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Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization 5th ed. [Kõva köide]

  • Formaat: Hardback, 752 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 257x191x30 mm, kaal: 1383 g
  • Sari: Aspen Casebook
  • Ilmumisaeg: 07-Mar-2016
  • Kirjastus: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business
  • ISBN-10: 1454870613
  • ISBN-13: 9781454870616
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  • Formaat: Hardback, 752 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 257x191x30 mm, kaal: 1383 g
  • Sari: Aspen Casebook
  • Ilmumisaeg: 07-Mar-2016
  • Kirjastus: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business
  • ISBN-10: 1454870613
  • ISBN-13: 9781454870616
Using cases and commentaries, this text helps students and non-specialist lawyers understand the basic principles of the law of business organization in the US, focusing on how these legal structures function to produce benefits to parties who enter into agreements and relationships, or how they add costs and impede business organization, based on the basic principles of economics. It addresses the fundamentals of organizational law in a business setting; the legal regulation of actions, decisions, and transactions that involve public corporations; and classes of corporate actions and related shareholder transactions subject to more specialized regulation by corporate law. This edition has updates to corporate finance and governance, mergers and acquisitions, and securities regulation. Annotation ©2016 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR (protoview.com)
Preface xxi
Acknowledgments xxv
Introduction 1(6)
1 Acting Through Others: The Law Of Agency 7(26)
1.1 Introduction To Agency
7(1)
1.2 Agency Formation, Agency Termination, And Principal's Liability
8(19)
1.2.1 Formation
8(1)
1.2.2 Termination
9(1)
1.2.3 Parties' Conception Does Not Control
9(4)
Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc.
9(4)
1.2.4 Liability in Contract
13(9)
1.2.4.1 Actual and Apparent Authority
13(3)
White v. Thomas
14(2)
1.2.4.2 Inherent Authority
16(20)
Gallant Ins. Co. v. Isaac
17(5)
1.2.5 Liability in Tort
22(5)
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin
22(2)
Hoover v. Sun Oil Co.
24(3)
1.2.6 Liability in Tort Under the Apparent Authority Doctrine
27(1)
1.3 The Governance Of Agency (The Agent's Duties)
27(6)
1.3.1 The Nature of the Agent's Fiduciary Relationship
27(1)
1.3.2 The Agent's Duty of Loyalty to the Principal
28(2)
Tarnowski v. Resop
28(2)
1.3.3 The Trustee's Duty to Trust Beneficiaries
30(4)
In re Gleeson
31(2)
2 Joint Ownership Of A Business: The Law Of Partnerships And Limited Liability Companies 33(42)
2.1 Introduction To Partnership: Why Joint Ownership?
34(5)
William Klein
John C. Coffee
The Need To Assemble At-Risk Capital
36(3)
2.2 Partnership Formation
39(3)
Vohland v. Sweet
39(3)
2.3 Relations With Third Parties
42(4)
2.3.1 Partnership Creditors' Claims Against Departing Partners
43(1)
2.3.2 Third-Party Claims Against Partnership Property
44(1)
2.3.3 Claims of Partnership Creditors to Partner's Individual Property
45(1)
2.4 Partnership Governance And Issues Of Authority
46(2)
National Biscuit Co. v. Stroud
46(2)
2.5 Termination (Dissolution And Dissociation)
48(11)
2.5.1 Accounting for Partnership's Financial Status and Performance
49(6)
Sample Partnership Balance Sheet
49(1)
Sample Partnership Income Statement
49(1)
Accounting for Partners' Capital
50(1)
Adams v. Jarvis
51(4)
2.5.2 Statutory Dissolution of a Partnership at Will
55(1)
2.5.3 Opportunistic Dissolution and the Partner's Duty of Loyalty
56(7)
Page v. Page
56(3)
2.6 Agency Conflicts Among Co-Owners: Fiduciary Duties
59(4)
Meinhard v. Salmon
59(4)
2.7 Limited Liability Successors Of The General Partnership
63(12)
2.7.1 The Limited Partnership
64(1)
2.7.2 The Limited Liability Partnership
