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Investor State Arbitration in a Changing World Order [Pehme köide]

Resar and Cheng examine the challenges to investor-state arbitration, and calls for reform from across the political spectrum. Whiling lauding recent reforms as enhancing the quality of justice rendered in arbitration, they argue that these are insufficient to resolve the domestic political challenges that investor-state arbitration faces. The only way to preserve the institution of investor-state arbitration, they say, is to convince broad populations to support the international flow of capital and the independent resolution of disputes arising from it. Such political support will remain tenuous at best, they predict, until and unless there is a more equitable distribution of the benefits from the international flow of capital. Annotation ©2021 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR (protoview.com)

Investor State Arbitration In A Changing World Order addresses challenges and reform proposals that dominate contemporary discussion of investor state arbitration. The authors argue that, although important for the institution’s development, current reforms are insufficient to guarantee investor state arbitration’s survival. Instead, if international investment arbitration is to survive and flourish, national governments must distribute more equally the benefits of international investment and trade.
Investor State Arbitration in a Changing World Order
1(78)
Alexander W. Resar
Tai-Heng Cheng
Abstract 1(1)
Keywords 1(1)
Preface 2(1)
Introduction: The Intertwined Fates of the Liberal Order and Investor-State Arbitration 3(10)
Part 1 The Development of Investor-State Arbitration
13(14)
1 Diplomatic Protection and Early Investment Arbitration
15(5)
2 Institutionalized Investment Protections: Investor-State Arbitration
20(5)
3 The Collapse of the Capital-Importing/Capital-Exporting Binary
25(2)
Part 2 Contextualizing the Backlash against Investor-State Arbitration
27(31)
1 The Nationalist Return to Mercantilism
29(9)
1.1 The Populist Challenge to ISA in Capital-Importing States
30(3)
1.2 The Unprincipled Challenge to ISA in Capital-Exporting States
33(3)
1.3 The Neo-Mercantilist Challenge to ISA in Capital-Exporting States
36(2)
2 Investor-State Arbitration's Democratic Legitimacy Deficiency
38(20)
2.1 The Weaker Challenge
40(5)
2.2 The Stronger Challenge
45(5)
2.3 The Inadequacy of Existing Attempts to Legitimate ISA
50(8)
Part 3 Reforming Investor-State Arbitration
58(21)
1 Incremental and Internal Reform
62(6)
2 Systemic Reform through Permanent Courts and Appellate Bodies
68(7)
3 State-Centric Systems of Control
75(4)
Conclusion: The Future of Investor State Arbitration 79(2)
References 81
Alexander W. Resar, J.D. (2017), Yale Law School, is an associate at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP. His practice involves litigation and arbitration of international disputes. He has also published articles on international law and United States public law.





Tai-Heng Cheng, is global Co-Head of International Arbitration and Trade, and Co-Managing Partner (Singapore) of Sidley Austin LLP. Formerly a tenured law professor in the United States, he is the author of four books and over 60 articles, which courts and tribunals have cited and relied on as authoritative.