| Foreword |
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| Acknowledgements |
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vii | |
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xv | |
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xxxiii | |
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1 | (12) |
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3 | (1) |
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4 | (2) |
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6 | (1) |
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7 | (6) |
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2 Attribution as Allocated and Delegated Powers |
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13 | (38) |
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I Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission |
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14 | (8) |
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A `Directing Mind and Will' |
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14 | (3) |
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B The Idea of Attribution |
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17 | (2) |
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C Meridian's Impact: Context-Specificity |
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19 | (3) |
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II Problems with Existing Approaches |
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22 | (6) |
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22 | (3) |
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B Unnecessary Controversy |
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25 | (1) |
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C Inconsistency and Self-Contradiction |
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26 | (2) |
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28 | (1) |
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III A Fictional View of Attribution |
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28 | (3) |
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IV A Non-Fictional Account of Attribution |
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31 | (8) |
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31 | (1) |
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B The Importance of the Company's Powers |
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32 | (2) |
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C The Source of the Company's Powers: The Constitution |
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34 | (1) |
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D Allocation and Delegation of the Company's Powers |
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35 | (2) |
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E Consistency with Meridian |
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37 | (2) |
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39 | (5) |
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39 | (1) |
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B Allocation and Delegation |
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40 | (2) |
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42 | (1) |
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43 | (1) |
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VI Attribution as Identifying Intentional Acts |
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44 | (4) |
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45 | (1) |
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B Companies as Group Agents |
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46 | (2) |
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48 | (3) |
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3 Attribution of Acts in Contract |
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51 | (38) |
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51 | (9) |
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A Contracting by Subordinate Agents |
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52 | (2) |
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B Contracting by the Board of Directors or Shareholders in General Meeting |
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54 | (1) |
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C Problems with Applying Agency Analysis to the Board or General Meeting |
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55 | (1) |
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56 | (1) |
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ii The Process of Incorporation |
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56 | (1) |
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iii Individual Members as Agents |
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57 | (1) |
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iv Fiduciary Duties and Other Incidents of Agency |
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58 | (2) |
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II Contracting by the Board or Shareholders in General Meeting |
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60 | (14) |
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A The Ultra Vires Doctrine and the Company's Powers |
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61 | (1) |
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B Identifying the Company's Powers to Contract |
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62 | (2) |
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C Allocating the Company's Powers to Contract |
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64 | (2) |
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66 | (1) |
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67 | (1) |
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68 | (2) |
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70 | (3) |
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73 | (1) |
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III Contracting by Subordinate Agents |
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74 | (7) |
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74 | (1) |
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B Delegation of Powers: Actual Authority |
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74 | (1) |
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75 | (2) |
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D Good Faith and Proper Purposes |
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77 | (1) |
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i Good Faith and Proper Purposes |
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77 | (3) |
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ii Breaches of Other Duties |
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80 | (1) |
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81 | (2) |
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V Attribution and Other Routes to Liability |
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83 | (5) |
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83 | (2) |
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85 | (1) |
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86 | (2) |
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88 | (1) |
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4 Attributing Acts in Tort |
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89 | (32) |
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I `Vicarious Liability' and Other Doctrines |
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90 | (4) |
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90 | (2) |
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92 | (1) |
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93 | (1) |
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II The Conceptual Basis of Vicarious Liability |
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94 | (2) |
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94 | (1) |
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95 | (1) |
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96 | (8) |
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A Employee Owes a Duty to Victim; Employer Does Not |
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96 | (3) |
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B Employee Has a Personal Defence; Employer Does Not |
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99 | (2) |
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C Employer Has a Defence; Employee Does Not |
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101 | (2) |
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D Contributory Negligence and Contribution |
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103 | (1) |
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IV 1956 and after: Development of Servant's Tort Theory |
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104 | (6) |
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104 | (2) |
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B Evidence for the Servant's Tort Theory |
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106 | (1) |
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i Reasoning of Courts after Lister |
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106 | (2) |
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ii Cases where Employee Owes a Duty, Employer Does Not |
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108 | (1) |
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iii Cases where Employer Owes a Duty, Employee Does Not |
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109 | (1) |
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V The Attribution of Acts after 1956 |
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110 | (3) |
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A Employer Owes Duty but Employee Does Not |
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110 | (2) |
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B Employer Breaches Duty but Employee Does Not |
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112 | (1) |
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C Employer Has No Defence, but Employee Does |
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112 | (1) |
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VI When are Acts Attributed? |
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113 | (7) |
