Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

Company States Keep: International Economic Organizations and Investor Perceptions [Pehme köide]

4.00/5 (2 hinnangut Goodreads-ist)
(University of Pennsylvania)
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 248 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 229x152x15 mm, kaal: 390 g, 29 Tables, unspecified; 7 Line drawings, black and white
  • Ilmumisaeg: 28-Jul-2016
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1107566827
  • ISBN-13: 9781107566828
Teised raamatud teemal:
Company States Keep: International Economic Organizations and Investor PerceptionsSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 248 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 229x152x15 mm, kaal: 390 g, 29 Tables, unspecified; 7 Line drawings, black and white
  • Ilmumisaeg: 28-Jul-2016
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1107566827
  • ISBN-13: 9781107566828
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9781107566828.html
Märksõnad:
This book argues that investor risk in emerging markets hinges on the company a country keeps. When a country signs on to an economic agreement with states that are widely known to be stable, it looks less risky. Conversely, when a country joins a group with more unstable members, it looks more risky. Investors use the company a country keeps as a heuristic in evaluating that country's willingness to honor its sovereign debt obligations. This has important implications for the study of international cooperation as well as of sovereign risk and credibility at the domestic level.

Arvustused

'This very creative book blends two important areas in international relations: the influence of international institutions and the effects of reputation. While the former has become a crucial part of the study of international relations, the latter is still not as central to the field as it should be. This book will be important for the fields of international organization and international political economy.' Jon Pevehouse, University of Wisconsin, Madison

Muu info

This book argues that investor risk in emerging markets hinges on the company a country keeps.
List of Figures
ix
List of Tables
xi
Acknowledgments xiii
1 Introduction: The Company You Keep
1(15)
1.1 International Cooperation and Uncertainty
7(2)
1.2 Why Emerging Markets? Why Sovereign Debt?
9(4)
1.3
Chapter Outline
13(3)
2 International Institutions and Sovereign Risk
16(35)
2.1 What Markets Tell Us about Institutions, and What Institutions Tell Markets
18(6)
2.1.1 Ability and Willingness to Repay Debt
20(2)
2.1.2 Other Ways of Measuring Risk
22(2)
2.2 Theories of International Institutions
24(2)
2.3 Collective Assessments of Risk
26(7)
2.3.1 IOs and Perceptions of Ability to Service Debt
28(2)
2.3.2 Affiliations and Reputation
30(3)
2.4 A Theory of the Company States Keep
33(9)
2.4.1 Proposed Depth of Integration
36(2)
2.4.2 Reputation of Countries in the Agreement
38(4)
2.5 Alternate Hypotheses
42(8)
2.5.1 Ha1: Changes in Member-State Behavior
43(2)
2.5.2 Ha2: Selection and Endogeneity
45(2)
2.5.3 Ha3: Enforcement of Rules or Constraints on Behavior
47(3)
2.6 Conclusion
50(1)
3 The Company You Keep in Comparative Perspective
51(34)
3.1 Operationalizing Risk through Sovereign Debt
53(3)
3.1.1 Sovereign Risk of Members of Regional Agreements
55(1)
3.2 Key Explanatory Variables
56(4)
3.3 Testing of Central Hypothesis (H1): The Company You Keep
60(8)
3.3.1 Empirical Results for the Company You Keep (H1)
62(6)
3.4 Robustness and Rival Explanations
68(10)
3.4.1 Test of Changes in Behavior (Ha1)
69(2)
3.4.2 Test of Endogeneity (Ha2)
71(2)
3.4.3 Test of Enforcement (Ha3)
73(5)
3.5 Conclusion
78(3)
3.6 Appendix
81(4)
4 The Effects of Good Company
85(39)
4.1 Investor Risk and EU Enlargement
87(2)
4.2 Data Analysis: Aggregate Effects of the EU as Good Company
89(3)
4.3 Evidence for the Company You Keep (H1)
92(4)
4.4 Effects for Postcommunist Countries
96(23)
4.4.1 Test of Ha1 -- Policy Reform
99(2)
4.4.2 Test of Ha2 -- Selection
101(6)
4.4.3 Test of Mechanism Underlying H1: The Company You Keep
107(4)
4.4.4 Examination of Ha3: Enforcement
111(8)
4.5 Conditions without Membership: The European Neighborhood Policy
119(2)
4.6 Conclusion
121(3)
5 When Emerging Markets Join Up with Bad Company
124(38)
5.0.1 Event Studies and Uncertainty
127(2)
5.1 Defaults and Bad Company in Latin America
129(16)
5.1.1 Investor Perceptions of Chavez's Bolivarian Revolution
130(15)
5.2 Perceptions of Russia and the Eurasian Union
145(8)
5.2.1 A New Customs Union and a Planned Eurasian Union
147(6)
5.3 When Countries Leave a "Bad Company" Organization
153(4)
5.4 Increases in Uncertainty: China's Reach into Emerging Markets
157(3)
5.5 Conclusion
160(2)
6 How Risk for Core Members Changes on IO Expansion
162(27)
6.1 Investor Risk to Core Members: Germany and EU Accession
164(9)
6.2 Mercosur: Contagion, Can't Pay, and Won't Pay
173(9)
6.2.1 Possible Contagion Effects: Ability to Pay
175(2)
6.2.2 Uruguay's Debt Restructuring
177(2)
6.2.3 Mercosur's Ideological Orientation: Willingness to Pay
179(3)
6.3 When New Members Change the Brand of the Organization
182(5)
6.3.1 Attenuated Effects in Current Enlargement Negotiations
183(2)
6.3.2 Turkey's EU Candidacy
185(2)
6.4 Conclusion
187(2)
7 Conclusion
189(12)
7.1 Implications
192(9)
Bibliography 201(24)
Index 225
Julia Gray is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Her work in international political economy and international organization has appeared or is forthcoming in the American Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, International Studies Quarterly, the European Journal of Political Research, Political Science Research Methods and the Review of International Organizations. Prior to her career in academia, she worked for four years as a journalist and editor in Prague and Budapest.