| Preface |
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iii | |
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ix | |
| Summary |
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xi | |
| Acknowledgments |
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xxi | |
| Abbreviations |
|
xxiii | |
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Chapter One Introduction: The Autocratic Challenge and Internet Freedom |
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1 | (16) |
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Political Space and the Internet |
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4 | (3) |
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7 | (5) |
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Introduction to Internet Freedom Programs |
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12 | (2) |
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Organization of the Report |
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14 | (3) |
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Chapter Two The Internet and Political Process in Different Regimes |
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17 | (26) |
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Is the Internet Transforming Politics? Where and How? |
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19 | (5) |
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Cyberactivism in Democratic and Nondemocratic Regimes |
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24 | (4) |
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How and Where Can Internet Freedom (Technologies) Transform Political Space? |
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28 | (10) |
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Political Communication and Social Mobilization |
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29 | (3) |
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Internet Freedom and Framing Process |
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32 | (1) |
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32 | (3) |
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Bloggers, Netizens, and Political Space |
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35 | (1) |
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Web 2.0 Users and Political Space |
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35 | (2) |
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Online Activists and Political Space |
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37 | (1) |
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Internet Freedom and the Modes of Transformation of Political Space |
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38 | (3) |
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41 | (2) |
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Chapter Three Cyberactivists, Social Media, and the Anti-Mubarak Protests in Egypt |
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43 | (30) |
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Social Media's Significance: The Debate |
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47 | (8) |
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48 | (1) |
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49 | (6) |
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How Social Media Bridged Egypt's Mobilization Gaps |
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55 | (15) |
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Social Media Was the Opposition's Only Tool for Reaching and Mobilizing a Mass Base |
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55 | (10) |
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No Other Opposition Force Would Confront the State with Mass Action |
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65 | (3) |
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Military Considered Defection Only After Demonstrations Grew and It Was Forced to Either Shoot or Remove Mubarak |
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68 | (2) |
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Conclusion: What This Means for the Study of Social Media |
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70 | (3) |
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Chapter Four Internet Freedom and Political Change in Syria |
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73 | (20) |
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Internet Usage by the Numbers |
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74 | (3) |
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77 | (2) |
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Use of the Internet in the Syrian Uprising |
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79 | (10) |
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Circumvention Technologies During the Protests |
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82 | (1) |
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83 | (4) |
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87 | (2) |
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How Internet Freedom Affected Political Change in Syria |
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89 | (4) |
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Chapter Five The Internet in China: Threatened Tool of Expression and Mobilization |
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93 | (26) |
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Netizens and Authorities in Cyberspace |
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95 | (1) |
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Censorship and Circumvention Methods |
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96 | (5) |
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Online Activists and Authorities in Political Space |
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101 | (2) |
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Online Mobilization and Policy Outcomes |
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103 | (9) |
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104 | (3) |
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107 | (3) |
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Internet and Popular Mobilization in Rural Areas |
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110 | (2) |
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Ethnic Riots and the Internet |
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112 | (4) |
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Internet Freedom Technologies: Tools for the Motivated Elites or Mass-Use Technologies? |
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116 | (3) |
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Chapter Six Fighting Electoral Fraud in the 2011 Russian Election with Internet and Social Media |
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119 | (30) |
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Critical Information and Postelection Protests |
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120 | (4) |
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124 | (6) |
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Russian Authorities and Cyberactivists |
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127 | (3) |
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Golos and Online Election Fraud Reporting |
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130 | (9) |
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Golos and Citizens' Whistle-Blowing |
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133 | (6) |
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Electoral Fraud, Social Media, and Post-Election Protests |
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139 | (6) |
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Social Media and Voter Mobilization |
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141 | (4) |
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145 | (4) |
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Chapter Seven Information Freedom During the Cold Wars The Impact of Western Radio Broadcasts |
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149 | (36) |
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Short-Term and Long-Term Objectives of RFE/RL |
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150 | (7) |
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Measuring the Size of RFE/RL Audiences and Determining Its Effectiveness |
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157 | (5) |
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The Role of RFE/RL in Social Unrest |
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162 | (9) |
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Learning from the Cold War Experience: Lessons and Analysis from Communist Archives for Promoting Internet Freedom |
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171 | (14) |
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What Impact Did U.S. Policymakers Hope to Achieve Through Their Efforts to Improve Communist Citizens' Access to Outside Information? |
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171 | (2) |
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How Could RFE/RL Safely Assist Opposition Figures and Parties to the Communist Regime? How Did this Assistance Affect the Political Space? |
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173 | (3) |
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What Did Communist Authorities Hope to Achieve Through Jamming Western Radio Broadcasts? How Did Western Broadcasters Attempt to Overcome Jamming? Did Jamming Alter the Impact of Western Radio Broadcasts? |
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176 | (3) |
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Who Was the Target Audience for Western Short-Wave Broadcasts? How Confrontational Toward Communist Authorities Should the Broadcasts Be? |
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179 | (3) |
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How Did U.S. Policymakers Measure Success in the Medium and Long Term of Western Radio Broadcasts? |
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182 | (3) |
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Chapter Eight Internet Freedom: Measure and Countermeasure |
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185 | (18) |
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The Struggle for Internet Freedom: A Multiplayer Strategic Competition |
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190 | (2) |
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Countermeasures and Counter-Countermeasures |
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192 | (5) |
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192 | (1) |
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193 | (1) |
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Site and Content Blocking |
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194 | (2) |
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196 | (1) |
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Pwning Dissident Computers |
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196 | (1) |
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Finding and Targeting Dissidents Through Their Internet Use |
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197 | (4) |
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198 | (1) |
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199 | (1) |
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199 | (1) |
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Greater Surveillance of Mobile Communication |
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200 | (1) |
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The Future Architecture of the Internet |
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201 | (2) |
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Chapter Nine Key Findings and Policy Implications for Internet Freedom Programs' Design |
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203 | (20) |
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Summary of Case Studies: The Relationship Between Internet Freedom and Political Space |
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204 | (7) |
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Impact of Opportunity Structures on the Outcomes of Online Mobilization |
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211 | (2) |
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Implications for the Design and Implementation of Internet Freedom Programs |
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213 | (3) |
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Leveraging Internet Freedom Programs: Maximizing Their Impact and Understanding Their Limitations |
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216 | (7) |
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Electoral Fraud Variable and Summary Statistics for the Russia Case Study |
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223 | (8) |
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231 | |
