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Defense Spending, Natural Resources, and Conflict [Kõva köide]

Edited by (American University in Cairo, Egypt), Edited by (University of Thessaly, Greece)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 136 pages, kõrgus x laius: 246x174 mm, kaal: 408 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 24-Jul-2015
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 1138933473
  • ISBN-13: 9781138933477
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • Formaat: Hardback, 136 pages, kõrgus x laius: 246x174 mm, kaal: 408 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 24-Jul-2015
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 1138933473
  • ISBN-13: 9781138933477
Teised raamatud teemal:

This book is an intellectual contribution of policy scientists and researchers from different academic institutions in different parts of the world. The Arab Spring, the rise of ISIS and terrorism ignite the debate on studying conflict and natural resources. Uniquely, the book discusses the sources of the conflicts and the institutions that are managing the conflicts. The natural resources, defense spending, conflict and human welfare are intertwined. In support of the ‘resource curse’ hypothesis, the book shows that an abundance of natural resources, particularly oil, encourages an increase in military spending and lower economic growth. In addition, the good economic and political institutions do reduce the hazard of conflict; and strong political institutions for checks and balances appear to weaken the impact of natural resources on conflicts.

The book also examines the relationship between defense and social welfare expenditures – specifically, health and education. Shedding light on the complicated nature of the relationship between defense spending, inequality, and types of political and welfare regimes gives us a deeper understanding of the type of democratic systems that will likely improve social welfare. In studying the political economy of defense spending, the book shows the link between public opinion toward defense spending and voters' support for candidates. The analysis shows that party identification or having a vested interest in defense industries do correlate with a preference for increasing defense spending.

This book was published as a special issue of Defence and Peace Economics.

Citation Information vii
Notes on contributors ix
1 Introduction: Defense spending, natural resources, and conflict
1(4)
Hamid E. Ali
2 Military Expenditures and Natural Resources: Evidence from rentier states in the Middle East and North Africa
5(10)
Hamid E. Ali
Omnia A. Abdellatif
3 Military Expenditure, Economic Growth and Heterogeneity
15(18)
J. Paul Dunne
Nan Tian
4 Does Military Spending Crowd Out Social Welfare Expenditures? Evidence from a panel of OECD countries
33(16)
Eric S. Lin
Hamid E. Ali
Yu-Lung Lu
5 Military Expenditures, Income Inequality, Welfare and Political Regimes: A dynamic panel data analysis
49(26)
Unal Tongur
Adem Y. Elveren
6 The Shifting Determinants of Defense Spending Preferences between 1980 And 2008
75(14)
Sencer Ecer
Nicholas J. Veasey
7 Resource Rents, Institutions, and Violent Civil Conflicts
89(26)
Ibrahim Ahmed Elbadawi
Raimundo Soto
8 Resource Dependence and Armed Violence: Impact on sustainability in developing countries
115(18)
Gilles Carbonnier
Natascha Wagner
Index 133
Christos Kollias is Professor of Applied Economics at the University of Thessaly, Department of Economics, Greece. He is also Editor of Defence and Peace Economics, External Research Associate of the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, Member of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Economic Sciences and Applied Research, co-edits the book series Science & Society (in Greek).



Hamid E. Ali is Associate Professor of Economics and Public Policy, The American University in Cairo, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy. He formerly taught at Southern Methodist University and Texas State University, USA. He was an auditor for the US Government Accountability Office and served on the editorial boards of many academic journals. He authored the book Darfur Political Economy: A Quest for Development by Routledge.