65(1)
2.7.3 The Limited Liability Company
66(11)
2.7.3.1 Taxation of LLCs
67(1)
2.7.3.2 Contractual Flexibility
68(19)
Pappas et al. v. Tzolis
69(6)
3 The Corporate Form 75(28)
3.1 Introduction To The Corporate Form
75(2)
3.2 Creation Of A Fictional Legal Entity
77(8)
3.2.1 A Note on the History of Corporate Formation
78(4)
3.2.2 The Process of Incorporating Today
82(1)
3.2.3 The Articles of Incorporation, or "Charter"
83(1)
3.2.4 The Corporate Bylaws
84(1)
3.2.5 Shareholders' Agreements
85(1)
3.3 Limited Liability
85(4)
Frank Easterbrook
Daniel Fischel
Limited Liability and the Corporation
87(2)
3.4 Transferable Shares
89(1)
3.5 Centralized Management
90(13)
3.5.1 Legal Construction of the Board
92(6)
3.5.1.1 The Holder of Primary Management Power
92(3)
Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co., Ltd. v. Cunninghame
92(3)
3.5.1.2 Structure and Function of the Board
95(2)
3.5.1.3 Formality in Board Operation
97(1)
3.5.1.4 A Critique of Boards
98(1)
3.5.2 Corporate Officers: Agents of the Corporation
98(7)
Jennings v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co.
99(4)
4 The Protection Of Creditors 103(40)
4.1 Mandatory Disclosure
104(1)
4.2 Capital Regulation
105(7)
4.2.1 Financial Statements
105(4)
4.2.2 Distribution Constraints
109(2)
4.2.3 Minimum Capital and Capital Maintenance Requirements
111(1)
4.3 Standard-Based Duties
112(19)
4.3.1 Director Liability
112(3)
4.3.2 Creditor Protection: Fraudulent Transfers
115(1)
4.3.3 Shareholder Liability
116(27)
4.3.3.1 Equitable Subordination
116(6)
Costello v. Fazio
116(6)
4.3.3.2 Piercing the Corporate Veil
122(66)
Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. The Pepper Source
123(4)
Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan
127(4)
4.4 Veil Piercing On Behalf Of Involuntary Creditors
131(12)
Walkovszky v. Carlton
132(11)
5 Debt, Equity, And Economic Value 143(20)
5.1 Capital Structure
143(4)
5.1.1 Legal Character of Debt
144(1)
5.1.2 Legal Character of Equity
145(2)
5.2 Basic Concepts Of Valuation
147(7)
5.2.1 The Time Value of Money
147(2)
5.2.2 Risk and Return
149(3)
5.2.3 Diversification and Systematic Risk
152(2)
5.3 Valuing Assets
154(9)
5.3.1 The Discount Cash Flow (DCF) Approach
154(3)
5.3.2 The Relevance of Prices in the Securities Market
157(9)
In re Emerging Communications Inc., Shareholder Litigation
158(5)
6 Normal Governance: The Voting System 163(66)
6.1 Introduction: Shareholder Voting In The New Corporate Governance
163(3)
6.2 Electing And Removing Directors
166(6)
6.2.1 Electing Directors
166(3)
6.2.2 Removing Directors
169(3)
6.3 Shareholder Meetings And Alternatives
172(1)
6.4 Proxy Voting And Its Costs
173(4)
Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.
175(2)
6.5 Class Voting
177(2)
6.6 Shareholder Information Rights
179(2)
6.7 Techniques For Separating Control From Cash Flow Rights
181(20)
6.7.1 Circular Control Structures
181(7)
Speiser v. Baker
182(6)
6.7.2 Vote Buying
188(9)
Frank Easterbrook
Daniel Fischel
Voting in Corporate Law
188(1)
Schreiber v. Carney
189(8)
6.7.3 Controlling Minority Structures
197(4)
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Reinier Kraakman
George G. Triantis
Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity
197(4)
6.8 Mitigating A Collective Problem Today: Activist Investors
201(2)
Marcel Kahan
Edward B. Rock
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control
202(1)
6.9 The Federal Proxy Rules
203(21)
6.9.1 Rules 14a-1 Through 14a-7: Disclosure and Shareholder Communication
203(4)
6.9.2 Activist Investors and the Short Slate Proxy Contest
207(1)
6.9.3 Access to the Company's Proxy Statement: Rule 14a-8: Shareholder Proposals
208(6)
6.9.4 Rule 14a-9: The Antifraud Rule
214(19)
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg
216(8)
6.10 Fiduciary Superintendence Of Shareholder Voting
224(5)
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.
