Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

Ethics of Capital Punishment: A Philosophical Investigation of Evil and its Consequences [Pehme köide]

3.75/5 (4 hinnangut Goodreads-ist)
(Professor of Legal & Political Philosophy, University of Cambridge)
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 368 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 236x156x20 mm, kaal: 532 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 30-Jan-2014
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0199642192
  • ISBN-13: 9780199642199
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • Pehme köide
  • Hind: 58,56 €*
  • * hind on lõplik, st. muud allahindlused enam ei rakendu
  • Tavahind: 73,20 €
  • Säästad 20%
  • Raamatu kohalejõudmiseks kirjastusest kulub orienteeruvalt 3-4 nädalat
  • Kogus:
  • Lisa ostukorvi
  • Tasuta tarne
  • Tellimisaeg 2-4 nädalat
  • Lisa soovinimekirja
Ethics of Capital Punishment: A Philosophical Investigation of Evil and its ConsequencesSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 368 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 236x156x20 mm, kaal: 532 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 30-Jan-2014
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0199642192
  • ISBN-13: 9780199642199
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9780199642199.html
Märksõnad:
Debate has long been waged over the morality of capital punishment, with standard arguments in its favour being marshalled against familiar arguments that oppose the practice. In The Ethics of Capital Punishment, Matthew Kramer takes a fresh look at the philosophical arguments on which the legitimacy of the death penalty stands or falls, and he develops a novel justification of that penalty for a limited range of cases.

The book pursues both a project of critical debunking of the familiar rationales for capital punishment and a project of partial vindication. The critical part presents some accessible and engaging critiques of major arguments that have been offered in support of the death penalty. These chapters, suitable for use in teaching courses on capital punishment, valuably take issue with positions at the heart of contemporary debates over the morality of such punishment.

The book then presents an original justification for executing truly terrible criminals, a justification that is free-standing rather than an aspect or offshoot of a general theory of punishment. Its purgative rationale, which has not heretofore been propounded in any current philosophical and practical debates over the death penalty, derives from a philosophical reconception of the nature of evil and the nature of defilement.

As the book contributes to philosophical discussions of those phenomena, it also contributes importantly to general normative ethics with sustained reflections on the differences between consequentialist approaches to punishment and deontological approaches. Above all, the volume contributes to the philosophy of criminal law with a fresh rationale for the use of the death penalty and with probing assessments of all the major theories of punishment that have been broached by jurists and philosophers for centuries. Although the book is a work of philosophy by a professional philosopher, it is readily accessible to readers who have not studied philosophy. It will stir both philosophers and anyone engaged with the death penalty to reconsider whether the institution of capital punishment can be an appropriate response to extreme evil.

Arvustused

Review from previous edition Hannah Arendt ends Eichmann in Jerusalem with a statement about the sentencing of Adolf Eichmann: "we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth with you." Kramer's excellent new book develops an original line of argument that echoes that Arendtian sentiment into what he calls the purgative justification for capital punishment....Kramer's book is a well-argued and inventive work that will generate new avenues of discussion in legal and moral philosophy * Eric M. Rovie, Political Studies Review * Matthew Kramer's book The Ethics of Capital Punishment is a significant achievement. Not only does it offer a thorough and up-to-date discussion of traditional justifications for the death penalty, it also attempts to offer an alternative, novel justification for it, something that Kramer calls the purgative rationale. Although I am not entirely sympathetic to this aim, I think that carving out a new territory within this already crowded intellectual space is something which ought to be commended * John Danaher, Criminal Law and Philosophy * The book's provocative thesis, connecting moral philosophy with legal scholarship, will surely occupy a position of importance in ongoing debates within criminal law * Harvard Law Review * In this bold philosophical inquiry, Professor Matthew Kramer develops a justification for the death penalty as a sui generis concept: the purgative rationale. After grappling with and rebutting the standard justifications for capital punishment deterrence, retributivism, incapacitation, and denunciation Professor Kramer develops the purgative rationale, arguing that a community is tainted in other words, its moral integrity is lessened by the continuing existence of anyone who has perpetrated some especially hideous crimes * Harvard Law Review *

