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1 | (18) |
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1.1 Organization of the Book |
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4 | (1) |
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1.2 How to Read this Book |
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5 | (1) |
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1.3 IM's Lethality: A Summary |
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5 | (4) |
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1.4 IM's Principal Areas of Operation |
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9 | (1) |
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1.5 Summary of IM Behavioral Model |
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10 | (3) |
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1.6 Policies Against the Indian Mujahideen |
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13 | (3) |
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1.6.1 Increased Vigilance When India-Pakistan Diplomatic Relations Warm |
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13 | (1) |
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1.6.2 Monitor Conferences Organized by the Indian Mujahideen |
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14 | (1) |
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1.6.3 Monitor IM Rhetoric About Their Terror Campaign and Claims of Responsibility by IM |
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14 | (2) |
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1.6.4 Monitor Internal Conflict Inside India |
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16 | (1) |
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1.6.5 Increased Vigilance After Arrests of IM Personnel |
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16 | (1) |
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16 | (3) |
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17 | (2) |
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19 | (30) |
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2.1 Emergence and History of Indian Mujahideen |
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20 | (4) |
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2.1.1 Jamaat-e-Islami, the Parent Organization |
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20 | (2) |
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2.1.2 JeI After the Partition |
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22 | (2) |
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2.2 The Student Islamic Movememt of India (SIMI) |
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24 | (5) |
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2.2.1 The Establishment and Early Years of SIMI |
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24 | (2) |
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2.2.2 Rise in Communal Tensions |
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26 | (2) |
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28 | (1) |
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29 | (1) |
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2.3 Growth of Islamist Militias in India |
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29 | (4) |
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30 | (1) |
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2.3.2 Gujarat Muslim Revenge Force |
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31 | (1) |
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2.3.3 Asif Reza Commando Force |
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31 | (1) |
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2.3.4 The Hyderabad Connection |
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32 | (1) |
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2.4 Indian Mujahideen: A Jihadi Hybrid |
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33 | (4) |
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2.4.1 The Gujarat Riots and Establishment of Indian Mujahideen |
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33 | (2) |
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2.4.2 Public Emergence of Indian Mujahideen |
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35 | (1) |
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2.4.3 Crackdown and Continuing Operations |
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36 | (1) |
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2.5 Organizational Overview |
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37 | (3) |
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2.5.1 Structure and Finance |
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37 | (2) |
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39 | (1) |
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39 | (1) |
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2.5.4 Tactics and Training |
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39 | (1) |
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2.6 IM's Links to Other Organizations |
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40 | (2) |
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40 | (1) |
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41 | (1) |
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42 | (7) |
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43 | (6) |
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3 Temporal Probabilistic Behavior Rules |
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49 | (12) |
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51 | (1) |
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52 | (2) |
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54 | (1) |
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3.4 Extracting SOMA-Rules Automatically |
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55 | (3) |
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3.5 Automatically Extracting TP-Rules |
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58 | (1) |
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59 | (2) |
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59 | (2) |
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61 | (14) |
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4.1 Attacks Against Public Sites and Arrests of Indian Mujahideen Personnel |
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65 | (1) |
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4.2 Attacks Against Public Sites and Communications About Their Campaign |
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65 | (1) |
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4.3 Attacks Against Public Sites and Claims of Responsibility |
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66 | (2) |
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4.4 Attacks on Public Sites and Conferences Held by Indian Mujahideen |
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68 | (1) |
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4.5 Attacks on Public Sites and Membership in Other Non-State Armed Groups |
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68 | (1) |
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4.6 Attacks on Public Sites and the Entertainment of Diplomatic Relations Between India and Pakistan |
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69 | (2) |
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4.7 Operational Hypothesis |
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71 | (1) |
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4.8 Conclusions and Policy Options |
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72 | (3) |
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73 | (2) |
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75 | (14) |
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5.1 Bombings and Arrests of Indian Mujahideen Personnel |
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77 | (1) |
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5.2 Bombings and Indian Mujahideen Communications About Their Terror Campaign |
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78 | (2) |
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5.3 Bombings and Conferences Held by Indian Mujahideen |
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80 | (1) |
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5.4 Bombings and Claims of Responsibility for Past Attacks |
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81 | (1) |
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5.5 Bombings and Membership in Other NSAGs |
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82 | (1) |
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5.6 Bombings and Warming of Diplomatic Relations Between India and Pakistan |
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83 | (1) |
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5.7 Bombings and Internal Conflict Within India |
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84 | (1) |
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5.8 Policy Options and Conclusions |
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85 | (4) |
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86 | (3) |
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6 Simultaneous and Timed Attacks |
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89 | (8) |
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6.1 Simultaneous and Timed Attacks and Conferences |
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91 | (2) |
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6.2 Simultaneous and Timed Attacks by IM and Arrests of IM Personnel |
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93 | (1) |
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6.3 Simultaneous and Timed Attacks and Membership in Other Armed Groups |
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94 | (1) |
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6.4 Conclusions and Policy Options |
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94 | (3) |
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96 | (1) |
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7 Total Deaths in Indian Mujahideen Attacks |
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97 | (10) |
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7.1 Number Killed and Conferences |
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99 | (1) |
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7.2 Numbers Killed and Communications About its Terror Campaign |
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99 | (1) |
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7.3 Number Killed and Arrests of Indian Mujahideen Personnel |
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100 | (1) |
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7.4 Numbers Killed and Improving Diplomatic Relations |
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101 | (1) |
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7.5 Numbers Killed and Relationship with Other NSAGs |
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101 | (1) |
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7.6 Numbers Killed and Claims of Responsibility |
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102 | (1) |
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7.7 Numbers Killed and Internal Conflict Within India |
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103 | (4) |
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105 | (2) |
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8 Computing Policy Options |
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107 | (8) |
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8.1 Policy Analysis Methodology |
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108 | (1) |
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108 | (1) |
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8.3 Computing Policies to Potentially Eliminate (Most) Violent Acts by IM |
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109 | (2) |
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8.4 Note on Alternate Policy Computation Methodologies |
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111 | (1) |
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112 | (3) |
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113 | (2) |
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9 Suggested Counter-Terrorism Policies |
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115 | (18) |
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9.1 Arrests of IM Personnel |
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119 | (2) |
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9.2 IM Communication About Terror Campaign |
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121 | (1) |
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122 | (1) |
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9.4 IM Claims of Responsibility |
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123 | (1) |
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9.5 Warming of India--Pakistan Diplomatic Relations |
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124 | (1) |
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9.6 Monitoring Internal Religious Conflict Within India |
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125 | (2) |
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9.7 Disrupting IM's Relationship with Other NSAGs |
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127 | (1) |
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128 | (5) |
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130 | (3) |
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10 Building a National Counter-Terrorism Center |
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133 | (8) |
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134 | (1) |
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10.2 The Indian Experience |
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135 | |
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137 | (1) |
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10.4 The Future of NCTC-India |
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138 | (3) |
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139 | (2) |
Appendix A Data Methodology |
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141 | (10) |
Appendix B List of All Terrorist Attacks Carried Out by IM |
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151 | (6) |
Appendix C List of All Temporal Probabilistic Rules Presented in this Book |
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157 | (4) |
Appendix D Instances of Improved Diplomatic Relations Between India and Pakistan |
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161 | (2) |
Appendix E Instances of Indian Mujahideens Conferences |
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163 | (2) |
Appendix F Indian Mujahideen Claims of Responsibility for Attacks |
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165 | (2) |
Appendix G Instances of Indian Mujahideen Communications About Its Terror Campaign |
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167 | (2) |
Index |
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169 | |