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Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology [Pehme köide]

  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 378 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 800 g
  • Sari: Routledge Classics
  • Ilmumisaeg: 26-Apr-2012
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0415519039
  • ISBN-13: 9780415519038
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  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 378 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 800 g
  • Sari: Routledge Classics
  • Ilmumisaeg: 26-Apr-2012
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0415519039
  • ISBN-13: 9780415519038
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With a new foreword by Dermot Moran

‘the work here presented seeks to found a new science – though, indeed, the whole course of philosophical development since Descartes has been preparing the way for it – a science covering a new field of experience, exclusively its own, that of "Transcendental Subjectivity"’ - Edmund Husserl, from the author’s preface to the English Edition

Widely regarded as the principal founder of phenomenology, one of the most important movements in twentieth century philosophy, Edmund Husserl’s Ideas is one of his most important works and a classic of twentieth century thought. This Routledge Classics edition of the original translation by W.R. Boyce Gibson includes the introduction to the English edition written by Husserl himself in 1931.

Husserl’s early thought conceived of phenomenology – the general study of what appears to conscious experience – in a relatively narrow way, mainly in relation to problems in logic and the theory of knowledge. The publication of Ideas in 1913 witnessed a significant and controversial widening of Husserl’s thought, changing the course of phenomenology decisively. Husserl argued that phenomenology was the study of the very nature of what it is to think, "the science of the essence of consciousness" itself.

Husserl’s arguments ignited a heated debate regarding the nature of consciousness and experience that has endured throughout the twentieth and continues in the present day. No understanding of twentieth century philosophy is complete without some understanding of Husserl, and his work influenced some of the great philosophers of the twentieth century, such as Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre.

