Implicit Bias and Philosophy brings the work of leading philosophers and psychologists together to explore core areas of psychological research on implicit (or unconscious) bias, as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology is comprised of two sections: 'The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, and Stereotype Threat,' and 'Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality.' The first section contains chapters examining the relationship between implicit attitudes and 'dual process' models of the mind; the role of affect in the formation and change of implicit associations; the unity (or disunity) of implicit attitudes; whether implicit biases are mental states at all; and whether performances on stereotype-relevant tasks are automatic and unconscious or intentional and strategic. The second section contains chapters examining implicit bias and skepticism; the effects of implicit bias on scientific research; the accessibility of social stereotypes in epistemic environments; the effects of implicit bias on the self-perception of members of stigmatized social groups as rational agents; the role of gender stereotypes in philosophy; and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning.
Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics is comprised of three sections. 'Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias' contains chapters examining the relationship of implicit biases to concepts that are central to moral responsibility, including control, awareness, reasons-responsiveness, and alienation. The chapters in the second section--'Structural Injustice'--explore the connections between the implicit biases held by individuals and the structural injustices of the societies in which they are situated. And finally, the third section--'The Ethics of Implicit Bias: Theory and Practice'--contains chapters examining strategies for implicit attitude change, the ramifications of research on implicit bias for philosophers working in ethics, and suggestions for combatting implicit biases in the fields of philosophy and law.
| Volume 1* |
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Part
1. The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, and Stereotype Threat |
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1.1 Playing Double: Implicit Bias, Dual Levels, and Self-Control |
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1.2 Implicit Bias, Reinforcement Learning, and Scaffolded Moral Cognition |
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1.3 The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias |
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1.4 De-Freuding Implicit Attitudes |
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1.5 Stereotype Threat and Persons |
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Part
2. Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality |
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2.1 Bias: Friend or Foe? Reflections on Saulish Skepticism |
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2.2 Virtue, Social Knowledge, and Implicit Bias |
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2.3 Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality |
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2.4 The Status Quo Fallacy: Implicit Bias and Fallacies of Argumentation |
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2.5 Revisiting Current Causes of Women's Underrepresentation in Science |
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2.6 Philosophers Explicitly Associate Philosophy with Maleness: An Examination of Implicit and Explicit Gender Stereotypes in Philosophy |
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| Volume 2* |
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Part
1. Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias |
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1.1 Who's Responsible for This? Moral Responsibility, Externalism, and Knowledge about Implicit Bias |
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1.2 Alienation and Responsibility |
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1.3 Attributability, Accountability, and Implicit Bias |
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1.4 Stereotypes and Prejudices: Whose Responsibility? Indirect Personal Responsibility for Implicit Biases |
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Nicole van Voorst Vader-Bours |
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1.5 Revisionism and Moral Responsibility for Implicit Attitudes |
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Part
2. Structural Injustice |
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2.1 The Too Minimal Political, Moral, and Civic Dimension of Claude Steele's "Stereotype Threat" Paradigm |
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2.2 Reducing Racial Bias: Attitudinal and Institutional Change |
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Part
3. The Ethics of Implicit Bias: Theory and Practice |
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3.1 A Virtue Ethics Response to Implicit Bias |
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3.2 Context and the Ethics of Implicit Bias |
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3.3 The Moral Status of Micro-Inequities: In Favor of Institutional Solutions |
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3.4 Discrimination Law, Equality Law, and Implicit Bias |
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Michael Brownstein is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at John Jay College/City University of New York. His research focuses on philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, with emphasis on the nature of the implicit mind. In 2014-2015 he was a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies, and visiting faculty at Deep Springs College. His published articles on automaticity, spontaneity, and implicit bias have appeared in journals such as Philosophical Studies, Mind and Language, and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. These mark a small transition from his first publication, 'The Wonderful World of Tame Reptiles', in Reptile Hobbyist.
Jennifer Saul is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield and Director of the Society for Women in Philosophy UK. Her research is primarily in philosophy of language, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of race. She is the author of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said (OUP, 2012); Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions (OUP, 2007); and Feminism: Issues and Arguments (OUP, 2003). She directed the Leverhulme International Network in Implicit Bias and Philosophy (2011-2013) that gave rise to these volumes. She has also served as a consultant on a zombie movie script.
