Speculative idealism is the end of transcendental idealism. Focusing on the problem of the beginning of philosophy, this thesis is substantiated in four chapters. The chapter on Kant exposes the problem of the beginning and its solution. The chapter on contemporary transcendental philosophy shows that even in the most advanced versions of transcendental philosophy, the problem of the beginning remains. The chapter on neo-Kantianism, so important for contemporary transcendental philosophy, renders explicit that here too the problem of the beginning is a paradigmatic burden of transcendental idealism. The first three chapters proof concerning all dimensions of Hegel's Logic (Being, Essence, Concept) that transcendental philosophy perishes due to the methodical profile of its reflection and requires its sublation by speculative idealism. For this reason, as becomes clear from the final chapter, a return to the late Fichte does not overcome the problem of the beginning either.
