First published in 1989, Goals, No-Goals and Own Goals presents a stimulating debate between three scientists and three philosophers about the significance and nature of goal-directed and intentional behaviour. At one extreme David McFarland brings into radical question the need for either of these concepts, at least in the scientific study of animal behaviour. At the other extreme, Alan Montefiore argues that such concepts are indispensable to any explication of the meaningful use of language and that we must therefore acknowledge their importance in understanding the nature of human behaviour. Denis Noble uses arguments drawn from computer science and physiology to show that it is incorrect to regard intentions as causes of neural events, even though it is correct to regard intentionality as responsible for our actions. Shawn Lockery outlines how intentional behaviour might be subjected to physiological study. Kathy Wilkes widens the debate by asking some basic questions about the nature of explanation and finally, Daniel Dennett argues how the study of animal behaviour might inform research in Artificial Intelligence.
This book will be a useful resource for scholars and researchers of cognitive science, philosophy, psychology, linguistics and physiology.
Preface Acknowledgements Part I: Introduction
1. General Introduction
2.
Philosophical Background
3. Scientific Introduction Part II: The Positions
Stated
4. Goals, No-Goals, Own Goals
5. Intentions and Causes
6. Intentional
Actions and Physiology
7. Cognitive Ethology: Hunting for Bargains or a Wild
Goose Chase?
8. Representation, Functionalism, and Simple Living Systems
9.
Representations and Explanations Part III: The Positions Debated
10. Narrow
Intentions
11. Explanations How not to Miss the Point
12. The Teleological
Imperative
13. Comments
14. Round Two
15. What Do Intentions Do? Part IV: A
Challenge Renewed
16. Swan Song of a Phoenix Bibliography Further Reading
Notes on authors
Alan Montefiore and Denis Noble