Preface v
1 Introduction 1(18)
1.1 The limits of the enquiry
1(2)
1.2 A matter of justification
3(5)
1.2.1 A first caveat
5(1)
1.2.2 A second caveat
6(2)
1.3 A pithy conspectus
8(11)
1.3.1
Chapter 2: Deterrence-oriented theories
8(2)
1.3.2
Chapter 3: Retributivism
10(1)
1.3.3
Chapter 4: The incapacitative rationale
11(1)
1.3.4
Chapter 5: The denunciatory conception
12(2)
1.3.5
Chapter 6: The purgative rationale
14(2)
1.3.6
Chapter 7: Problems of administration
16(3)
2 Deterrence through Capital Punishment 19(50)
2.1 The deterrence-oriented rationale expounded
20(3)
2.2 Simplistic strictures
23(7)
2.2.1 A misjudged recourse to Rawls
24(5)
2.2.1.1 Donnelly's first line of reasoning: the matter of slavery
24(1)
2.2.1.2 Donnelly's second line of reasoning: an untenable asymmetry
25(1)
2.2.1.3 Donnelly's third line of reasoning: public order
26(1)
2.2.1.4 Some further reflections
27(2)
2.2.2 Using people as means
29(1)
2.3 Empirical doubts
30(8)
2.3.1 The meagerness of the evidence
31(2)
2.3.2 General misgivings
33(5)
2.3.2.1 Prospects versus certainties
34(1)
2.3.2.2 Beyond deliberation
34(2)
2.3.2.3 Brutalization
36(2)
2.4 The moral untenability of the deterrence-oriented rationale
38(29)
2.4.1 The manner of use
39(5)
2.4.1.1 Blocking the analogy?
40(2)
2.4.1.2 Help from an unexpected quarter?
42(2)
2.4.2 No limits
44(27)
2.4.2.1 The massacre of the innocents
45(13)
2.4.2.1.1 Ineffective dissimulation?
45(4)
2.4.2.1.2 A retributivistic side-constraint?
49(4)
2.4.2.1.3 Justifiable executions of innocents?
53(5)
2.4.2.2 Types ofpunishments
58(16)
2.4.2.2.1 Proportionality
59(1)
2.4.2.2.2 Utilitarianism
60(5)
2.4.2.2.3 Retributivism to the rescue?
65(1)
2.4.2.2.4 Sunstein and Vermeule on analogies
66(1)
2.5 A pithy conclusion
67(2)
3 Death and Retribution 69(68)
3.1 Some key themes
71(9)
3.1.1 Desert and moral responsibility
72(1)
3.1.2 Human equality
72(2)
3.1.3 Commensurateness, proportionality, and lex talionis
74(4)
3.1.3.1 Commensurateness
74(1)
3.1.3.2 Proportionality
74(3)
3.1.3.3 Lex talionis
77(1)
3.1.4 Punishment as communication
78(2)
3.2 Versions of retributivism
80(24)
3.2.1 Desert-focused retributivism
80(17)
3.2.1.1 Freedom as the unjust gain?
81(4)
3.2.1.2 The price of a licence
85(7)
3.2.1.2.1 A first query
85(1)
3.2.1.2.2 A second query
86(2)
3.2.1.2.3 A third query
88(2)
3.2.1.2.4 A fourth query
90(2)
3.2.1.3 Self-indulgence
92(5)
3.2.1.3.1 A manifestly unsustainable version of the thesis
92(1)
3.2.1.3.2 A tenable version of the thesis
93(3)
3.2.1.3.3 Some qualifications
96(1)
3.2.2 Vindicatory retributivism
97(7)
3.2.2.1 Retribution is not revenge
98(1)
3.2.2.2 The communicative dimension
99(2)
3.2.2.3 A first objection to the communicative dimension of vindicatory retributivism
101(1)
3.2.2.4 A second objection to the communicative dimension of vindicatory retributivism
102(2)
3.3 Does retributivism disallow capital punishment?
104(11)
3.3.1 Contrition precluded?
105(5)
3.3.1.1 A first rejoinder by Markel
107(1)
3.3.1.2 The time of the punishment
108(1)
3.3.1.3 Post-punitive opportunities for reform
109(1)
3.3.2 Human dignity revisited
110(5)
3.3.2.1 The exploitation of pain
112(1)
3.3.2.2 The death penalty and moral responsibility
113(2)
3.4 Can retributivism justify capital punishment?
115(20)
3.4.1 The views of retributivists
116(3)
3.4.2 On the limited determinacy of retributivism
119(9)