225(4)
7 Normal Governance: The Duty Of Care 229(54)
7.1 Introduction To The Duty Of Care
229(1)
7.2 The Duty Of Care And The Need To Mitigate Director Risk Aversion
230(3)
Gagliardi v. TriFoods International, Inc.
231(2)
7.3 Statutory Techniques For Limiting Director And Officer Risk Exposure
233(6)
7.3.1 Indemnification
233(5)
Waltuch v. Conticommodity Services, Inc.
233(5)
7.3.2 Directors and Officers Insurance
238(1)
7.4 Judicial Protection: The Business Judgment Rule
239(9)
Kamin v. American Express Co.
240(3)
7.4.1 Understanding the Business Judgment Rule
243(1)
7.4.2 The Duty of Care in Takeover Cases: A Note on Smith v. Van Gorkom
244(2)
7.4.3 Additional Statutory Protection: Authorization for Charter Provisions Waiving liability for Due Care Violations
246(2)
7.5 The Board's Duty To Monitor: Losses "Caused" By Board Passivity
248(29)
Francis v. United Jersey Bank
249(6)
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.
255(4)
In the Matter of Michael Marchese
259(6)
In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation
265(7)
In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation
272(5)
7.6 "Knowing" Violations Of Law
277(6)
Miller v. AT&T
278(5)
8 The Duty Of Loyalty: Conflict Transactions 283(60)
8.1 Duty To Whom?
284(8)
8.1.1 The Shareholder Primacy Norm
284(5)
A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow
287(2)
8.1.2 Constituency Statutes
289(1)
8.1.3 Defining Corporate Purpose in the Charter: Benefit Corporations
290(2)
8.2 Self-Dealing Transactions
292(6)
8.2.1 The Disclosure Requirement
293(5)
State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co.
293(3)
Melvin Eisenberg
Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law
296(2)
8.3 The Effect Of Approval By A Disinterested Party
298(13)
8.3.1 Early Regulation of Fiduciary Self-Dealing
298(2)
8.3.2 Judicial Review of Self-Dealing Today: The Limited Role of Safe Harbor Statutes
300(5)
Cookies Food Products v. Lakes Warehouse
300(5)
8.3.3 Judicial Review When Transaction Has Been Approved by a Disinterested Majority of the Board
305(4)
Melvin Eisenberg
Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law
306(1)
Cooke v. Oolie
307(2)
8.3.4 Approval by a Minority of Directors: Special Board Committees
309(1)
8.3.5 Shareholder Ratification of Conflict Transactions
309(4)
Lewis v. Vogelstein
310(1)
8.4 Corporate Directors And The Duty Of Good Faith
311(2)
8.5 Controlling Shareholders And The Fairness Standard
313(14)
8.5.1 Different Treatment for Controlling Shareholders?
313(13)
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien
314(4)
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.
318(8)
8.5.2 Approval by a Board Minority of "Independent" Directors: Special Committees
326(1)
8.6 Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
327(3)
8.6.1 Determining Which Opportunities "Belong" to the Corporation
328(1)
8.6.2 When May a Fiduciary Take a Corporate Opportunity?
329(1)
8.7 The Duty Of Loyalty In Close Corporations
330(13)
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.
331(5)
Frank Easterbrook
Daniel Fischel
Close Corporations and Agency Costs
336(19)
Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc.