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A Ultra Vires: The Company's Powers |
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113 | (1) |
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B Qualifying Relationships: Allocation and Delegation |
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114 | (2) |
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C The Course of Employment: Scope |
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116 | (2) |
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D The Course of Employment: Proper Exercise? |
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118 | (2) |
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120 | (1) |
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5 Attributing Acts in Unjust Enrichment |
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121 | (29) |
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122 | (3) |
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II Attribution Rules in Unjust Enrichment Claims |
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125 | (6) |
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A Directing Mind and Will |
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125 | (1) |
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B Meridian's Special Rules |
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125 | (1) |
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126 | (1) |
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D Rules Wider than Agency? |
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127 | (1) |
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i Payment Made in Good Faith on Principal's Behalf |
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127 | (1) |
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128 | (1) |
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iii Some Legitimate Role in Transaction |
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129 | (2) |
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131 | (6) |
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131 | (2) |
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B Scope: Which Acts of Payment? |
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133 | (3) |
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136 | (1) |
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IV Induced Mistakes: Representations |
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137 | (4) |
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A Watts and Tompkins' Arguments |
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138 | (1) |
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139 | (2) |
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141 | (4) |
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142 | (1) |
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B Scope: When Will Receipt be Attributed? |
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143 | (1) |
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144 | (1) |
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VI Reasons in Favour of Consistency |
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145 | (3) |
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A Inconsistency within a Single Unjust Enrichment Claim |
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146 | (1) |
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B Inconsistency between Claims where There is a Contract and Those Without |
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146 | (1) |
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C Inconsistency between Unjust Enrichment Claims and Other Private Law Claims |
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147 | (1) |
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148 | (2) |
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150 | (27) |
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151 | (4) |
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A Directing Mind and Will |
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151 | (1) |
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152 | (1) |
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C Meridian: Purpose of the Substantive Rule |
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153 | (2) |
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155 | (4) |
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155 | (2) |
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157 | (2) |
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159 | (3) |
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A The Company's Controller or Chief Moving Force |
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159 | (1) |
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160 | (1) |
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161 | (1) |
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161 | (1) |
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162 | (1) |
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162 | (12) |
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162 | (4) |
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166 | (3) |
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169 | (3) |
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172 | (2) |
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174 | (3) |
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PART III DIFFICULT PROBLEMS |
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7 Attribution in Enforcing Duties |
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177 | (26) |
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178 | (5) |
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178 | (2) |
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180 | (2) |
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182 | (1) |
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II When and Why is Attribution Unavailable? |
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183 | (4) |
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184 | (1) |
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B `Denuding the Duty of Value' |
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185 | (2) |
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187 | (2) |
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187 | (1) |
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188 | (1) |
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IV The Effect of Attribution |
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189 | (5) |
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A Effects of Attributing Acts |
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189 | (1) |
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i Contributory Negligence |
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189 | (1) |
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ii Contribution and Indemnity |
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190 | (1) |
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191 | (1) |
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B Effects of Attributing Knowledge |
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192 | (1) |
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192 | (1) |
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193 | (1) |
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iii Estoppel by Acquiescence |
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193 | (1) |
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194 | (4) |
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195 | (1) |
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B The Range of Factors Approach |
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196 | (1) |
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C The Modified Reliance Test |
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197 | (1) |
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VI Applying the Analysis to Stone & Rolls, Bilta, and Singularis |
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198 | (3) |
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199 | (1) |
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200 | (1) |
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201 | (1) |
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201 | (2) |
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203 | (20) |
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I Connecting Act and Knowledge |
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204 | (6) |
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204 | (1) |
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B Suggestions of a Wider Approach |
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205 | (3) |
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C The Return of a Connection between Act and Knowledge |
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208 | (2) |
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II The `Knowing and Intending' Test |
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210 | (11) |
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A Fraudulent Misrepresentations |
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211 | (5) |
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216 | (1) |
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217 | (4) |
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III Aggregation's Importance |
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221 | (1) |
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222 | (1) |
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223 | (10) |
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223 | (1) |
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II The Account, Illustrated |
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224 | (2) |
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226 | (6) |
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A Corporate Attribution in Criminal Law |
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226 | (4) |
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B Implications for Attribution to Other Artificial Legal Persons |
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230 | (2) |
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IV Tying the Threads Together |
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232 | (1) |
| Bibliography |
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233 | (8) |
| Index |
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241 | |