3.4.2.1 Commensurateness to the rescue?
119(5)
3.4.2.1.1 Going too far
120(2)
3.4.2.1.2 Against uniqueness
122(2)
3.4.2.2 Proportionality
124(4)
3.4.2.3 Lex talionis
128(9)
3.4.2.3.1 Reiman on retribution and equality
129(1)
3.4.2.3.2 Waldron on returning like for like
130(5)
3.5 A concluding rejection of scepticism
135(2)
4 Death as Incapacitation 137(18)
4.1 The general doctrine
137(10)
4.1.1 Punishment as incapacitation
138(2)
4.1.2 Incapacitation is not tantamount to deterrence
140(5)
4.1.2.1 Four differences
140(3)
4.1.2.2 A missed distinction: some closing remarks and examples
143(2)
4.1.3 Incapacitation is not tantamount to retribution or denunciation
145(2)
4.2 The fatal shortcomings of the incapacitative justification
147(6)
4.2.1 Moral responsibility swept aside
147(3)
4.2.2 More on moral responsibility
150(1)
4.2.3 The hurdle of the Minimal Invasion Principle
151(2)
4.3 Conclusion: irreparable damage
153(2)
5 Death as a Means of Denunciation 155(24)
5.1 The general denunciatory theory of punishment
155(6)
5.1.1 Denunciation versus deterrence
157(2)
5.1.2 Denunciation versus retribution
159(2)
5.2 The denunciatory theory as a rationale for capital punishment
161(1)
5.3 The unsustainability of the denunciatory theory
162(16)
5.3.1 Empirical murkiness
162(2)
5.3.2 When perceptions do not match reality
164(4)
5.3.2.1 Denunciation versus incapacitation
165(2)
5.3.2.2 A problem of principle
167(1)
5.3.3 Inverted proportionality and surreptitious crimes
168(4)
5.3.3.1 Reinforcement of moral outlooks
168(2)
5.3.3.2 The defusing of vindictive impulses
170(1)
5.3.3.3 The consolidation of a community's identity
171(1)
5.3.4 No upper limit
172(2)
5.3.5 The minimal invasion principle afresh
174(4)
5.4 Concluding reflections
178(1)
6 The Purgative Rationale for Capital Punishment 179(88)
6.1 The execution of Achan
181(6)
6.1.1 The extraneous features
182(4)
6.1.1.1 Excessive severity and the massacre of the innocents
182(1)
6.1.1.2 Collective responsibility versus defilement
183(2)
6.1.1.3 Some further extraneous features
185(1)
6.1.2 The gist of the purgative rationale
186(1)
6.2 The nature of evil
187(36)
6.2.1 The underlying states of mind
188(15)
6.2.1.1 Sadistic malice
189(2)
6.2.1.2 Heartlessness
191(8)
6.2.1.2.1 Heartlessness without evil
193(1)
6.2.1.2.2 Heartlessness with some qualms
194(2)
6.2.1.2.3 Heartlessness with seemingly good intentions
196(1)
6.2.1.2.4 Heartlessness, moral conflicts, and mitigation
197(2)
6.2.1.3 Extreme recklessness
199(4)
6.2.1.3.1 More realistic examples
200(1)
6.2.1.3.2 Recklessness without evil
201(1)
6.2.1.3.3 The qualitative/quantitative distinction again
202(1)
6.2.2 The factor of harmfulness
203(20)
6.2.2.1 Connections between culpability and harm
204(8)
6.2.2.1.1 Failed attempts and unmaterialized risks
204(2)
6.2.2.1.2 Overdetermined harm
206(2)
6.2.2.1.3 Attenuated links
208(3)
6.2.2.1.4 Spectatorial pleasure
211(1)
6.2.2.2 Is severe harm necessary for evil?
212(14)
6.2.2.2.1 Concomitants of harm
215(1)
6.2.2.2.2 Tortured cats and bullied children
216(2)
6.2.2.2.3 Sadistic voyeurism again
218(1)
6.2.2.2.4 A face-saving reply
219(2)
6.2.2.2.5 An embarrassing secret
221(2)
6.3 Defilement and death
223(37)
6.3.1 Nothing supernatural
224(2)
6.3.2 Paradigmatic cases
226(2)
6.3.2.1 Richard's Case
227(1)
6.3.2.2 Joseph's Case
227(1)
6.3.3 Defilement and purgation
228(32)
6.3.3.1 A first query: humankind as a whole?
