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Improving the U.S. Military's Understanding of Unstable Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups: Insights from Social Science [Pehme köide]

  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 116 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 274x216x10 mm, kaal: 340 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Jan-2014
  • Kirjastus: RAND
  • ISBN-10: 0833081640
  • ISBN-13: 9780833081643
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 116 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 274x216x10 mm, kaal: 340 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Jan-2014
  • Kirjastus: RAND
  • ISBN-10: 0833081640
  • ISBN-13: 9780833081643
This report identifies and assesses factors that create and perpetuate environments susceptible to insurgency, terrorism, and other extremist violence to inform military decisions on allocation of analytic and security assistance resources.
Preface iii
Abstract v
Figures, Tables, and Box
xi
Summary xiii
Acknowledgments xvii
Abbreviations xix
Chapter One Introduction
1(4)
Sociology and Anthropology in DoD's Irregular Warfare Context
3(1)
Research Approach and Road Map to This Report
3(2)
Chapter Two Gaining Insights into Unstable, Conflict-Prone Environments Through Social Science Lenses
5(12)
Introduction
5(1)
Sociological Theories
5(5)
Conflict Theory
5(1)
Social Movement Theory
6(2)
Social Network Theory
8(2)
Institutional/Organizational Theory
10(1)
Anthropological Theories
10(4)
Cultures of Violence
11(1)
Cultures of Independence and Resistance
12(1)
Inequality and Aggression
12(1)
Local Systems of Social Control, Kinship Ties, and Identity
13(1)
Other Social Science Theories and Unstable Environments
14(1)
Rational Choice Theory
14(1)
Greed and Grievance Theories
14(1)
Concluding Remarks
15(2)
Chapter Three Factors Associated with Environments Vulnerable to Conflict
17(22)
Introduction
17(1)
Methodology for Validating the List of Factors and Their Characteristics
18(1)
Key Factors and Their Attributes
19(17)
Factor 1 Level of External Support for Violent, Nonstate Groups
21(1)
Factor 2 Extent to Which Government Considered Illegitimate or Ineffective by the Population
22(1)
Factor 3 Presence of Tribal or Ethnic Indigenous Populations with History of Resisting State Rule, and/or Cultures That Encourage or Justify Violent Behavior
23(2)
Factor 4 Levels of Absolute or Relative Poverty/Inequality; Presence of One or More Groups That Have Recently Lost Status or Power
25(2)
Factor 5 Extent to Which Local Governance Is Fragmented or Nonexistent and Vulnerable to Co-Option from Insurgent Replacement Institutions
27(1)
Factor 6 Existence of Ungoverned Space
28(1)
Factor 7 Presence of Multiple Violent, Nonstate Groups Competing for Power
29(1)
Factor 8 Level of Government Restriction on Political or Ideological Dissent; Extent to Which Individuals Feel Alienated from Governing Process
30(2)
Factor 9 Level of Consistency/Agreement Between Nonstate Group's Goals and Philosophy and Preferences/Worldview/Ideology of Target Populations
32(1)
Factor 10 Extent to Which Population and Nonstate Groups Perceive Faltering Government Commitment to a Counterinsurgency Campaign
33(1)
Factor 11 Capacity, Resources, and Expertise of Violent, Nonstate Groups
34(1)
Factor 12 Pervasiveness of Social Networks Capable of Being Galvanized and Mobilized to Resistant Action
35(1)
Concluding Remarks
36(3)
Chapter Four Relationships Among Factors: Peru and Nepal Case Studies
39(8)
The Shining Path in Peru, 1980-1992
40(3)
The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1997-2006
43(2)
Concluding Remarks
45(2)
Chapter Five Utilizing the Factors for Analysis
47(12)
Metrics for Detecting and Assessing Factors
48(6)
Metrics for Factor 1 External Support
48(2)
Metrics for Factor 2 Government Legitimacy or Effectiveness
50(1)
Metrics for Factor 3 History of Resistance
51(1)
Metrics for Factor 4 Poverty and Inequality
51(1)
Metrics for Factor 5 Fragmented Governance
51(1)
Metrics for Factor 6 Ungoverned Space
52(1)
Metrics for Factor 7 Multiple Armed Groups
52(1)
Metrics for Factor 8 Government Repression
52(1)
Metrics for Factor 9 Insurgent Group and Population Goal Consistency
53(1)
Metrics for Factor 10 Perceived Government Commitment
53(1)
Metrics for Factor 11 Capacity of Armed Group
54(1)
Metrics for Factor 12 Social Networks
54(1)
Applying the Factors in Analysis
54(3)
Using the Factors to Prioritize Level of Effort
55(2)
Concluding Remarks
57(2)
Chapter Six Conclusion
59(4)
Key Findings
59(1)
Recommendations
60(1)
Concluding Remarks
61(2)
APPENDIXES
A Factors from Joint and Army Doctrine
63(4)
B Factor Matrix
67(18)
C Cross-Matching 12 Factors with RAND Case Studies on 30 Counterinsurgencies
85(4)
Bibliography 89