The 2022 National Defense Strategy calls for "integrated deterrence" in how the United States postures its cyberspace forces to address the strategic challenges posed by revisionist powers--in this case China. An integrated deterrence strategy entails combining cyber operations with other warfighting domains to reduce a competitor's perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraints. Such a strategy also represents a departure from the current U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) focus on technical operations in the cyber domain. The authors begin with an examination of various theories of international relations to highlight a variety of views on U.S.-China competition. They then apply the concept of selective overmatch to reevaluate current U.S. cyber operations in light of competition and possible conflict with China. Because the United States cannot maintain superiority in all aspects of cyber operations equally, it must selectively create advantage over China by targeting influence points--elements of the adversary's political, economic, or societal strength--that will most likely achieve U.S. objectives. By identifying the key influence points for China and the United States and the actions that might be taken against them, the authors explore selective overmatch as a framework for categorizing and assessing vulnerabilities in the Chinese and U.S. cyber domains, as well as for expanding the capabilities of cyber operations, integrating deterrence, and sustaining U.S. primacy. Selective overmatch, properly understood and applied, can provide a roadmap for CYBERCOM's future operations.
The authors apply the concept of selective overmatch to reevaluate current U.S. cyber operations in light of competition and possible conflict with China and show how this framework can provide a roadmap for U.S. Cyber Command’s future operations.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy calls for “integrated deterrence” in how the U.S. military uses its cyberspace forces to address the strategic challenges posed by revisionist powers, such as China. The authors apply the concept of selective overmatch to reevaluate current U.S. cyber operations in light of competition and possible conflict with China and show how this framework can provide a roadmap for U.S. Cyber Command’s future operations.
