| Preface |
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vii | |
| Acknowledgements |
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ix | |
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xv | |
| References to judicial and Policy Guiding Documents in Mainland China (Bilingual) |
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xvii | |
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xxi | |
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xxiii | |
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xxv | |
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Table of Legislation and Other Materials |
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xxxi | |
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1 Introduction and Theoretical Framework |
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1 | (32) |
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1 | (7) |
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1.2 Restructuring Models in Anglo-America and Asia |
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8 | (4) |
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1.2.1 The US Pure Debtor in Possession Regime |
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8 | (1) |
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1.2.2 The Three UK Models |
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9 | (1) |
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1.2.3 Transplanting US/UK Restructuring Concepts in Asia |
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10 | (2) |
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1.3 Understanding the Interaction between Corporate Governance and Restructuring Law |
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12 | (5) |
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1.4 Building an Analytical Framework |
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17 | (5) |
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1.4.1 Management--Creditor and Shareholder--Creditor Conflicts |
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18 | (1) |
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1.4.2 Creditor--Creditor Conflicts |
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18 | (1) |
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1.4.3 Non-Performing Loans Management |
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19 | (2) |
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21 | (1) |
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1.4.5 Non-Bankruptcy Rules on Enforcing Contracts and Directors' Duties |
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21 | (1) |
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22 | (9) |
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1.5.1 Distinction between Deployment and Distribution |
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22 | (1) |
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1.5.2 Court Restructurings of Large Companies |
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23 | (1) |
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1.5.3 Choice of Asian Jurisdictions |
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24 | (2) |
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1.5.4 Framework of the Book |
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26 | (5) |
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1.6 Organisation of the Book |
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31 | (2) |
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2 Development of Corporate Restructuring Law in Four Asian Jurisdictions |
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33 | (24) |
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33 | (2) |
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2.2 Emerging Jurisdictions |
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35 | (9) |
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36 | (3) |
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39 | (5) |
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2.3 Advanced Jurisdictions |
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44 | (11) |
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44 | (7) |
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51 | (4) |
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55 | (2) |
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3 The Agency Costs of Manager-Creditor and Shareholder--Creditor Relationships in Restructuring |
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57 | (44) |
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57 | (3) |
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3.2 Institutional and Organisational Background |
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60 | (6) |
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60 | (1) |
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61 | (5) |
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3.3 Strategies to Deal with Agency Costs of Manager-Creditor and Shareholder--Creditor Conflicts in Anglo-American Restructurings |
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66 | (7) |
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3.3.1 The Hold-Out Problem |
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66 | (4) |
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3.3.2 Heightened Friction between Creditors and Shareholders |
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70 | (3) |
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3.4 Addressing Information Asymmetry and Hold-Out Problems in Asian Restructurings |
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73 | (20) |
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3.4.1 Process of Bargaining: Mandatory Disclosure Regime |
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73 | (2) |
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3.4.2 Distribution of Proceeds of Restructuring and the APR in Asia |
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75 | (10) |
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3.4.3 Heightened Conflicts in Asian Restructurings |
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85 | (8) |
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3.5 Enhancing the Restructuring Regime: Lessons and Implications |
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93 | (6) |
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3.5.1 No One-Size-Fits-All Rule for APR and Cram-Down |
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94 | (1) |
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3.5.2 The Example of Corporate Governance |
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94 | (5) |
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99 | (2) |
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4 The Agency and Coordination Costs of Creditor--Creditor Relationships in Restructuring |
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101 | (51) |
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101 | (2) |
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4.2 Institutional and Organisational Background |
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103 | (11) |
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103 | (2) |
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105 | (8) |
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4.2.3 Distressed Debt and Loan Markets |
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113 | (1) |
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4.3 Strategies to Deal with Agency and Coordination Costs of Creditor-Creditor Conflicts in Anglo-American Restructurings |
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114 | (10) |
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4.3.1 The Deployment Question |
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115 | (3) |
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4.3.2 The Distribution Question |
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118 | (3) |
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4.3.3 Creditor Protection in Cram-Downs |
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121 | (2) |
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4.3.4 Existing Bank Creditor Providing New Finance |
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123 | (1) |
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4.4 The Features of Asian Restructurings |
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124 | (19) |
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4.4.1 The Deployment Question |
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124 | (7) |
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4.4.2 Distribution of Assets |
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131 | (12) |
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4.5 Enhancing the Restructuring Regime in Asia: Lessons and Implications |
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143 | (7) |
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4.5.1 The Advantages and Limits of the APR and Equal Treatment |
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143 | (3) |
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4.5.2 Reducing the Costs of Negotiation Among Creditors |
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146 | (2) |
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4.5.3 Recent Developments in Onshore and Offshore Restructuring |
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148 | (2) |
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150 | (2) |
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5 Managing Non-Performing Loans and their Impact on Agency and Coordination Costs in Two Emerging Jurisdictions |
