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Licensing Standard Essential Patents: FRAND and the Internet of Things [Kõva köide]

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(European University Institute, Italy)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 320 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 238x164x22 mm, kaal: 620 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 18-Nov-2021
  • Kirjastus: Hart Publishing
  • ISBN-10: 1509947558
  • ISBN-13: 9781509947553
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Licensing Standard Essential Patents: FRAND and the Internet of ThingsSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 320 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 238x164x22 mm, kaal: 620 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 18-Nov-2021
  • Kirjastus: Hart Publishing
  • ISBN-10: 1509947558
  • ISBN-13: 9781509947553
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9781509947553.html
Märksõnad:
What is the licensing framework of standard essential patents (SEPs) for connectivity standards such as 5G and Wi-Fi? How will the framework change with the Internet of Things (IoT)? This book provides comprehensive answers to these questions.

For over two decades, connectivity standards have been the subject of litigation and controversy around the globe. Now, with the introduction of 5G and the emergence of the world of connected objects, or the IoT, the licensing framework for SEPs is becoming even more contentious. In order to bring clarity to the debate, this book analyses and explains key components of a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licence for SEPs; clarifies the economic, policy and market background of SEP disputes; examines the interrelated application of contract, patent and competition laws; and describes the approaches by courts and regulators in the EU, US and the UK. Importantly, the book also assesses how the experience from the smartphone and ICT industries can be applied in a new environment of the IoT, and considers what needs to be changed in the future SEP licensing landscape.

The book provides a holistic coverage of SEP licensing issues in an attempt to reduce uncertainty within this highly complex and technical area, and will be useful to practitioners, policy makers, SMEs and large technology companies in the IoT, as well as academics interested in the field.