338(5)
9 Executive Compensation 343(32)
9.1 Introduction
343(1)
9.2 The Challenge Of Executive Pay
344(8)
9.2.1 Creating Incentives That Align Managers with Investors
344(3)
9.2.2 Political and Regulatory Responses to Executive Pay
347(5)
9.3 Are U.S. CEOs Paid Too Much?
352(6)
Lucian Bebchuk
Jesse Fried
Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues
355(2)
Bengt Holmstrom
Pay Without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment
357(1)
9.4 Judicial Review Of Compensation
358(10)
9.4.1 The Law of Executive Officer Compensation
358(29)
In re The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Shareholder Litigation
360(8)
9.5 Judicial Review Of Director Compensation
368(7)
Calma v. Templeton
369(6)
10 Shareholder Lawsuits 375(52)
10.1 Distinguishing Between Direct And Derivative Claims
375(4)
10.2 Solving A Collective Action Problem: Attorneys' Fees And The Incentive To Sue
379(6)
Fletcher v. Aj. Industries, Inc.
380(5)
10.3 Standing Requirements
385(2)
10.4 Balancing The Rights Of Boards To Manage The Corporation And Shareholders' Rights To Obtain Judicial Review
387(31)
10.4.1 The Demand Requirement of Rule 23
388(12)
Levine v. Smith
388(5)
Rales v. Blasband
393(7)
10.4.2 Special Litigation Committees
400(21)
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado
400(6)
In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation
406(8)
Joy v. North
414(4)
10.5 Dealing With An Abundance Of Shareholder Suits: Exclusive Forum Bylaws
418(3)
10.6 Settlement And Indemnification
421(4)
10.6.1 Settlement by Class Representatives
421(1)
10.6.2 Settlement by Special Committee
422(7)
Carlton Investments v. TLC Beatrice International Holdings, Inc.
422(3)
10.7 When Are Derivative Suits In Shareholders' Interests?
425(2)
11 Transactions In Control 427(32)
11.1 Sales Of Control Blocks: The Seller's Duties
429(19)
11.1.1 The Regulation of Control Premia
429(8)
Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc.
430(1)
Perlman v. Feldmann
431(6)
11.1.2 A Defense of the Market Rule in Sales of Control
437(23)
Frank H. Easterbrook
Daniel R. Fischel
Corporate Control Transactions
437(5)
In re Delphi Financial Group Shareholder Litigation
442(6)
11.2 Sale Of Corporate Office
448(1)
11.3 Looting
449(1)
11.4 Tender Offers: The Buyer's Duties
450(6)
Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd.
452(4)
11.5 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act Waiting Period
456(3)
12 Fundamental Transactions: Mergers And Acquismons 459(72)
12.1 Introduction
459(1)
12.2 Economic Motives For Mergers
460(4)
12.2.1 Integration as a Source of Value
460(1)
12.2.2 Other Sources of Value in Acquisitions: Tax, Agency Costs, and Diversification
461(2)
12.2.3 Suspect Motives for Mergers
463(1)
12.2.4 Do Mergers Create Value?
464(1)
12.3 The Evolution Of The U.S. Corporate Law Of Mergers
464(2)
12.3.1 When Mergers Were Rare
465(1)
12.3.2 The Modern Era
465(1)
12.4 The Allocation Of Power In Fundamental Transactions
466(3)
12.5 Overview Of Transactional Form
469(9)
12.5.1 Asset Acquisition
469(5)
Katz v. Bregman
470(4)
12.5.2 Stock Acquisition
474(1)
12.5.3 Mergers
475(2)
12.5.4 Triangular Mergers
477(1)
12.6 Structuring The M&A Transaction
478(9)
12.6.1 Timing
479(1)
12.6.2 Regulatory Approvals, Consents, and Title Transfers
479(1)
12.6.3 Planning Around Voting and Appraisal Rights
480(1)
12.6.4 Due Diligence, Representations and Warranties, Covenants, and Indemnification
480(2)
12.6.5 Deal Protections and Termination Fees
482(1)
12.6.6 Accounting Treatment
482(1)
12.6.7 A Case Study: Excerpt from Timberjack Agreement and Plan of Merger
482(5)
12.7 The Appraisal Remedy
487(11)
12.7.1 History and Theory
487(2)
12.7.2 The Appraisal Alternative in Interested Mergers
489(2)
12.7.3 The Market-Out Rule
491(1)
12.7.4 The Nature of "Fair Value"
492(1)
12.7.5 Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
493(2)
12.7.6 Current Developments in Appraisal
495(3)
12.8 The De Facto Merger Doctrine
498(4)
Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.
