This book explores whether there exists a distinct form of cognitive phenomenality that cannot be reduced to sensory experience. To investigate this central question in the cognitive phenomenology debate from an introspective-empirical perspective, the method of introspection is examinedalong with its challenges and criticismsthrough an evaluation of both historical and contemporary approaches to introspective research. In addition, a qualitative-empirical study of thinking activity is conducted to uncover performative and agentive phenomena, which may serve as arguments for a cognitively phenomenal dimension irreducible to sensory or emotional experience.
1 Introduction.- 2 Cognitive Phenomenology Debate.- 3 Introspection.- 4
Empirical Study.- 5 Discussion: Cognitive Phenomenology and First-Person
Experience.- 6 Summary and Outlook.- 7 References.
Dr. Jonas Raggatz has been deeply engaged with the topic of consciousness for many years. After earning his B.Sc. in Biology and M.Sc. in Philosophy-Neuroscience-Cognition, he worked as a research associate in the field of transdisciplinary consciousness studies at Alanus University, where he also completed his doctoral dissertation with the present work. Since 2024, he has been a research associate at Witten/Herdecke University. His research focuses include epistemology, introspection, the mind-body problem, and thinking.
