| Preface |
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iii | |
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ix | |
| Summary |
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xi | |
| Acknowledgments |
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xxiii | |
| Abbreviations |
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xxv | |
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1 | (18) |
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2 | (3) |
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Mutual Mistrust Is Likely to Characterize a Cybercrisis |
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5 | (5) |
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States May Have Room for Maneuver in a Cybercrisis |
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10 | (6) |
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16 | (1) |
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17 | (2) |
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Chapter Two Avoiding Crises by Creating Norms |
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19 | (20) |
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What Kind of Norms Might Be Useful? |
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20 | (1) |
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Enforce Laws Against Hacking |
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20 | (2) |
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Dissociate from Freelance Hackers |
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22 | (1) |
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Discourage Commercial Espionage |
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23 | (1) |
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Be Careful About the Obligation to Suppress Cybertraffic |
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24 | (1) |
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24 | (2) |
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Confidence-Building Measures |
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26 | (2) |
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Norms for Victims of Cyberattacks |
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28 | (1) |
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29 | (1) |
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30 | (1) |
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Military Necessity and Collateral Damage |
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31 | (2) |
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33 | (2) |
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35 | (1) |
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36 | (3) |
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Chapter Three Narratives, Dialogue, and Signals |
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39 | (34) |
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Narratives to Promote Control |
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40 | (1) |
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A Narrative Framework for Cyberspace |
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41 | (3) |
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Victimization, Attribution, Retaliation, and Aggression |
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44 | (1) |
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45 | (1) |
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46 | (1) |
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47 | (2) |
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49 | (1) |
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Emollients: Narratives to Walk Back a Crisis |
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50 | (1) |
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51 | (3) |
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"Well, At Least Not on Our Orders" |
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54 | (3) |
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57 | (1) |
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58 | (2) |
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"At Least It Does Not Portend Anything" |
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60 | (1) |
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61 | (1) |
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62 | (3) |
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65 | (2) |
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67 | (2) |
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Signaling That Cybercombat Is Not Kinetic Combat |
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69 | (1) |
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70 | (3) |
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Chapter Four Escalation Management |
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73 | (50) |
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74 | (2) |
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76 | (2) |
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78 | (1) |
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Escalation Risks in Phase 0 |
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78 | (2) |
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Escalation Risks for Contained Local Conflicts |
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80 | (1) |
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Escalation Risks for Uncontained Conflicts |
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81 | (3) |
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Managing Proxy Cyberattacks |
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84 | (1) |
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What Hidden Combatants Imply for Horizontal Escalation |
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84 | (4) |
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Managing Overt Proxy Conflict |
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88 | (1) |
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The Difficulties of Tit-for-Tat Management |
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89 | (1) |
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The Importance of Preplanning |
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90 | (1) |
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Disjunctions Among Effort, Effect, and Perception |
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91 | (2) |
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93 | (4) |
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Escalation into Kinetic Warfare |
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97 | (2) |
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Escalation into Economic Warfare |
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99 | (4) |
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103 | (3) |
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Managing the Third-Party Problem |
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106 | (2) |
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The Need for a Clean Shot |
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108 | (2) |
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110 | (4) |
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114 | (1) |
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114 | (3) |
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117 | (3) |
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120 | (3) |
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Chapter Five Implications for Strategic Stability |
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123 | (24) |
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Translating Sources of Cold War Instability to Cyberspace |
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123 | (1) |
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What Influence Can Cyberwar Have If Nuclear Weapons Exist? |
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124 | (1) |
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Can a Cyberattack Disarm a Target State's Nuclear Capabilities? |
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125 | (1) |
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Can a Cyberattack Disarm a Target State's Cyberwarriors? |
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126 | (3) |
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Does Cyberwar Lend Itself to Alert-Reaction Cycles? |
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129 | (1) |
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Are Cyberdefenses Inherently Destabilizing? |
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129 | (1) |
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Would a Cyberspace Arms Race Be Destabilizing? |
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130 | (3) |
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Surprise Attack as a Source of Instability |
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133 | (2) |
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Misperception as a Source of Crisis |
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135 | (1) |
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One Side Takes Great Exception to Cyberespionage |
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136 | (1) |
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Defenses Are Misinterpreted as Preparations for War |
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136 | (2) |
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Too Much Confidence in Attribution |
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138 | (1) |
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Too Much Confidence in or Fear of Preemption |
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139 | (2) |
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Supposedly Risk-Free Cyberattacks |
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141 | (2) |
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143 | (1) |
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144 | (3) |
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Chapter Six Can Cybercrises Be Managed? |
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147 | (4) |
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A Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks |
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151 | (4) |
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B Overt, Obvious, and Covert Cyberattacks and Responses |
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155 | (4) |
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C Can Good Cyberdefenses Discourage Attacks? |
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159 | (4) |
| Bibliography |
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163 | |