230(1)
6.3.3.2 A second query: capital punishment for mere contempt?
231(1)
6.3.3.3 A third query: whence the community's involvement?
232(3)
6.3.3.4 A fourth query: why death?
235(2)
6.3.3.5 A fifth query: a role for repentance?
237(3)
6.3.3.6 A sixth query: difficult backgrounds and extenuation
240(4)
6.3.3.6.1 General inflexibility
241(2)
6.3.3.6.2 Some exceptions
243(1)
6.3.3.7 A seventh query: mental maladies and shortcomings
244(4)
6.3.3.7.1 Mistakes about harmfulness versus mistakes about morality
244(1)
6.3.3.7.2 Mental retardation
245(1)
6.3.3.7.3 Mental illness
246(1)
6.3.3.7.4 Insanity after conviction
247(1)
6.3.3.8 An eighth query: failed attempts afresh
248(1)
6.3.3.9 A ninth query: jurisdictional complexities
249(3)
6.3.3.10 A tenth query: vagueness and aggravating factors
252(4)
6.3.3.10.1 The concerns of the opponents of the purgative rationale
253(1)
6.3.3.10.2 Dealing with vagueness
254(2)
6.3.3.11 An eleventh query: permissibility as well as obligatoriness?
256(15)
6.3.3.11.1 When permissibility is missing
256(1)
6.3.3.11.2 When executions are permissible
257(3)
6.4 Conclusion: why only liberal democracies?
260(7)
6.4.1 An ancillary reason: procedural fairness
260(2)
6.4.2 The chief reason: purgation in a moral community
262(5)
7 The Death Penalty in Operation 267(62)
7.1 Mistakes and irrevocability
269(28)
7.1.1 A preliminary point: clarifying an ambiguity
270(1)
7.1.2 Intentional killings of innocents?
271(7)
7.1.2.1 A specious argument
271(4)
7.1.2.2 Intentional or not?
275(3)
7.1.2.2.1 The de dicto/de re distinction
276(1)
7.1.2.2.2 The distinction applied
277(1)
7.1.3 Sweeping too broadly
278(6)
7.1.3.1 Lempert's reasoning afresh
279(1)
7.1.3.2 Intentionality at the level of decision-making, once again
280(1)
7.1.3.3 Steiker and Steiker on the distinctive harms of mistaken executions
281(3)
7.1.4 Irrevocability?
284(6)
7.1.4.1 Compensability
284(2)
7.1.4.2 Remedies during one's lifetime
286(4)
6.3.5 Capital punishment in the shadow of mistakes
290(7)
7.1.5.1 Confidence rather than certainty
292(3)
7.1.5.2 Exasperation as the price of legitimacy
295(2)
7.2 Arbitrariness
297(16)
7.2.1 A markedly inadequate response
299(4)
7.2.2 Another unsatisfactory response
303(2)
7.2.3 Distortive exaggeration
305(6)
7.2.3.1 Processes of differentiation in practice
305(3)
7.2.3.1.1 Studies cited by Dolinko
306(2)
7.2.3.1.2 McCord on aggravating factors
308(1)
7.2.3.2 Differentiation in principle
308(3)
7.2.4 Residual arbitrariness
311(2)
7.3 Invidious discrimination
313(13)
7.3.1 Extrinsicality
314(1)
7.3.2 A couple of complexities and the key rejoinder
315(2)
7.3.3 No severe punishments? A first look
317(1)
7.3.4 No severe punishments? A second look
318(6)
7.3.4.1 An opening reply to Cholbi
319(1)
7.3.4.2 A further reply to Cholbi
319(1)
7.3.4.3 A final reply to Cholbi
320(4)
7.3.4.3.1 Fair discrimination
320(3)
7.3.4.3.2 A dubious principle
323(1)
7.3.4.4 A briefsummation
324(1)
7.3.5 Substance dressed up afresh as procedure
324(2)
7.4 A few words in conclusion
326(3)
References 329(12)
Index 341
Matthew H. Kramer is Professor of Legal & Political Philosophy at the University of Cambridge; Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge; and Director of the Cambridge Forum for Legal & Political Philosophy. He is the author of a dozen previous books and the co-editor of four other books.