Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

Legislative Priority Rule and the EU Internal Market for Goods: A Constitutional Approach [Kõva köide]

(Guest lecturer, Saint-Louis University)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 320 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 240x164x29 mm, kaal: 636 g
  • Sari: Oxford Studies in European Law
  • Ilmumisaeg: 01-Sep-2022
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0192856219
  • ISBN-13: 9780192856210
Teised raamatud teemal:
Legislative Priority Rule and the EU Internal Market for Goods: A Constitutional ApproachSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 320 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 240x164x29 mm, kaal: 636 g
  • Sari: Oxford Studies in European Law
  • Ilmumisaeg: 01-Sep-2022
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0192856219
  • ISBN-13: 9780192856210
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9780192856210.html
Märksõnad:
The process of integrating the internal market for goods is intrinsically bound up with the question of how to divide and exercise public power without undermining free movement. The founding Treaties allow for this debate to play out by both protecting the free movement of goods and allowing
for national regulatory input. The EU legislator is also empowered to resolve persisting tensions in this field between diversity and centralization, market integration and market regulation, and as regards the question of who decides.

As guarantor of the rule of law, the European Court of Justice must pay heed to such legislative input in a manner that preserves the principle of institutional balance and the hierarchy of norms. To do so, it often relies on the Legislative Priority Rule as its 'constitutional compass'. Founded on
the principles of pre-emption and the presumption of constitutionality, this longstanding yet relatively unknown Rule casts exhaustive EU (product) legislation as the Court's sole norm of reference to resolve regulatory disputes, to the exclusion of Articles 34 - 36 TFEU.