Foreword to the Routledge Classics Edition xiii
Author's Preface to the English Edition xxxiv
Translator's Preface li
Introduction 1(6)
PART I ESSENCE AND COGNITION OF ESSENCE
7(42)
1 Fact and Essence
9(24)
§1 Natural knowledge and experience
9(1)
§2 Fact. Inseparability of fact and essence
10(1)
§3 Essential insight and individual intuition
11(3)
§4 Essential insight and the play of fancy. Knowledge of essences independent of all knowledge of facts
14(1)
§5 Judgments about essence and judgments of eidetic generality
15(1)
§6 Some fundamental concepts. Generality and necessity
16(2)
§7 Sciences of facts and sciences of the essence
18(1)
§8 Interdependence of the sciences of fact and of essence
19(1)
§9 Region and regional eidetics
20(1)
§10 Region and category. The analytic region and its categories
21(3)
§11 Syntactical objectivities and ultimate substrata. Syntactical categories
24(1)
§12 Genus and species
25(1)
§13 Generalization and formalization
26(2)
§14 Substrative categories. The substrative essence and the τoδετι
28(1)
§15 Independent and dependent objects. Concretum and Individual
29(1)
§16 Region and category in the sphere of substantive meaning. Synthetic cognitions a priori
30(2)
§17 Conclusions of the logical considerations
32(1)
2 Naturalistic Misconstructions
33(16)
§18 Introduction to the critical discussions
33(2)
§19 The empiricist's identification of experience and primordial dator act
35(2)
§20 Empiricism and scepticism
37(2)
§21 Obscurities on the idealistic side
39(1)
§22 The reproach of Platonic realism. Essence and concept
40(2)
§23 Spontaneity of ideation, essence, and fiction
42(1)
§24 The principle of all principles
43(1)
§25 The positivist at work as natural scientist, the natural scientist in reflective thought as positivist
44(1)
§26 Sciences of the dogmatic and sciences of the philosophic standpoint
45(4)
PART II THE FUNDAMENTAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL OUTLOOK
49(74)
1 The Thesis of the Natural Standpoint and its Suspension
51(10)
§27 The world of the natural standpoint: I and my world about me
51(2)
§28 The "cogito". My natural world-about-me and the ideal worlds-about-me
53(1)
§29 The "other" Ego-subjects and the intersubjective natural world-about-me
54(1)
§30 The general thesis of the natural standpoint
55(1)
§31 Radical alteration of the natural thesis. "Disconnexion", "Bracketing"
56(3)
§32 The phenomenological επoΧη
59(2)
2 Consciousness and Natural Reality
61(29)
§33 Intimation concerning "pure" or "transcendental consciousness" as phenomenological residuum
61(2)
§34 The essence of consciousness as theme of inquiry
63(2)
§35 The cogito as "act". The non-actuality modification
65(2)
§36 Intentional experience. Experience in general
67(1)
§37 The "directedness" of the pure Ego in the cogito, and the noticing that apprehends
68(3)
§38 Reflexions on acts. Immanent and transcendent perceptions
71(1)
§39 Consciousness and natural reality. The view of the "man in the street"
72(2)
§40 "Primary" and "secondary" qualities. The bodily given thing "mere appearance" of the "physically true"
74(2)
§41 The real nature of perception and its transcendent object
76(2)
§42 Being as Consciousness and Being as Reality. Intrinsic difference between the modes of tuition
78(2)
§43 Light on a fundamental error
80(2)
§44 The merely phenomenal being of the transcendent, the absolute being of the immanent
82(3)
§45 Unperceived experience, unperceived reality
85(2)
§46 Indubitability of immanent, dubitability of transcendent perception
87(3)
3 The Region of Pure Consciousness
90(20)
§47 The natural world as correlate of consciousness
90(2)
§48 Logical possibility and real absurdity of a world outside our own
92(1)
§49 Absolute consciousness as residuum after the nullifying of the world
93(3)
§50 The phenomenological viewpoint and pure consciousness as the field of phenomenology
96(1)
§51 The import of the transcendental preliminary reflexions
97(2)
§52 Supplementary remarks. The physical thing and the "unknown cause of appearances"
99(5)
§53 Animalia and psychological consciousness
104(2)
§54 The same continued. The transcendent psychological experience contingent and relative, the transcendental experience necessary and absolute
106(2)
§55 Conclusion. All reality exists through "the dispensing of meaning." No "subjective idealism"
108(2)
4 The Phenomenological Reductions
110(13)
§56 The question concerning the extension of the phenomenological reduction. The natural and the mental sciences
110(1)
§57 The question of the suspension of the pure Ego
111(1)
§58 The transcendence of God suspended
112(1)
§59 The transcendence of the eidetic. The suspending of pure logic as mathesis universalis
113(2)
§60 The suspending of the material-eidetic disciplines
115(2)
§61 The methodological importance of the systematic theory of phenomenological reductions
117(2)
§62 Epistemological preliminaries. "Dogmatic" and phenomenological standpoints
119(4)
PART III PROCEDURE OF PURE PHENOMENOLOGY IN RESPECT OF METHODS AND PROBLEMS
123(142)
1 Preliminary Considerations of Method
125(21)
§63 The special importance for phenomenology of considerations of method
125(2)
§64 The self-suspending of the phenomenologist
127(1)
§65 The reference of phenomenology back to its own self
127(2)
§66 Faithful expression of the clearly given. Unambiguous terms
129(1)
§67 Method of clarification. The "nearness" and "remoteness" of given data
130(2)
§68 Genuine and counterfeit grades of clearness. The essence of normal clarifying
132(1)
§69 The method of apprehending essences with perfect clearness
133(1)
§70 The role of perception in the method for clarifying the essence. The privileged position of free fancy
134(3)
§71 The problem of the possibility of a descriptive eidetic of experiences
137(1)
§72 Concrete, abstract, "mathematical" sciences of Essential Being
138(3)
§73 Application to the problem of phenomenology. Description and exact determination
141(1)
§74 Descriptive and exact sciences
142(1)
§75 Phenomenology as descriptive theory of the essence of pure experiences
143(3)
2 General Structures of Pure Consciousness
146(36)
§76 The theme of the following studies
146(3)
§77 Reflexion as the basic peculiarity of the sphere of experience. Studies on reflexion
149(3)
§78 Phenomenological study of reflexions upon experience