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152 | (36) |
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152 | (2) |
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5.2 Institutional and Organisational Background in the International Context for Resolving NPLs |
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154 | (2) |
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5.2.1 AMCs as Debt Aggregation Vehicles |
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154 | (1) |
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5.2.2 Developing the Market for Distressed Assets |
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155 | (1) |
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5.3 Institutional Background to NPLs in India and Mainland China |
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156 | (5) |
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156 | (4) |
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160 | (1) |
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5.4 AMCs and Variations to Agency and Coordination Costs in Restructuring |
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161 | (20) |
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162 | (9) |
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171 | (6) |
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5.4.3 Variations to the Agency Costs of CAMCs in China |
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177 | (4) |
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5.5 Developing Active Distressed Loan Markets in India and Mainland China |
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181 | (4) |
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181 | (2) |
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183 | (2) |
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5.6 Conclusion, Lessons and Implications for Managing NPLs |
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185 | (2) |
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5.6.1 Incentivising CAMCs/ARCs |
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186 | (1) |
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5.6.2 Future of the CAMC/ARC Model and Distressed Loan Markets |
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187 | (1) |
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187 | (1) |
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6 Insolvency Practitioners as Gatekeeper Intermediaries |
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188 | (29) |
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188 | (3) |
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6.2 Role of Insolvency Practitioners: A Comparative Perspective |
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191 | (10) |
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191 | (8) |
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6.2.2 Schemes of Arrangement with Insolvency Practitioner Having a Statutory or an Intermediary Role |
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199 | (2) |
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6.3 The Governance of Intermediaries: Accountability, Conflicts of Interest and Effectiveness |
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201 | (9) |
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6.3.1 Appointment and Accountability |
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202 | (2) |
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204 | (2) |
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6.3.3 Conflicts of Interest |
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206 | (1) |
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6.3.4 Effectiveness of the Insolvency Practitioner |
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207 | (3) |
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6.4 Lessons, Implications and Options for Reform in Asian Jurisdictions |
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210 | (5) |
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6.4.1 Reconceptualising the Role of the Insolvency Practitioner |
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210 | (3) |
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6.4.2 Reforms Addressing the Insolvency Practitioner's Conflicts of Interest |
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213 | (2) |
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215 | (2) |
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7 Role of the Courts in Court-Supervised Restructurings |
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217 | (36) |
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217 | (3) |
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7.2 Legislative Framework and Judicial Discretion in the US and the UK: Strengths and Limitations |
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220 | (7) |
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220 | (3) |
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7.2.2 Plan Confirmation or Sanction of the Scheme of Arrangement |
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223 | (3) |
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226 | (1) |
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7.3 Legislative Framework and Judicial Discretion in Asia |
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227 | (11) |
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7.3.1 Moratorium and Conditions |
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228 | (6) |
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7.3.2 Sanction of the Scheme |
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234 | (2) |
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236 | (2) |
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7.4 Lessons and Implications |
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238 | (7) |
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7.4.1 Leeway to Debtor's Management |
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239 | (1) |
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7.4.2 Cram-Down of Dissenting Creditors and Valuation |
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240 | (1) |
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241 | (1) |
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7.4.4 The Choice and Objectives of Regulation |
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242 | (3) |
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7.5 The Experience of Mainland China |
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245 | (6) |
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7.5.1 Improving Certainty and Predictability of Plan Approval through Judicial Pronouncements |
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247 | (1) |
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7.5.2 Addressing the Length of Time in Restructuring and Moratorium |
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248 | (2) |
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7.5.3 Analysis and the Future of Pre-Packs |
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250 | (1) |
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251 | (2) |
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8 Relationship between Restructuring Law, Enforcing Contracts and Directors' Duties |
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253 | (22) |
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253 | (2) |
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8.2 Impact of Enforcing Creditor Rights on Restructuring Law |
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255 | (13) |
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8.2.1 Enforcement of Debts and Resolving Insolvency |
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255 | (2) |
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8.2.2 Usage of Formal Insolvency and Restructuring Law |
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257 | (11) |
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268 | (1) |
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8.4 Directors' Duties and Incentives to Invoke or Use Restructuring Law |
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269 | (5) |
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8.4.1 Why should Incentives to Commence Insolvency Proceedings Matter? |
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269 | (2) |
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271 | (3) |
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274 | (1) |
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9 Restructuring Law, Implications for Reform and Conclusion |
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275 | (19) |
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275 | (1) |
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9.2 Seven Propositions in this Book |
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276 | (9) |
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9.3 Future Prospects for Reform in the Asian Jurisdictions |
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285 | (7) |
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285 | (2) |
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287 | (2) |
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289 | (2) |
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291 | (1) |
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292 | (2) |
| Appendices |
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294 | (8) |
| Bibliography |
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302 | (17) |
| Index |
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319 | |