To avoid any resulting normative inversion, EU (product) legislation must be acknowledged as accommodating a more complex vertical distribution of power than what is often assumed. To this end, the book suggests replacing harmonization models with a new framework to better describe and assess the
impact of EU legislation, and to facilitate transparent, rational, and Treaty-compliant dispute resolution.
Table of Cases
xv
Table of Legislation
xxxi
Table of European Union primary law and International Instruments
xxxvii
List of Abbreviations
xxxix
1 The Legislative Priority Rule and the Internal Market for Goods
1(35)
1 Introduction
1(3)
2 Regulating the Internal Market for Goods
4(14)
2.1 The `How' of the Internal Market for Goods
5(3)
2.2 `Harmonization' Before Adoption of the Single European Act
8(1)
2.2.1 An absolutist vision of total harmonization
8(3)
2.2.2 A nuanced reality
11(3)
2.2.3 A growing need for concrete change
14(1)
2.3 A New Vision for the Internal Market
15(3)
3 Representation and Control Within the Treaty Framework
18(15)
3.1 Member States in the EU Decision-Making Process
19(1)
3.1.1 Article 34 TFEU and `market access'
20(3)
3.1.2 An avenue for national Voice
23(2)
3.2 Exercising and Controlling EU Legislative Power
25(5)
3.3 Introducing the Legislative Priority Rule
30(3)
4 Outline of the Book
33(3)
2 Foundations: The Principles Underlying the Legislative Priority Rule
36(62)
1 Introduction
36(2)
2 The Pre-emption Principle
38(16)
2.1 An Autonomous Concept with a Legislation-Based Definition
41(1)
2.1.1 An autonomous concept
41(3)
2.1.2 An effect of EU (internal market) legislation
44(1)
2.2 Establishing Pre-emptive Effects
45(1)
2.2.1 The search for balance
46(3)
2.2.2 The US approach
49(2)
2.2.3 The pre-emptive effects of EU legislation
51(3)
3 The Presumption of Constitutionality
54(42)
3.1 The Judiciary and the Legislator
56(1)
3.1.1 Conceptualizing a complex relationship
57(1)
3.1.1.1 The judiciary and legislator: two visions
58(2)
3.1.1.2 The EU citizens'saga
60(5)
3.1.2 The bridge of deference
65(4)
3.1.3 The presumption of constitutionality
69(3)
3.2 The Presumption of Constitutionality and the Legislative Priority Rule
72(1)
3.2.1 The constitutional dimension of EU product rules
72(6)
3.2.2 Limiting the legislator
78(1)
3.2.2.1 The Damocles sword of judicial review
78(3)
3.2.2.2 Consistent interpretation of EU legislation
81(3)
3.2.2.3 Reviewing national acts of discretion
84(2)
3.2.3 Empowering the EU legislator
86(1)
3.2.3.1 A presumption of reconciliation
87(2)
3.2.3.2 A presumption of proportionality
89(4)
3.2.3.3 Room to reset the balance?
93(3)
4 Conclusion
96(2)
3 Development: From Ad Hoc Guideline to Constitutional Compass
98(59)
1 Introduction
98(1)
2 Establishment (1956-1993)
99(27)
2.1 Establishing the Tedeschi Leg
99(1)
2.1.1 The origins of the Tedeschi leg
99(3)
2.1.2 Tedeschi v Denkavit
102(3)
2.1.3 The Tedeschi deal
105(1)
2.2 The Second Leg Emerges Slowly
106(1)
2.2.1 The Legislative Priority Rule and the Common Agricultural Policy
106(2)
2.2.2 Articles 34-35 TFEU persist as norms of reference
108(4)
2.2.3 Establishing the Legislative Priority Rule
112(1)
2.3 From an Ad Hoc `Exhaustion Approach' to a Systematically Applied Rule
113(1)
2.3.1 The Court's analytical approaches
114(1)
2.3.1.1 The exhaustion approach
114(1)
2.3.1.2 The classic approach
115(1)
2.3.1.3 The mixed approach
115(1)
2.3.1.4 Dual analysis
116(1)
2.3.2 Assessing the analytical approaches
117(1)
2.3.2.1 Managing the relationship between primary and secondary law
117(2)
2.3.2.2 The Piageme saga
119(2)
2.3.2.3 The Cosmetics Directive saga
121(2)
2.3.3 The `exhaustion approach' as the Court's preference
123(3)
3 Refinement (1990s to the Present Day)
126(28)
3.1 Triggering the Legislative Priority Rule
127(1)
3.1.1 Discarding `necessity' and `monitoring compliance'
127(1)
3.1.1.1 Harmonizing the `necessary' measures
128(1)
3.1.1.2 Monitoring compliance with the Community standard
129(1)
3.1.2 Triggering the Legislative Priority Rule
130(1)
3.1.2.1 Establishing regulatory scope
131(2)
3.1.2.2 Establishing regulatory character
133(3)
3.1.3 The relevance of time
136(2)
3.2 The Second Leg of the Legislative Priority Rule
138(1)
3.2.1 The second leg and the hierarchy of norms
138(1)
3.2.1.1 Bristol-Meyers Squibb
139(2)
3.2.1.2 DaimlerChrysler
141(3)
3.2.2 Resolving the Cosmetics Directive saga
144(2)
3.2.3 The need for judicial vigilance
146(2)
3.3 Reversing the Legislative Priority Rule
148(1)
3.3.1 The Court's residual jurisdiction
148(1)
3.3.2 Legislative amendments
149(1)
3.3.3 Treaty-based derogations
150(1)
3.3.3.1 Article 114 (4-5) TFEU
150(2)
3.3.3.2 Article 193 TFEU
152(2)
4 Conclusion
154(3)
4 Application: The Legislative Priority Rule Before the Court
157(64)
1 Introduction
157(1)
2 Case Law Review: Enforcing and Limiting the Effects of EU Product Rules
158(21)
2.1 The Integrative Effect of EU Legislation
159(7)
2.2 The Regulatory Effect of EU Legislation
166(7)
2.3 The Conditional Effect of EU Legislation
173(5)
2.4 Summarizing the Case Law Review
178(1)
3 Assessing the Case Law
179(40)
3.1 Reflecting the Varied Legislative Acquis
180(1)
3.1.1 Triggering the Legislative Priority Rule
181(2)
3.1.2 Applying the Legislative Priority Rule
183(3)
3.1.3 Respecting the free movement of goods
186(2)
3.2 An Inconsistent Judicial Approach?
188(1)
3.2.1 Some `inconsistent' Court judgments
188(1)
3.2.1.1 Triggering the Legislative Priority Rule
189(3)
3.2.1.2 Assessing the national measure
192(2)
3.2.2 Explaining the Court's approach
194(1)
3.2.2.1 The regulatory goal pursued
195(3)
3.2.2.2 The question of time
198(4)
3.2.2.3 Other influencing factors
202(1)
3.3 The Risk of Imbalance
203(1)
3.3.1 An integration or free trade bias?
204(1)
3.3.1.1 Facilitating a low-standards regime
204(4)
3.3.1.2 `Locked in'to a low-standards regime
208(2)
3.3.1.3 The legislative agenda trumps the liberal agenda
210(2)
3.3.2 Undermining free movement of goods?
212(1)
3.3.2.1 Triggering the Legislative Priority Rule
213(1)
3.3.2.2 Assessing the national measure
214(5)
4 Conclusion
219(2)
5 Towards a New Framework for Review
221(28)
1 Introduction
221(1)
2 The Current Framework: A Binary Vision of EU Regulation
221(15)
2.1 A Gap Between the Discourse and Reality of Harmonization
222(4)
2.2 The Court's Response
226(3)
2.3 Consequences of the Binary Vision
229(1)
2.3.1 Mischaracterizing EU legislation and Court judgments
230(3)
2.3.2 Language, choice, and strategy in the courtroom
233(3)
3 Beyond the Binary Vision
236(10)
3.1 A New Categorization for National Measures
237(1)
3.1.1 Treaty-based discretion
237(1)
3.1.2 Direct implementation
237(1)
3.1.3 Legislation-based discretion
238(2)
3.2 The Relevance of `Regulatory Character'
240(3)
3.3 A New Framework for Review
243(3)
4 Conclusion
246(3)
6 Conclusion
249(4)
Select Bibliography 253(12)
Index 265
Eadaoin Ní Chaoimh is a post-doctoral researcher and guest lecturer in EU law and Legal English at Université Saint-Louis, Brussels. She holds a Bachelor Degree in Law and French from Trinity College Dublin (Ireland) and a Masters in EU law from the College of Europe (Bruges, Belgium). Before commencing her PhD, Dr Ní Chaoimh worked in a variety of fields of EU and Irish law, in private practice and civil society organisations.