| Preface |
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iii | |
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vii | |
| Summary |
|
ix | |
| Acknowledgments |
|
xxi | |
| Abbreviations |
|
xxiii | |
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1 | (6) |
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4 | (3) |
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Chapter Two The U.S. Experience in Land Warfare, 1939--2014 |
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7 | (24) |
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The Formative Years: World War II Through Korea |
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8 | (5) |
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The Model Breaks Down: The Vietnam War Through the 1980s |
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13 | (5) |
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The 1990s and the Search for a New Paradigm |
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18 | (6) |
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From NCW to Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001--2014 |
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24 | (5) |
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29 | (2) |
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Chapter Three Lessons from 13 Years of War |
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31 | (54) |
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32 | (53) |
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1 The Making of National Security Strategy Has Suffered from a Lack of Understanding and Application of Strategic Art |
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32 | (12) |
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2 An Integrated Civilian-Military Process Is a Necessary, But Not Sufficient, Condition of Effective National Security Policy and Strategy |
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44 | (8) |
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3 Military Campaigns Must Be Based on a Political Strategy, Because Military Operations Take Place in the Political Environment of the State in Which the Intervention Takes Place |
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52 | (7) |
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4 Technology Cannot Substitute for Expertise in History, Culture, and Languages Because of the Inherently Human and Uncertain Nature of War |
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59 | (4) |
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5 Interventions Should Not Be Conducted Without a Plan to Conduct Stability Operations, Capacity Building, Transition, and, If Necessary, Counterinsurgency |
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63 | (8) |
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6 Shaping, Influence, and Unconventional Operations May Be Cost-Effective Ways of Addressing Conflict That Obviate the Need for Larger, Costlier Interventions |
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71 | (6) |
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7 The Joint Force Requires Nonmilitary and Multinational Partners, as Well as Structures for Coordinated Implementation |
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77 | (8) |
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Chapter Four Future Conflict and Implications for the JIIM |
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85 | (40) |
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87 | (6) |
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The Need for a Theory of Success |
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93 | (8) |
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Proposals for Institutional Reform |
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101 | (3) |
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Enhancing Strategic Competence |
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104 | (1) |
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Organizational Adaptation |
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105 | (5) |
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SOF-Conventional Force Interdependence |
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110 | (4) |
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Innovative and Multifunctional Personnel |
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114 | (2) |
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Joint Capabilities for Irregular Warfare |
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116 | (1) |
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Interagency and Intergovernmental Coordination |
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117 | (2) |
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Improving Coalitions and Leveraging Multinational Expertise |
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119 | (4) |
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123 | (2) |
| References |
|
125 | |
