In assigning blame for the recent economic crisis, many have pointed to the proliferation of new, complex financial products--mortgage securitization in particular--as being at the heart of the meltdown. The prominent economists from academia, policy institutions, and financial practice who contribute to this book, however, take a more nuanced view of financial innovation. They argue that it was not too much innovation but too little innovation--and the lack of balance between debt-related products and asset-related products--that lies behind the crisis. Prevention of future financial crises, then, will be aided by a regulatory and legal framework that fosters the informed use of financial innovation and its positive effects on the economy rather than quashing innovation entirely.
The book, which includes two contributions from 2013 Nobe Laureate Robert Shiller as well as a discussion of Shiller's "MacroMarkets" tool, considers the key ingredients of financial innovation from both academia and industry; and how future innovation-lined crises might be avoided.
ContributorsJosef Ackermann, Nicholas C. Barberis, John Y. Campbell, Karl E. Case, Robin Greenwood, Michael Haliassos, Otmar Issing, Alexander Popov, Robert J. Shiller, Andrei Shleifer, Frank R. Smets, Susan J. Smith, Maria Vassalou, Luis M. Viceira
