Preface |
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iii | |
Abstract |
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v | |
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xi | |
Summary |
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xiii | |
Acknowledgments |
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xvii | |
Abbreviations |
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xix | |
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1 | (4) |
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Sociology and Anthropology in DoD's Irregular Warfare Context |
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3 | (1) |
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Research Approach and Road Map to This Report |
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3 | (2) |
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Chapter Two Gaining Insights into Unstable, Conflict-Prone Environments Through Social Science Lenses |
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5 | (12) |
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5 | (1) |
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5 | (5) |
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5 | (1) |
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6 | (2) |
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8 | (2) |
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Institutional/Organizational Theory |
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10 | (1) |
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10 | (4) |
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11 | (1) |
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Cultures of Independence and Resistance |
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12 | (1) |
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Inequality and Aggression |
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12 | (1) |
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Local Systems of Social Control, Kinship Ties, and Identity |
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13 | (1) |
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Other Social Science Theories and Unstable Environments |
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14 | (1) |
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14 | (1) |
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Greed and Grievance Theories |
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14 | (1) |
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15 | (2) |
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Chapter Three Factors Associated with Environments Vulnerable to Conflict |
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17 | (22) |
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17 | (1) |
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Methodology for Validating the List of Factors and Their Characteristics |
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18 | (1) |
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Key Factors and Their Attributes |
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19 | (17) |
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Factor 1 Level of External Support for Violent, Nonstate Groups |
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21 | (1) |
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Factor 2 Extent to Which Government Considered Illegitimate or Ineffective by the Population |
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22 | (1) |
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Factor 3 Presence of Tribal or Ethnic Indigenous Populations with History of Resisting State Rule, and/or Cultures That Encourage or Justify Violent Behavior |
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23 | (2) |
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Factor 4 Levels of Absolute or Relative Poverty/Inequality; Presence of One or More Groups That Have Recently Lost Status or Power |
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25 | (2) |
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Factor 5 Extent to Which Local Governance Is Fragmented or Nonexistent and Vulnerable to Co-Option from Insurgent Replacement Institutions |
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27 | (1) |
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Factor 6 Existence of Ungoverned Space |
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28 | (1) |
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Factor 7 Presence of Multiple Violent, Nonstate Groups Competing for Power |
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29 | (1) |
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Factor 8 Level of Government Restriction on Political or Ideological Dissent; Extent to Which Individuals Feel Alienated from Governing Process |
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30 | (2) |
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Factor 9 Level of Consistency/Agreement Between Nonstate Group's Goals and Philosophy and Preferences/Worldview/Ideology of Target Populations |
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32 | (1) |
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Factor 10 Extent to Which Population and Nonstate Groups Perceive Faltering Government Commitment to a Counterinsurgency Campaign |
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33 | (1) |
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Factor 11 Capacity, Resources, and Expertise of Violent, Nonstate Groups |
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34 | (1) |
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Factor 12 Pervasiveness of Social Networks Capable of Being Galvanized and Mobilized to Resistant Action |
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35 | (1) |
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36 | (3) |
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Chapter Four Relationships Among Factors: Peru and Nepal Case Studies |
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39 | (8) |
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The Shining Path in Peru, 1980-1992 |
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40 | (3) |
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The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1997-2006 |
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43 | (2) |
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45 | (2) |
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Chapter Five Utilizing the Factors for Analysis |
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47 | (12) |
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Metrics for Detecting and Assessing Factors |
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48 | (6) |
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Metrics for Factor 1 External Support |
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48 | (2) |
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Metrics for Factor 2 Government Legitimacy or Effectiveness |
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50 | (1) |
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Metrics for Factor 3 History of Resistance |
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51 | (1) |
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Metrics for Factor 4 Poverty and Inequality |
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51 | (1) |
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Metrics for Factor 5 Fragmented Governance |
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51 | (1) |
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Metrics for Factor 6 Ungoverned Space |
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52 | (1) |
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Metrics for Factor 7 Multiple Armed Groups |
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52 | (1) |
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Metrics for Factor 8 Government Repression |
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52 | (1) |
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Metrics for Factor 9 Insurgent Group and Population Goal Consistency |
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53 | (1) |
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Metrics for Factor 10 Perceived Government Commitment |
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53 | (1) |
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Metrics for Factor 11 Capacity of Armed Group |
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54 | (1) |
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Metrics for Factor 12 Social Networks |
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54 | (1) |
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Applying the Factors in Analysis |
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54 | (3) |
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Using the Factors to Prioritize Level of Effort |
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55 | (2) |
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57 | (2) |
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59 | (4) |
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59 | (1) |
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60 | (1) |
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61 | (2) |
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A Factors from Joint and Army Doctrine |
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63 | (4) |
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67 | (18) |
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C Cross-Matching 12 Factors with RAND Case Studies on 30 Counterinsurgencies |
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85 | (4) |
Bibliography |
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89 | |