Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial Agents [Pehme köide]

  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 264 pages, kõrgus x laius: 229x152 mm, kaal: 392 g, 1 Table, 2 Figures
  • Ilmumisaeg: 18-Jul-2011
  • Kirjastus: The University of Michigan Press
  • ISBN-10: 0472051458
  • ISBN-13: 9780472051458
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 264 pages, kõrgus x laius: 229x152 mm, kaal: 392 g, 1 Table, 2 Figures
  • Ilmumisaeg: 18-Jul-2011
  • Kirjastus: The University of Michigan Press
  • ISBN-10: 0472051458
  • ISBN-13: 9780472051458
Teised raamatud teemal:

“An extraordinarily good synthesis from an amazing range of philosophical, legal, and technological sources . . .  the book will appeal to legal academics and students, lawyers involved in e-commerce and cyberspace legal issues, technologists, moral philosophers, and intelligent lay readers interested in high tech issues, privacy, [ and] robotics.”
—Kevin Ashley, University of Pittsburgh School of Law

 

As corporations and government agencies replace human employees with online customer service and automated phone systems, we become accustomed to doing business with nonhuman agents. If artificial intelligence (AI) technology advances as today’s leading researchers predict, these agents may soon function with such limited human input that they appear to act independently. When they achieve that level of autonomy, what legal status should they have?

Samir Chopra and Laurence F. White present a carefully reasoned discussion of how existing philosophy and legal theory can accommodate increasingly sophisticated AI technology. Arguing for the legal personhood of an artificial agent, the authors discuss what it means to say it has “knowledge” and the ability to make a decision. They consider key questions such as who must take responsibility for an agent’s actions, whom the agent serves, and whether it could face a conflict of interest.

 

Arvustused

"Chopra and White have produced an important and fascinating book on the emerging law of artificial agents. Their work combines a sophisticated understanding of technology with a deep insight about the law. The result is a magisterial survey that ranges over topics from tort liability for bots to the possibility that artificially intelligent agents might acquire legal personhood." Lawrence B. Solum, University of Illinois "In this rigorous and enlightening analysis, Chopra and White . . . effortlessly move from profound examinations of the philosophy of artificial intelligence to practical legal responses to current problems. . . . Chopra and White are indispensable guides to the legal dilemmas of an increasingly automated world." Frank A. Pasquale, Seton Hall University and Princeton University Center for Information Technology Policy

Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1(4)
Chapter 1 Artificial Agents and Agency
5(24)
1.1 Agency and the Intentional Stance
11(7)
1.2 Artificial Agents and Legal Agency
18(7)
1.3 The Implications of Applying Agency Doctrine to Artificial Agents
25(2)
1.4 A Note on Terminology and Scope
27(2)
Chapter 2 Artificial Agents and Contracts
29(42)
2.1 The Contracting Problem
29(2)
2.2 Solutions to the Contracting Problem in Closed Systems
31(1)
2.3 Solutions to the Contracting Problem in Open Systems
32(11)
2.4 Evaluating the Application of Agency Doctrine to Artificial Agents
43(18)
2.5 Legislative Responses
61(6)
2.6 Bot Contracting: Register v. Verio and eBay v. Bidder's Edge
67(2)
2.7 Conclusion
69(2)
Chapter 3 Attribution of Knowledge to Artificial Agents and Their Principals
71(48)
3.1 Attributing Knowledge to Artificial Agents
72(10)
3.2 Law's Epistemology
82(3)
3.3 Corporate Knowledge and Artificial Agents
85(13)
3.4 Applications of the Analysis and the Legal Doctrines
98(19)
3.5 Conclusion
117(2)
Chapter 4 Tort Liability for Artificial Agents
119(34)
4.1 Navigating Analogies
119(4)
4.2 Liability Schemes for Artificial Agents Understood as Instrumentalities
123(4)
4.3 Liability Schemes for Artificial Agents Understood as Actors and Agents
127(8)
4.4 Liability of Suppliers of Artificial Agents
135(10)
4.5 Responsibility and Liability of the Artificial Agent
145(5)
4.6 Conclusion
150(3)
Chapter 5 Personhood for Artificial Agents
153(40)
5.1 Could Artificial Agents Be Legal Persons?
153(7)
5.2 According Dependent Legal Personality to Artificial Agents
160(2)
5.3 According Independent Legal Personality to Artificial Agents
162(9)
5.4 Philosophical Objections to Personhood for Artificial Agents
171(11)
5.5 The Significance of Personhood Jurisprudence
182(4)
5.6 Recognizing Artificial Agents as Persons
186(3)
5.7 Conclusion
189(4)
Notes 193(28)
References 221(22)
Index 243
Samir Chopra is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

Laurence F. White is a lawyer and policymaker specializing in law and technology and financial markets regulation.