Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

Justifying Violent Protest: Law and Morality in Democratic States [Kõva köide]

  • Formaat: Hardback, 168 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 500 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 30-Dec-2022
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 1032226935
  • ISBN-13: 9781032226934
  • Formaat: Hardback, 168 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 500 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 30-Dec-2022
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 1032226935
  • ISBN-13: 9781032226934
This book presents a radical, but compelling, argument that liberal democracies must be able accommodate violent protest. We often think of violent protest as being alien to liberal democracy, an extraordinary occurrence within our peaceful societies. Yet this is simply untrue. Violent protest is a frequent and normal part of democratic life. The real question is: should it be? Can rebellion or riot against government ever be morally justifiable in our society? By framing state demands for obedience as "legitimacy claims," or moral arguments, states who make illogical and unjust laws make weaker arguments for obedience. This in turn gives citizens stronger moral reasons to disobey. Violence can act as moral dialogue with expressive and instrumental value in denouncing unjust laws and can have just as important a role in democracy as peaceful protest. This book examines the activism of Hong Kong pro-democracy protesters, Extinction Rebellion, Black Lives Matter, and many other groups internationally, in order to demonstrate that not only can violent protest be acceptable; in times of grave injustice, it is unavoidable. This book will appeal to a broad range of academics, in legal and political theory, sociolegal studies, criminology, history, and philosophy, as well as others with interests in contemporary forms of protest.
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction 1(13)
Why violent protest?
1(1)
Theoretical background
2(3)
Chapter synopsis
5(2)
Theoretical frames
7(2)
Theoretical presumptions
9(5)
1 Constitutional morality
14(17)
Liberal democratic theory: a very brief overview
16(3)
Moral grounds and constitutional morality
19(6)
Difficulties with constitutional moral principles
25(2)
Chapter 1 conclusion
27(4)
2 Legitimacy
31(21)
Introduction
31(1)
Conceptions of legitimacy
32(1)
Consent
33(1)
Sociological theories
34(1)
Normative rationality
35(3)
Legitimacy claims
38(1)
Legitimation and constitutionality
39(2)
Limitations to this concept
41(1)
State legitimacy
41(1)
Chaos
42(2)
Does a poor legitimacy claim generate automatic duties to disobey?
44(1)
Prima facie duties of obedience and "everyday law"
44(2)
Amoral constitutions and states
46(2)
Chapter 2 conclusion
48(4)
3 Protest as a legitimacy counterclaim in democratic constitutions
52(15)
Protest: a brief theoretical overview
53(3)
Protest, constitutional morality, and legitimacy claims
56(1)
Caveats
57(2)
Illustrative cases of legitimacy claims in protest
59(3)
Chapter 3 conclusion
62(5)
4 Violent protest as a legitimacy counterclaim in democratic constitutions
67(32)
Overview
67(1)
Definitions of violence
68(8)
The roles of political violence
76(5)
Violent protests as legitimacy counterclaims: the language of violence
81(6)
State violence
87(2)
Chapter 4 conclusion
89(10)
5 General limitations to violent protest
99(35)
"General and specific" limitations to political violence
99(1)
General limitations to violence in protest
100(1)
Illegality
101(2)
Violence as innately immoral
103(8)
Nonviolence as preference
111(6)
Needlessness
117(3)
Instrumentality
120(4)
Social cohesion
124(3)
Chapter 5 conclusion: learning from limitations
127(7)
6 Specific limitations to the legitimacy of violent protest
134(22)
"Legitimate" state monopolies on violence
135(2)
The liberty objection
137(3)
The rule of law or justice objection
140(4)
The democracy objection
144(5)
Chapter 6 conclusion: justifying violent protest
149(7)
Conclusions 156(3)
The US Capitol incident and beyond 159(2)
One last comment: passing on the torch 161(4)
Index 165
James Greenwood-Reeves is Lecturer at the School of Law, University of Leeds, United Kingdom.