Muu info

This book offers a complete guide for practitioners to the licensing of standard essential patents and an assessment of the licensing framework in the ever-changing environment of the Internet of Things.
Foreword v
Acknowledgements vii
Abbreviations xv
List of Cases and Legislation
xvii
Introduction 1(10)
I Setting the Context
1(6)
II Structure
7(4)
PART I THE STANDARD-DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT
1 Standards, Standard-Development Organisations and Standard Essential Patents
11(27)
I Standards
11(7)
A Technical Interoperability Standards
13(1)
B Classification of Standards
14(1)
i Standards Based on their Source
14(1)
a De Facto Standards
14(1)
b Collaborative Standards
15(1)
c Governmental Standards
16(1)
ii Open and Closed Standards
17(1)
II Standard Development Organisations
18(8)
A Types of SDOs
20(2)
B Membership
22(1)
C How SDOs Develop Standards
22(4)
III Standard Essential Patents
26(11)
A SEPs in IPR Policies of SDOs
28(1)
i Disclosure Rules
28(2)
ii Licensing Rules
30(2)
B The Meaning of Essentiality
32(1)
C The Problem of Over-Disclosure
33(4)
IV Conclusion
37(1)
2 The Dynamics of Standard Essential Patent Licensing: Patent Holdup, Holdout and Royalty Stacking
38(21)
I Industry Convergences and Changing Market Dynamics
38(2)
II Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking
40(6)
A Patent Holdup
40(2)
B Royalty Stacking
42(2)
C The Influence of Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theories
44(2)
III Criticism of Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theories
46(7)
A The Lack of Empirical Evidence of Systematic Negative Effects
47(4)
B The Misunderstanding of the Standardisation Process and Legal Licensing Framework
51(2)
IV Patent Holdout
53(2)
V Conclusion
55(4)
PART II THE MEANING AND CONTENT OF A FRAND LICENCE
3 The Nature of a FRAND Commitment
59(26)
I The Principles and the Text of a FRAND Commitment
59(2)
II The Enforceability of a FRAND Commitment
61(23)
A Contract Law
61(3)
i Can SDO Non-Members Rely on a FRAND Contract?
64(1)
ii Is a FRAND Commitment Sufficiendy Clear to be an Enforceable Contract?
65(2)
iii Transferability of a FRAND Commitment
67(3)
iv Not All Jurisdictions Recognise Third-Party Beneficiary Rights
70(1)
v SDOs Could Clarify the Contractual Nature of a FRAND Commitment
71(1)
B Competition Law
71(1)
i EU Competition Law and Breach of FRAND Commitments
72(5)
ii US Antitrust Law and Breach of FRAND Commitments
77(3)
iii The Role of Competition Law in the SEP Context
80(2)
C Alternative Theories on the Enforceability of FRAND Commitments
82(2)
III Conclusion
84(1)
4 FRAND Royalty
85(39)
I The Principles of FRAND Royalty
86(16)
A The Value of the Technology Itself (the Ex Ante Incremental Value Approach)
87(3)
i Reception in Practice
90(1)
ii Criticism of the Ex Ante Incremental Value Approach
91(1)
a Misunderstanding the Standard-Development Process
92(2)
b Depreciating the Value of SEPs
94(1)
c Not Used in Real-World Commercial Transactions
95(1)
d Inapplicability in Practice
96(3)
B Sharing the Value of Standardisation
99(3)
II Calculating FRAND Royalties in Practice
102(19)
A Comparable Licences
103(3)
i Application in Practice
106(4)
B Top-Down Approach
110(4)
i Application in Practice
114(6)
C Other Approaches
120(1)
III Conclusion
121(3)
5 The Non-Discrimination Requirement of a FRAND Commitment
124(25)
I Positive and Negative Aspects of Price Discrimination in Standard Essential Patent Licensing
125(3)
II The Non-Discrimination Requirement in the Text of a FRAND Commitment
128(2)
III No Requirement to Apply Uniform Terms to All Licensees
130(1)
IV Interpretations of the Non-Discrimination Requirement of a FRAND Commitment
131(14)
A Prohibition of Discrimination between Different Levels of the Production Chain
131(1)
B Prohibiting Price Discrimination of Vertically Integrated SEP Holders against Downstream Competitors
132(1)
C Prohibiting Discrimination against Similarly Situated Licensees
133(1)
i Which Licensees are Similarly Situated?
134(2)
ii When is Dissimilar Treatment Discriminatory?
136(3)
iii What are the Remedies for Discrimination?
139(3)
V The Application of the Non-Discrimination Requirement of a FRAND Commitment
142(3)
VI Confidentiality Agreements and Disclosure of Licences
145(2)
VII Conclusion
147(2)
6 FRAND Royalty Base
149(23)
I Introduction: The End-Product or Component?
149(2)
II The Appropriate FRAND Royalty Base
151(6)
III The Legal Requirement to Use a Particular Royalty Base
157(11)
A Origins and Evolution of the SSPPU Theory
158(1)
i US Patent Damages System and the Emergence of the SSPPU Theory
158(3)
ii Reception and Expansion of the SSPPU Doctrine by the Federal Circuit
161(3)
iii Clarification and Backtracking of the SSPPU Doctrine by the Federal Circuit
164(2)
iv Jury Bias as a Reason for the Introduction of the SSPPU
166(1)
B Conclusion
167(1)
IV The Royalty Base in Standard Essential Patent Litigation
168(2)
V Conclusion
170(2)
7 FRAND and Value Chain Licensing
172(23)
I The Value Chain Licensing Debate
172(2)
II Patent Law and Value Chain Licensing
174(3)
III FRAND Commitments and Value Chain Licensing
177(5)
IV Competition Law and Value Chain Licensing
182(8)
A Refusal to License and EU Competition Law
183(3)
B Article 101 TFEU and the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
186(1)
C Refusal to License and US Antitrust Law
187(3)
V Policy Outlook for the Internet of Things
190(3)
VI Conclusion
193(2)
8 Remedies
195(34)
I Injunctions
195(16)
A Principles of Equity (US Courts)
196(2)
B Public Policy (International Trade Commission)
198(3)
C Unfair Competition (Federal Trade Commission)
201(2)
D Competition Law (EU)
203(3)
i The Interpretation of Huawei v ZTE by National Courts
206(5)
E Conclusion
211(1)
II Global or Territorial Scope of a FRAND Licence?
211(6)
III Antisuit Injunctions
217(4)
IV Past Damages
221(2)
V Procedural Remedies to Facilitate Patent Licensing
223(2)
A A FRAND Trial First
224(1)
B Interim Payments
225(1)
VI Conclusion
225(4)
PART III STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENT LICENSING IN THE INTERNET OF THINGS
9 Standard Essential Patent Licensing in the Internet of Things
229(32)
I Challenges of FRAND Licensing in the Internet of Things
229(2)
II Current Proposals for Improving the Standard Essential Patent Licensing Framework
231(11)
A Transparency of the SEP Landscape
232(3)
B Unilateral Ex Ante Disclosure of Maximum Licensing Terms
235(2)
C Collectively Setting an Aggregate Royalty for a Standard
237(3)
D Global Rate-Setting Tribunals
240(2)
III Collective Licensing Models for the Internet of Things
242(18)
A Patent Pools for the IoT
243(5)
i Overcoming the Obstacles in Pool Formation
248(1)
a Assembling a Critical Number of Upstream Companies is Sufficient
249(2)
b Pool Royalty to Induce Pool Participation and Prevent Free Riding
251(1)
c Division of Royalties
252(2)
d Essentiality Checks
254(1)
e IoT Industry-Specific Licensing Terms
255(2)
f Transparency of Terms and Patents
257(1)
B Implemented Collective Licensing Associations
258(2)
IV Conclusion
260(1)
Bibliography 261(20)
Index 281
Igor Nikolic is Robert Schuman Fellow at the European University Institute, Italy, and Senior Fellow at the Centre for Law, Economics and Society, University College London, UK.