This volume presents new perspectives on the metaphilosophical view of equilibrism. It features original contributions from leading epistemologists who specialize in metaphilosophical issues.
This volume presents new perspectives on the metaphilosophical view of equilibrism. It features original contributions from leading epistemologists who specialize in metaphilosophical issues.
Philosophers have always been interested in the true nature and ultimate goals of their own enterprise. Equilibrism is a new and increasingly popular metaphilosophical vision that offers an alternative to views that are intoxicatingly optimistic or depressingly pessimistic about the purpose of philosophy. According to equilibrism, philosophers are to develop theories that are in harmony or equilibrium with their own pre-philosophical convictions. Collectively, philosophy aims at populating the logical space with consistent philosophical theories, or stable equilibria. The chapters in this volume address, among others, the following questions: Can we really settle for a more modest goal than the intellectual maintenance of our respective philosophical beliefs (equilibria)? Does the intellectual maintenance of our own equilibria really entitle us to rationally hold on to their truth? If we are sympathetic to equilibrism, what doxastic attitude should we adopt towards the propositions featuring in the equilibria we develop? Are all our beliefs that we have turned into an equilibrium equally firm? To what extent should we care about or respect our commonsensical opinions in philosophical theorizing?
Equilibrism in Metaphilosophy will appeal to scholars and graduate students interested in metaphilosophy, the epistemology of philosophy, philosophical methodology, the ethics of belief, and metaphilosophical skepticism.
Introduction: What is Metaphilosophical Equilibrism? László Kocsis and
János Tzsér PART I. Disagreement
1. Equilibrism and the Argument from
Disagreement Insa Lawler
2. The Metaphilosophical Problem of the Criterion,
Equilibrism, and the Problem of Disappointment Scott Aikin
3. A New
Disagreement Challenge: Deep Disagreements and Philosophy Victoria Lavorerio
4. Philosophy and the Egocentric Perspective Richard Fumerton PART II.
Beliefs
5. Knockdown Arguments for Philosophically Substantive Conclusions
Bryan Frances
6. Pyrrhonian Equilibrism László Bernáth and János Tzsér
7.
Pragmatism about Philosophical Belief Chris Ranalli
8. Ontology and
Acceptance Ted Parent
9. The Instability of Equilibrism and the Need for
Support Tamás Paár PART III. Commonsense
10. Wittgensteins Commonsense
Radicalism Duncan Pritchard
11. Philosophy and Common-Sense Noah Lemos
12.
Balancing Beliefs: Lewis on the Role of Commonsense in Philosophical
Theorizing László Kocsis Part IV. Perspectives
13. What is Philosophical
Progress? An Equilibrium-based Pluralist Account Jie Gao
14. Overfitting or
Extensional Adequacy? The Case of Morally Pregnant Cases in Epistemology Mona
Simion and Harmen Ghijsen
15. Equilibrism and Ethics Folke Tersman
16.
Metaequilibrism: Embracing a Diversity of Aims for Philosophy Graham
Bex-Priestley.
László Kocsis is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pecs, Pecs, Hungary. His research interests lie in analytic metaphysics, philosophy of science, history of analytic philosophy, epistemology, and theories of truth. He is the coeditor of Wilfrid Sellarss Metaphilosophy: Two Images and the Philosophy in Between (Bloomsbury, 2026). János Tzsér is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, Research Centre for the Humanities in Budapest, Hungary. His main research interests include philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphilosophy. He is the author of The Failure of Philosophical Knowledge (Bloomsbury, 2023).
