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LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games [Kõva köide]

(Tilburg University)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 512 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 252x173x36 mm, kaal: 1116 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 22-Apr-2005
  • Kirjastus: John Wiley & Sons Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0470015241
  • ISBN-13: 9780470015247
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • Formaat: Hardback, 512 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 252x173x36 mm, kaal: 1116 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 22-Apr-2005
  • Kirjastus: John Wiley & Sons Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0470015241
  • ISBN-13: 9780470015247
Teised raamatud teemal:
Game theory is the theory of social situations, and the majority of research into the topic focuses on how groups of people interact by developing formulas and algorithms to identify optimal strategies and to predict the outcome of interactions. Only fifty years old, it has already revolutionized economics and finance, and is spreading rapidly to a wide variety of fields.

LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games is an assessment of the state of the art in its field and the first modern book on linear-quadratic game theory, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing strategic decision making problems in economics and management. Linear quadratic dynamic models have a long tradition in economics, operations research and control engineering; and the author begins by describing the one-decision maker LQ dynamic optimization problem before introducing LQ differential games.

  • Covers cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, and treats the standard information structures (open-loop and feedback).
  • Includes real-life economic examples to illustrate theoretical concepts and results.
  • Presents problem formulations and sound mathematical problem analysis.
  • Includes exercises and solutions, enabling use for self-study or as a course text.
  • Supported by a website featuring solutions to exercises, further examples and computer code for numerical examples.

LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games offers a comprehensive introduction to the theory and practice of this extensively used class of economic models, and will appeal to applied mathematicians and econometricians as well as researchers and senior undergraduate/graduate students in economics, mathematics, engineering and management science.

Preface ix
Notation and symbols xi
Introduction
1(14)
Historical perspective
1(9)
How to use this book
10(1)
Outline of this book
10(4)
Notes and references
14(1)
Linear algebra
15(48)
Basic concepts in linear algebra
15(6)
Eigenvalues and eigenvectors
21(2)
Complex eigenvalues
23(8)
Cayley-Hamilton theorem
31(3)
Invariant subspaces and Jordan canonical form
34(8)
Semi-definite matrices
42(1)
Algebraic Riccati equations
43(11)
Notes and references
54(1)
Exercises
55(4)
Appendix
59(4)
Dynamical systems
63(58)
Description of linear dynamical systems
64(6)
Existence-uniqueness results for differential equations
70(8)
General case
70(4)
Control theoretic extensions
74(4)
Stability theory: general case
78(5)
Stability theory of planar systems
83(8)
Geometric concepts
91(5)
Performance specifications
96(9)
Examples of differential games
105(9)
Information, commitment and strategies
114(1)
Notes and references
114(1)
Exercises
115(3)
Appendix
118(3)
Optimization techniques
121(54)
Optimization of functions
121(4)
The Euler-Lagrange equation
125(8)
Pontryagin's maximum principle
133(21)
Dynamic programming principle
154(8)
Solving optimal control problems
162(1)
Notes and references
162(1)
Exercises
163(7)
Appendix
170(5)
Regular linear quadratic optimal control
175(54)
Problem statement
175(2)
Finite-planning horizon
177(15)
Riccati differential equations
192(4)
Infinite-planning horizon
196(13)
Convergence results
209(9)
Notes and references
218(1)
Exercises
219(5)
Appendix
224(5)
Cooperative games
229(32)
Pareto solutions
230(10)
Bargaining concepts
240(6)
Nash bargaining solution
246(5)
Numerical solution
251(2)
Notes and references
253(1)
Exercises
254(5)
Appendix
259(2)
Non-cooperative open-loop information games
261(98)
Introduction
264(1)
Finite-planning horizon
265(13)
Open-loop Nash algebraic Riccati equations
278(5)
Infinite-planning horizon
283(16)
Computational aspects and illustrative examples
299(6)
Convergence results
305(7)
Scalar case
312(7)
Economics examples
319(7)
A simple government debt stabilization game
320(2)
A game on dynamic duopolistic competition
322(4)
Notes and references
326(1)
Exercises
327(13)
Appendix
340(19)
Non-cooperative feedback information games
359(68)
Introduction
359(3)
Finite-planning horizon
362(9)
Infinite-planning horizon
371(12)
Two-player scalar case
383(6)
Computational aspects
389(14)
Preliminaries
390(3)
A scalar numerical algorithm: the two-player case
393(6)
The N-player scalar case
399(4)
Convergence results for the two-player scalar case
403(9)
Notes and references
412(1)
Exercises
413(8)
Appendix
421(6)
Uncertain non-cooperative feedback information games
427(58)
Stochastic approach
428(5)
Deterministic approach: introduction
433(2)
The one-player case
435(9)
The one-player scalar case
444(6)
The two-player case
450(5)
A fishery management game
455(6)
A scalar numerical algorithm
461(11)
Stochastic interpretation
472(2)
Notes and references
474(1)
Exercises
475(6)
Appendix
481(4)
References 485(10)
Index 495


Jacob Engwerda is the author of LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games, published by Wiley.