152(4)
§79 Critical excursus. Phenomenology and the difficulties of "self-observation"
156(6)
§80 The relation of experiences to the pure Ego
162(2)
§81 Phenomenological time and the time-consciousness
164(3)
§82 Continuation. The threefold limit of experience, as at once the limit of reflexion upon experience
167(1)
§83 Apprehension of the unitary stream of experience as "Idea"
168(2)
§84 Intentionality as the main phenomenological theme
170(4)
§85 Sensile Uλη, intentional μoρφη
174(4)
§86 The functional problems
178(4)
3 Noesis and Noema
182(22)
§87 Introductory remarks
182(2)
§88 Real (reelle) and intentional factors of experience. The noema
184(2)
§89 Noematic statements and statements concerning reality. The noema in the psychological sphere
186(1)
§90 The "noematic meaning" and the distinction between "immanent" and "real (wirklichen) objects"
187(4)
§91 Extension to the farthest reaches of Intentionality
191(1)
§92 The transformations of Attention in regard both to noesis and noema
192(3)
§93 Transition to the noetic-noematic structures of the higher sphere of consciousness
195(1)
§94 Noesis and noema in the sphere of the judgment
196(3)
§95 The analogous distinctions in the spheres of Sentiment and Will
199(2)
§96 Transition to the chapters that follow. Concluding remarks
201(3)
4 Theory of the Noetic-Noematic Structures: Elaboration of the Problems
204(61)
§97 The hyletic and noetic phases as real (reelle). The noematic as non-real phases of experience
204(4)
§98 Mode of being of the noema. Doctrine of forms for noeses and for noemata
208(3)
§99 The noematic nucleus and its distinguishing marks in the sphere of presentations and representations
211(2)
§100 Levels in the construction of presentations in noesis and noema, in accordance with essential laws
213(1)
§101 Characteristics of levels as such. Different types of "reflexions"
214(1)
§102 Transition to new dimensions in characterization
215(1)
§103 Characters distinctive of Being and of Belief
216(2)
§104 Doxic modalities as modifications
218(1)
§105 The modality of Belief, as Belief; the modality of Being, as Being
219(1)
§106 Affirmation and Negation together with their noematic correlates
220(2)
§107 Reiterated modifications
222(1)
§108 Noematical characters are not determined through "reflexion"
223(1)
§109 The neutrality-modification
224(2)
§110 Neutralized consciousness and the critical authority of the reason. The nature of Assuming
226(1)
§111 Neutrality-modification and Fancy
227(2)
§112 Repeatability of the fancy-modification at successive levels; non-repeatability of the neutrality-modification
229(1)
§113 Actual and potential positings
230(3)
§114 Further concerning neutrality-modification and the potentiality of the theses
233(4)
§115 Applications. The extended concept of Act. Act-fulfilments and impulses to act
237(2)
§116 Transition to new analyses. The secondary noeses and their noematic correlates
239(3)
§117 The secondary theses and conclusion of the doctrine of the modifications of the neutralizing process. The general concept of "Theses"
242(4)
§118 Syntheses of consciousness. Syntactic forms
246(1)
§119 Transformation of polythetic into monothetic acts
247(2)
§120 Positionality and neutrality in the sphere of the syntheses
249(1)
§121 The doxic syntactics in the spheres of feeling and will
250(3)
§122 Modes of carrying out articulated syntheses. The "Thema"
253(2)
§123 Vagueness and distinctness as modes in the fulfilling of synthetic acts
255(1)
§124 The noetic-noematic stratum of the "Logos". Meaning and meaning something
256(3)
§125 The completing modalities in the sphere of logical expression and the method of clarification
259(1)
§126 Completeness and generality of expression
260(1)
§127 Expression of judgments and expression of the noemata of feeling
261(4)
PART IV REASON AND REALITY (WIRKLICHKEIT)
265(60)
1 Noematic Meaning and Relation to the Object
267(17)
§128 Introduction
267(2)
§129 "Content" and "Object"; the content as "meaning"
269(2)
§130 Delimitation of the essence "noematic meaning"
271(1)
§131 The "object", the "determinable X in the noematic sense"
272(3)
§132 The nucleus as meaning in the mode of its full realization
275(1)
§133 The noematic meaning as posited. Thetically and synthetically posited meanings (positions). Posited meanings in the domain of presentations
275(2)
§134 The apophantic formal doctrine
277(3)
§135 Object and consciousness. Transition to the phenomenology of Reason
280(4)
2 Phenomenology of the Reason
284(21)
§136 The first basic form of the rational consciousness: The primordial dator "vision"
284(3)
§137 Self-evidence and Insight. "Primordial" and "pure", assertoric and apodeictic self-evidence
287(1)
§138 Adequate and inadequate self-evidence
288(3)
§139 Interweavings of all the varieties of Reason. Theoretic, axiological, and practical Truth
291(2)
§140 Confirmation. Warranty (Berechtigung) apart from self-evidence. Equivalence of the positional and neutral insights
293(2)
§141 Immediate and mediate rational positing. Mediate self-evidence
295(2)
§142 Being and the Thesis of Reason
297(2)
§143 The adequate presentation of a Thing as an Idea in the Kantian sense
299(1)
§144 Reality and primordial dator consciousness: Concluding determinations
300(1)
§145 Critical consideration of the phenomenology of Self-evidence
301(4)
3 Grades of Generality in the Ordering of the Problems of the Theoretic Reason
305(20)
§146 The most general problems
305(1)
§147 Ramifications of the problem. Formal Logic, Axiology, and Praxis
306(3)
§148 Problems of the theoretical reason as bearing on Formal Ontology
309(2)
§149 Problems of the theoretical reason as bearing on the regional ontologies. The problem of the phenomenological constituting function
311(4)
§150 Continuation. The Thing-region as transcendental clue
315(3)
§151 Strata of the transcendental constitution of the Thing. Supplementary considerations
318(1)
§152 Transfer of the problem of the transcendental constituting function to other regions
319(2)
§153 The full extension of the transcendental problem. The inquiries classified
321(4)
Notes 325(18)
Analytical Index 343(32)
Index to Proper Names 375
Edmund Husserl (18591938) through his creation of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl was one of the most influential philosophers of our century.