'In this excellent book, Akira Okada gives a coherent presentation of the non-cooperative approach to coalition formation. He covers an impressive range of issues, including the incorporation of externalities, renegotiation and incomplete information. His style, both pedagogical and rigorous, is likely to benefit a great many researchers in this fascinating area.' P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Tilburg University, The Netherlands 'The result of decades of research, this book clarifies the difference between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory and makes a compelling case that they are complements rather than substitutes. Starting with simple examples and definitions before introducing the formal concepts and results, the book contains both applications and advanced topics such as externalities, incomplete information and gradual expansion of coalitions through renegotiation. An excellent state-of-the art book for graduate students and researchers interested in coalition formation and cooperation.' Maria Montero, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 'Okada's Games and Coalitions is not only a comprehensive and thorough textbook on game theory, but also one that offers a holistic approach to its two main branches: cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. While most game theory books treat these branches as separate, if not opposing, Okada reveals the intimate connection between them.' Eyal Winter, the Silverzweig Professor of Economics, The Hebrew University, and the Andrews and Brunner Professor of Economics, Lancaster University
