1)
In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc.
294(1)
7.4 Controlling Shareholders and the Fairness Standard
295(18)
7.4.1 Different Treatment for Controlling Shareholders?
295(1)
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien
296(4)
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.
300(8)
7.4.2 Approval by a Board Minority of "Independent" Directors
308(2)
7.4.3 Loyalty and Due Care Get Commingled: Delaware's Unique Approach to Adjudicating Due Care Claims Against Corporate Directors
310(3)
7.5 Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
313(3)
7.5.1 Determining Which Opportunities "Belong" to the Corporation
314(1)
7.5.2 When May a Fiduciary Take a Corporate Opportunity?
315(1)
7.6 The Duty of Loyalty in Close Corporations
316(13)
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.
317(5)
Close Corporations and Agency Costs
322(2)
Frank Easterbrook
Daniel Fischel
Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc.
324(5)
8 Executive Compensation
329(38)
8.1 Introduction
329(1)
8.2 The Challenge of Executive Pay
330(1)
8.3 A Brief History of Executive Compensation in the U.S.
331(8)
8.4 Are U.S. CEO's Paid too Much?
339(4)
Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues
340(2)
Lucian Bebcbuk
Jesse Fried
Pay Without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment
342(1)
Bengt Holmstrom
8.5 Judicial Review of Compensation
343(24)
8.5.1 The Law of Director and Officer Compensation
343(2)
In re The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Shareholder Litigation
345(8)
8.5.2 The Delaware Courts' Approach to Option Grants
353(1)
Lewis v. Vogelstein
353(3)
8.5.3 The Disney Decision
356(2)
In Re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation
358(9)
9 Shareholder Lawsuits
367(50)
9.1 Distinguishing Between Direct and Derivative Claims
367(3)
9.2 Solving a Collective Action Problem: Attorneys' Fees and the Incentive to Sue
370(7)
Fletcher v. A.J. Industries, Inc.
371(6)
9.3 Standing Requirements
377(2)
9.4 Balancing the Rights of Boards to Manage the Corporation and Shareholders' Rights to Obtain Judicial Review
379(31)
9.4.1 The Demand Requirement of Rule 23
380(1)
Levine v. Smith
380(5)
Rales v. Blasband
385(7)
9.4.2 Special Litigation Committees
392(1)
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado
392(6)
In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation
398(8)
Joy v. North
406(4)
9.5 Settlement and Indemnification
410(4)
9.5.1 Settlement by Class Representatives
410(2)
9.5.2 Settlement by Special Committee
412(1)
Carlton Investments v. TIC Beatrice International Holdings, Inc.
412(2)
9.6 When Are Derivative Suits in Shareholders' Interests?
414(3)
10 Transactions in Control
417(36)
10.1 Sales of Control Blocks: The Seller's Duties
419(20)
10.1.1 The Regulation of Control Premia
419(1)
Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc.
420(1)
Perlman v. Feldmann
421(6)
10.1.2 A Defense of the Market Rule in Sales of Control
427(1)
Corporate Control Transactions
427(5)
Frank H. Easterbrook
Daniel R. Fischel
In Re Delphi Financial Group Shareholder Litigation
432(7)
10.2 Sale of Corporate Office
439(1)
10.3 Looting
439(4)
Harris v. Carter
440(3)
10.4 Tender Offers: The Buyer's Duties
443(6)
Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd.
445(4)
10.5 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act Waiting Period
449(4)
11 Fundamental Transactions: Mergers And Acquisitions
453(58)
11.1 Introduction
453(1)
11.2 Economic Motives for Mergers
454(4)
11.2.1 Integration as a Source of Value
454(1)
11.2.2 Other Sources of Value in Acquisitions: Tax, Agency Costs, and Diversification
455(2)
11.2.3 Suspect Motives for Mergers
457(1)
