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Composition of Secure Multi-Party Protocols: A Comprehensive Study 2003 ed. [Pehme köide]

  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 200 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, kaal: 690 g, XVI, 200 p., 1 Paperback / softback
  • Sari: Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2815
  • Ilmumisaeg: 08-Sep-2003
  • Kirjastus: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
  • ISBN-10: 354020105X
  • ISBN-13: 9783540201052
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Composition of Secure Multi-Party Protocols: A Comprehensive Study 2003 ed.Suurem pilt
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 200 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, kaal: 690 g, XVI, 200 p., 1 Paperback / softback
  • Sari: Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2815
  • Ilmumisaeg: 08-Sep-2003
  • Kirjastus: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
  • ISBN-10: 354020105X
  • ISBN-13: 9783540201052
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9783540201052.html
Märksõnad:

In the setting of multi-party computation, sets of two or more parties with private inputs wish to jointly compute some (predetermined) function of their inputs. General results concerning secure two-party or multi-party computation were first announced in the 1980s. Put briefly, these results assert that under certain assumptions one can construct protocols for securely computing any desired multi-party functionality. However, this research relates only to a setting where a single protocol execution is carried out. In contrast, in modern networks, many different protocol executions are run at the same time.

This book is devoted to the general and systematic study of secure multi-party computation under composition. Despite its emphasis on a theoretically well-founded treatment of the subject, general techniques for designing secure protocols are developed that may even result in schemes or modules to be incorporated in practical systems. The book clarifies fundamental issues regarding security in a multi-execution environment and gives a comprehensive and unique treatment of the composition of secure multi-party protocols.

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Springer Book Archives
Foreword vii
Preface xi
1. Introduction 1(20)
1.1 Secure Multi-party Computation
1(7)
1.2 Protocol Composition
8(7)
1.2.1 Types of Protocol Composition
8(2)
1.2.2 Feasibility of Security under Composition
10(5)
1.3 Our Results
15(6)
1.3.1 The Composition of Authenticated Byzantine Agreement
16(2)
1.3.2 Secure Computation without Agreement
18(1)
1.3.3 Universally Composable Multi-party Computation
18(3)
2. The Composition of Authenticated Byzantine Agreement 21(24)
2.1 Introduction
21(4)
2.2 Definitions
25(4)
2.2.1 Computational Model
25(1)
2.2.2 Byzantine Generals/Agreement
26(1)
2.2.3 Composition of Protocols
27(2)
2.3 Impossibility for Parallel Composition
29(6)
2.4 Sequential Composition of Deterministic Protocols
35(3)
2.5 Authenticated Byzantine Agreement Using Unique Identifiers
38(7)
3. Secure Computation without Agreement 45(36)
3.1 Introduction
46(7)
3.1.1 Byzantine Agreement and Secure Multi-party Computation
46(1)
3.1.2 Our Results
47(4)
3.1.3 Related Work
51(2)
3.2 Definitions - Secure Computation
53(8)
3.2.1 Execution in the Ideal Model
54(4)
3.2.2 Execution in the Real Model
58(2)
3.2.3 Security as Emulation of a Real Execution in the Ideal Model
60(1)
3.3 Broadcast with Abort
61(1)
3.3.1 Strengthening Broadcast with Abort
62(1)
3.4 Secure Computation with Abort and No Fairness
62(10)
3.5 Secure Computation with Abort and Partial Fairness
72(5)
3.6 Obtaining Security under Self Composition
77(4)
4. Universally Composable Multi-party Computation 81(104)
4.1 Introduction
81(3)
4.2 Overview
84(9)
4.2.1 The Model
84(2)
4.2.2 An Outline of the Results and Techniques
86(7)
4.3 Preliminaries
93(15)
4.3.1 Universally Composable Security: The General Framework
93(9)
4.3.2 Universal Composition with Joint State
102(4)
4.3.3 Well-Formed Functionalities
106(2)
4.4 Two-Party Secure Computation for Semi-honest Adversaries
108(20)
4.4.1 Universally Composable Oblivious Transfer
108(8)
4.4.2 The General Construction
116(12)
4.5 Universally Composable Commitments
128(13)
4.6 Universally Composable Zero-Knowledge
141(2)
4.7 The Commit-and-Prove Functionality FCP
143(12)
4.7.1 UC Realizing FCP for Static Adversaries
144(5)
4.7.2 UC Realizing FCP for Adaptive Adversaries
149(6)
4.8 Two-Party Secure Computation for Malicious Adversaries
155(7)
4.8.1 The Protocol Compiler
155(6)
4.8.2 Conclusions
161(1)
4.9 Multi-party Secure Computation
162(23)
4.9.1 Multi-party Secure Computation for Semi-honest Adversaries
163(6)
4.9.2 Authenticated Broadcast
169(3)
4.9.3 One-to-Many Extensions of FMCOM, FZK, and FCP
172(7)
4.9.4 Multi-party Secure Computation for Malicious Adversaries
179(6)
References 185(6)
Index 191