499(3)
12.9 The Duty Of Loyalty In Controlled Mergers
502(29)
12.9.1 Cash Mergers or Freeze-Outs
503(17)
Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.
505(7)
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp et al.
512(8)
11.9.2 Do Controlling Shareholders Have a Duty to Offer Only a Fair Price on the First Tender Offer Step of a Two Step Freeze-Out?
520(73)
In re CNX Gas Corporation Shareholders Litigation
521(10)
13 Public Contests For Corporate Control 531(86)
13.1 Introduction
531(3)
13.2 Defending Against Hostile Tender Offers
534(7)
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
534(7)
13.3 Private Law Innovation: The Poison Pill
541(6)
13.4 Choosing A Merger Or Buyout Partner: Revlon, Its Sequels, And Its Prequels
547(13)
Smith v. Van Gorkom
548(8)
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc.
556(4)
13.5 Pulling Together Unocal And Revlon
560(22)
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.
561(7)
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.
568(14)
13.6 Regulation Of Takeovers In Other Legal Systems
582(2)
13.7 Bringing Takeovers Law Down To Date
584(9)
Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan
584(6)
C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General Employees and Sanitation Employees Retirement Trust
590(3)
13.8 Protecting The Deal
593(12)
13.8.1 "No Shops/No Talks" and "Fiduciary Outs"
596(1)
13.8.2 Shareholder Lock-ups
597(8)
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.
597(8)
13.9 State Antitakeover Statutes
605(5)
13.9.1 First- and Second-Generation Antitakeover Statutes (1968-1987)
605(3)
13.9.2 Third-Generation Antitakeover Statutes
608(2)
13.10 Proxy Contests For Corporate Control
610(7)
Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.
611(6)
14 Trading In The Corporation's Securities 617(76)
14.1 Common Law Of Directors' Duties When Trading In The Corporation's Stock
617(4)
Goodwin v. Agassiz
618(3)
14.2 The Corporate Law Of Insider Trading Post-Goodwin
621(4)
Freeman v. Decio
622(3)
14.3 §16(b) And Rule 16-B Under The 1934 Act
625(2)
14.4 Exchange Act §10(b) And Rule 10b-5
627(43)
14.4.1 Evolution of Private Right of Action Under §10
628(1)
14.4.2 Elements of a 10b-5 Claim
629(1)
14.4.3 Early Rule 10b-5 Insider Trading Liability: The Equal Access Theory
630(10)
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
630(6)
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green
636(4)
14.4.4 The Equal Access Theory of Rule 10b-5 Liability
640(1)
14.4.5 Elements of 10b-5 Liability: The Fiduciary Duty Theory
641(6)
Chiarella v. United States
642(5)
14.4.6 The Problem of Tippees after Chiarella
647(13)
Dirks v. SEC
647(5)
United States v. Newman
652(8)
14.4.7 Note on Regulation FD
660(3)
14.4.8 The Introduction of the Misappropriation Theory
663(3)
United States v. O'Hagan
663(3)
14.4.9 Civil Liability, Civil Fines, and Criminal Penalties for Security Fraud Violations
666(4)
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.
667(3)
14.5 The Other Side Of 10B-5: Fraud-On-The-Market Class Actions
670(13)
14.5.1 Materiality and Reliance in FOM Class Actions
671(6)
Basic Inc. v. Levinson
671(6)
14.5.2 Loss Causation in 10b-5 Class Actions
677(3)
14.5.3 The Role of Class Certification in Recent Challenges to FOM Actions
680(3)
14.6 Insider Trading And Fom Class Actions: The Academic Policy Debates
683(10)
14.6.1 The Insider-Trading Debate
683(4)
14.6.2 The Academic Policy Debate over FOM Class Actions
687(6)
Table of Cases 693(6)
Index 699