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Labour Unions, Public Policy and Economic Growth [Pehme köide]

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(University of Helsinki)
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 252 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 229x152x15 mm, kaal: 380 g, Worked examples or Exercises
  • Ilmumisaeg: 20-May-2010
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0521144051
  • ISBN-13: 9780521144056
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Labour Unions, Public Policy and Economic GrowthSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 252 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 229x152x15 mm, kaal: 380 g, Worked examples or Exercises
  • Ilmumisaeg: 20-May-2010
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0521144051
  • ISBN-13: 9780521144056
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9780521144056.html
Märksõnad:
Collective bargaining is still the main vehicle for labour worldwide to negotiate with management in both the public and private sectors. This book presents a new theoretical model of union bargaining. It challenges the commonly held view that collective bargaining has a negative impact on economic welfare and argues that with the existence of market failure, collective bargaining can be welfare enhancing. This book will be a research resourse for scholars, profesionals and policy-makers and supplementary reading for upper-level courses in labour economics, public economics, game theory and international economics.

Collective bargaining is still the main vehicle worldwide for labor to negotiate with management in both the public and private sectors. This book presents a new theoretical model of union bargaining. It challenges the commonly held view that collective bargaining has a negative impact on economic welfare and argues that with the existence of market failure, collective bargaining can be welfare enhancing. This book will be a research resource for scholars, professionals and policymakers and supplementary reading for upper-level courses in labor economics, public economics, game theory and international economics.

Muu info

A theoretical model of union bargaining, challenging the view that collective bargaining always has a negative impact on welfare.
List of figures
xi
Preface xiii
Overview 1(5)
1 Basic concepts of game theory
6(21)
1.1 Introduction
6(1)
1.2 The application of games to labour economics
6(3)
1.3 Strategic games
9(4)
1.4 Extensive games
13(3)
1.5 Repeated games
16(1)
1.6 Bargaining with alternating offers
17(3)
1.7 Asymmetric bargaining with alternating offers
20(3)
1.8 Conclusions
23(4)
Appendix la The proof of proposition 1.1
24(3)
2 Collective bargaining without investment
27(26)
2.1 Introduction
27(1)
2.2 The agents
28(4)
2.3 The use of two-part wages
32(2)
2.4 Hidden profits
34(3)
2.5 The right-to-manage model
37(4)
2.6 The case of many unions
41(6)
2.7 Conclusions
47(6)
Appendix 2a The proof of relations (2.13)
48(1)
Appendix 2b The proof of proposition 2.2
49(1)
Appendix 2c The proof of functions (2.31)
50(1)
Appendix 2d The proof of proposition 2.5
50(3)
3 The use of corrective taxes and subsidies
53(24)
3.1 Introduction
53(2)
3.2 The structure of the economy
55(4)
3.3 The private agents
59(2)
3.4 Exogenous wages
61(2)
3.5 Endogenous wages
63(2)
3.6 Public policy
65(2)
3.7 Profit-sharing
67(2)
3.8 Conclusions
69(8)
Appendix 3a The proof of function (3.17)
70(2)
Appendix 3b The proof of result (3.29)
72(2)
Appendix 3c The proof of result (3.35)
74(3)
4 Taxation and production efficiency
77(20)
4.1 Introduction
77(1)
4.2 The framework
78(1)
4.3 General equilibrium
79(4)
4.4 Public policy
83(2)
4.5 Wage-setting in the public sector
85(3)
4.6 Private profits
88(3)
4.7 Conclusions
91(6)
Appendix 4a The proof of propositions 4.1-4.4
92(3)
Appendix 4b The proof of proposition 4.5
95(1)
Appendix 4c The proof of proposition 4.8
95(2)
5 Credibility in collective bargaining
97(26)
5.1 Introduction
97(1)
5.2 The model
98(2)
5.3 One-shot bargaining
100(7)
5.4 The formation of reputation
107(3)
5.5 Conclusions
110(13)
Appendix 5a The proof of proposition 5.1
112(1)
Appendix 5b The proof of proposition 5.2
113(1)
Appendix 5c The proof of proposition 5.3
114(1)
Appendix 5d The proof of proposition 5.4
115(1)
Appendix 5e The proof of proposition 5.5
116(2)
Appendix 5f The proof of proposition 5.6
118(5)
6 Monopoly unions and sluggish investment
123(18)
6.1 Introduction
123(1)
6.2 The model
124(2)
6.3 The dynamic game
126(1)
6.4 Credible contracts
127(2)
6.5 Non-credible contracts
129(3)
6.6 The formation of reputation
132(1)
6.7 Conclusions
133(8)
Appendix 6a The proof of results (6.12)
134(1)
Appendix 6b The proof of proposition 6.1
135(2)
Appendix 6c Optimization with autonomous systems
137(1)
Appendix 6d The proof of results (6.18)
138(1)
Appendix 6e The proof of proposition 6.3
138(1)
Appendix 6f The derivation of equations (6.21)
139(2)
7 Ordinary wages versus profit-sharing
141(18)
7.1 Introduction
141(1)
7.2 The model
142(2)
7.3 Collective bargaining
144(3)
7.4 The choice of the regime
147(4)
7.5 Conclusions
151(8)
Appendix 7a The proof of proposition 7.1
152(3)
Appendix 7b The proof of results (7.24) and (7.25)
155(4)
8 Unions and economic growth
159(41)
8.1 Introduction
159(2)
8.2 The setting
161(3)
8.3 The overall structure of the model
164(2)
8.4 The behaviour of the individual agents
166(3)
8.5 Steady state with given labour inputs
169(2)
8.6 Collective bargaining
171(3)
8.7 Non-unionized workers
174(1)
8.8 Profit-sharing
175(2)
8.9 Welfare evaluation
177(1)
8.10 Conclusions
178(22)
Appendix 8a The proof of equation (8.11)
180(1)
Appendix 8b The proof of conditions (8.18)
181(2)
Appendix 8c The proof of functions (8.25)
183(2)
Appendix 8d The proof of functions (8.30) and (8.31)
185(1)
Appendix 8e The proof of proposition 8.1
186(9)
Appendix 8f The proof of proposition 8.2
195(1)
Appendix 8g The proof of proposition 8.3
195(3)
Appendix 8h The proof of proposition 8.4
198(2)
9 Unions and international specialization
200(30)
9.1 Introduction
200(2)
9.2 The setting
202(3)
9.3 The overall structure of the model
205(3)
9.4 The behaviour of the individual agents
208(3)
9.5 Balanced growth
211(1)
9.6 Unionized economy
212(3)
9.7 Non-unionized workers
215(1)
9.8 Profit-sharing
216(1)
9.9 Welfare evaluation
217(2)
9.10 Conclusions
219(11)
Appendix 9a The proof of relations (9.24) and (9.25)
220(3)
Appendix 9b The proof of proposition 9.1
223(3)
Appendix 9c The proof of proposition 9.2
226(1)
Appendix 9d The proof of proposition 9.4
227(3)
References 230(4)
Index 234