11.2.4 Do Mergers Create Value?
457(1)
11.3 The Evolution of the U.S. Corporate Law of Mergers
458(2)
11.3.1 When Mergers Were Rare
458(1)
11.3.2 The Modern Era
459(1)
11.4 The Allocation of Power in Fundamental Transactions
460(2)
11.5 Overview of Transactional Form
462(9)
11.5.1 Asset Acquisition
463(1)
Katz v. Bregman
463(4)
11.5.2 Stock Acquisition
467(2)
11.5.3 Mergers
469(2)
11.5.4 Triangular Mergers
471(1)
11.6 Structuring the M&A Transaction
471(9)
11.6.1 Timing
472(1)
11.6.2 Regulatory Approvals, Consents, and Title Transfers
473(1)
11.6.3 Planning Around Voting and Appraisal Rights
473(1)
11.6.4 Due Diligence, Representations and Warranties, Covenants, and Indemnification
473(2)
11.6.5 Deal Protections and Termination Fees
475(1)
11.6.6 Accounting Treatment
475(1)
11.6.7 A Case Study: Excerpt from Timberjack Agreement and Plan of Merger
475(5)
11.7 The Appraisal Remedy
480(7)
11.7.1 History and Theory
480(2)
11.7.2 The Appraisal Alternative in Interested Mergers
482(2)
11.7.3 The Market-Out Rule
484(1)
11.7.4 The Nature of "Fair Value"
485(1)
11.7.5 Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
486(1)
11.8 The De Facto Merger Doctrine
487(4)
Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.
488(3)
11.9 The Duty of Loyalty in Controlled Mergers
491(20)
11.9.1 Cash Mergers or Freeze-Outs
492(3)
11.9.2 What Constitutes Control and Exercise of Control
495(1)
Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.
496(6)
11.9.3 Controlling Shareholder Fiduciary Duty on the First Step of a Two-Step Tender Offer
502(1)
In re CNX Gas Corporation Shareholders litigation
503(8)
12 Public Contests for Corporate Control
511(96)
12.1 Introduction
511(4)
12.2 Defending Against Hostile Tender Offers
515(7)
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
515(7)
12.3 Private Law Innovation: The Poison Pill
522(10)
Moran v. Household International, Inc.
525(7)
12.4 Choosing a Merger or Buyout Partner: Revlon, Its Sequels, and Its Prequels
532(13)
Smith v. Van Gorkom
532(8)
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc.
540(5)
12.5 Pulling Together Unocal and Revlon
545(29)
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.
545(8)
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.
553(14)
Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan
567(7)
12.6 Protecting the Deal
574(13)
12.6.1 "No Shops/No Talks" and "Fiduciary Outs"
577(1)
12.6.2 Shareholder Lock-ups
578(1)
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.
579(8)
12.7 State Antitakeover Statutes
587(7)
12.7.1 First- and Second-Generation Antitakeover Statutes (1968-1987)
587(1)
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
588(4)
12.7.2 Third-Generation Antitakeover Statutes (1987-2000)
592(2)
12.8 Proxy Contests for Corporate Control
594(7)
Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.
595(6)
12.9 The Takeover Arms Race Continues
601(6)
12.9.1 "Dead Hand" Pills
601(2)
12.9.2 Mandatory Pill Redemption Bylaws
603(4)
13 Trading in the Corporation's Securities
607(78)
13.1 Common Law of Directors' Duties When Trading in the Corporation's Stock
607(5)
Goodwin v. Agassiz
608(4)
13.2 The Corporate Law of Fiduciary Disclosure Today
612(6)
13.2.1 Corporate Recovery of Profit from "Insider" Trading
612(1)
Freeman v. Decio
613(4)
13.2.2 Board Disclosure Obligations Under State Law
617(1)
13.3 Exchange Act § 16(b) and Rule 16
618(3)
13.4 Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
621(64)
13.4.1 Evolution of Private Right of Action Under §10
621(2)
13.4.2 Elements of a 10b-5 Claim
623(1)
13.4.2.1 Elements of a 10b-5 Claim: False or Misleading Statement or Omission
624(1)
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
624(6)
Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green
630(7)
13.4.2.2 Elements of 10b-5 Liability: The Equal Access Theory
637(1)
13.4.2.3 Elements of 10b-5 Liability: The Fiduciary Duty Theory
638(2)
Chiarella v. United States
640(4)
Dirks v. SEC
644(9)
United States v. Chestman
653(5)
United States v. O'Hagan
658(4)
13.4.2.4 Elements of 10b-5 Liability: Materiality
662(1)
Basic Inc. v. Levinson
662(3)
13.4.2.5 Elements of 10b-5 Liability: Scienter
665(3)
13.4.2.6 Elements of 10b-5 Liability: Standing, in Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Securities
668(1)
13.4.2.7 Elements of 10b-5 Liability: Reliance
669(1)
Basic Inc. v. Levinson
669(5)
13.4.2.8 Elements of 10b-5 Recovery: Causation
674(1)
13.4.3 Remedies for 10b-5 Violations
675(1)
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.
675(4)
13.4.4 The Academic Debate
679(2)
13.4.4.1 Insider Trading and Informed Prices
681(1)
13.4.4.2 Insider Trading as a Compensation Device
682(3)
Table of Cases 685(6)
Index 691