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Macroeconomics of Corruption: Governance and Growth Second Edition 2021 [Kõva köide]

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  • Formaat: Hardback, 345 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, kaal: 699 g, 14 Illustrations, black and white; IX, 345 p. 14 illus., 1 Hardback
  • Sari: Springer Texts in Business and Economics
  • Ilmumisaeg: 21-Apr-2021
  • Kirjastus: Springer Nature Switzerland AG
  • ISBN-10: 3030675564
  • ISBN-13: 9783030675561
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Macroeconomics of Corruption: Governance and Growth Second Edition 2021Suurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 345 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, kaal: 699 g, 14 Illustrations, black and white; IX, 345 p. 14 illus., 1 Hardback
  • Sari: Springer Texts in Business and Economics
  • Ilmumisaeg: 21-Apr-2021
  • Kirjastus: Springer Nature Switzerland AG
  • ISBN-10: 3030675564
  • ISBN-13: 9783030675561
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9783030675561.html
Märksõnad:
This textbook examines corruption through a macroeconomic lens, exploring the relationship between corruption, fiscal policy, and political economy. It merges macroeconomic growth models with elements of political economic theory to address important applied topics such as income inequality within and across countries, growth slowdowns, and fiscal crises. Revised and updated to include new research findings and recent policy discussions, the second edition contains 15 new sections and 2 new chapters on topics such as public defaults, the wage elasticity of work and the interest elasticity of saving, and the economic and fiscal impact of the 2020 pandemic.





Most of the basic ideas are illustrated using a two-period model of government investment that captures the future cost of policies that favor the present. The more subtle and advanced issues are illustrated and, in some cases, quantified, using the overlapping-generations model of economic growth. The models used to illustrate the mechanisms of economic growth are extended to incorporate politics and the behavior of public official. The text concludes with a thorough discussion of policy reforms designed to address the issues discussed in earlier chapters.





Intended for students familiar with intermediate-level economics, the second edition contains a technical appendix, expanded end-of-chapter questions and problems, and a complete solutions manual. The second edition also offers updated resources for instructors, including sample syllabi and over 550 multiple choice questions. Offering a unified explanation for the causes and consequences of government failure, fiscal crisis, and needed policy reforms, this text is appropriate for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate courses in macroeconomics, political economy, and public policy.
1 Introduction
1(30)
1.1 Corruption
2(3)
1.2 Close Cousins: Kleptocracy, Corruption, and Rent-Seeking
5(3)
1.3 Modeling the Government
8(4)
1.3.1 Focus on the National Interest
8(1)
1.3.2 Efficiency of Resource Use
8(1)
1.3.3 Limit Economic Disparity
9(1)
1.3.4 Value Future Generations
9(3)
1.4 Tax Evasion
12(3)
1.5 Taxation and Government Debt
15(3)
1.5.1 Endogenous Tax Rates
15(1)
1.5.2 Endogenous Government Debt
15(3)
1.6 Economic Growth
18(1)
1.7 Modeling the Culture of Corruption
19(1)
1.8 The Big Three: Growth Slowdown, Wage Inequality, and Fiscal Crisis
20(2)
1.9 Policy Reforms
22(2)
1.10 Outline
24(1)
1.11 Exercises
25(6)
References
28(3)
2 Two-Period Model of Government Investment
31(48)
2.1 The Life-Cycle Model of Consumption and Saving
32(3)
2.2 Introducing the Government
35(3)
2.3 The Small-Open Economy Model
38(4)
2.4 Human Capital, Inequality, and Public Debt
42(4)
2.5 Public Debt Defaults
46(2)
2.6 Public Capital and Productivity
48(1)
2.7 Pure and Impure Public Capital
49(2)
2.8 The Allocation of Public Capital
51(2)
2.9 Fiscal Federalism
53(5)
2.10 A Note on Migration
58(1)
2.11 A Dynamic Generational Model
59(4)
2.12 Principles for Tax Collection
63(1)
2.13 Conclusion
63(2)
2.14 Exercises
65(14)
Appendix
73(3)
References
76(3)
3 Politics and Corruption in the Two-Period Model
79(36)
3.1 Fiscal Policy with Policy Makers
81(2)
3.2 The Politics of Investment Allocation
83(4)
3.3 Fiscal Federalism with Politics
87(5)
3.4 Foreign Funding and Regional Inequality
92(2)
3.5 Political Polarization
94(6)
3.6 Interest Groups and Rent Seeking
100(6)
3.7 Determinants of Corruption
106(2)
3.8 Conclusion
108(1)
3.9 Exercises
109(6)
Appendix
112(1)
References
113(2)
4 Overlapping-Generations Model of Economic Growth
115(36)
4.1 Firms, Production, and the Demand for Capital
116(5)
4.1.1 Capital and Labor Shares
119(2)
4.2 Household Saving and the Supply of Capital
121(3)
4.2.1 The Wage Elasticity of Work and the Interest Elasticity of Saving
124(1)
4.3 Competitive Equilibrium in a Growing Economy
124(6)
4.3.1 Transition Equation Analytics
128(1)
4.3.2 From the Capital-Labor Ratio to Worker Productivity Growth
129(1)
4.4 Steady State Growth---Technical Progress
130(2)
4.4.1 Transition Equation Analytics
131(1)
4.4.2 From the Capital-Labor Ratio to Worker Productivity Growth
132(1)
4.5 Quantitative Theory
132(6)
4.6 Beyond Private Capital: Other Sources of Growth
138(2)
4.7 Growth and Welfare
140(5)
4.8 Exercises
145(6)
References
149(2)
5 Fiscal Policy in the Overlapping-Generations Model
151(34)
5.1 Introducing the Government
151(5)
5.1.1 The Fiscal Gap
153(1)
5.1.2 Government Capital and Private Production
154(1)
5.1.3 Households with Taxes and Transfers
155(1)
5.1.4 Capital Market Equilibrium and Fiscal Policy
156(1)
5.2 The Economic Effects of Fiscal Policy---Government Purchases
156(3)
5.2.1 Government Purchases-Consumption
157(1)
5.2.2 Government Purchases-Consumption and Investment
158(1)
5.3 The Economic Effects of Fiscal Policy---Intergenerational Transfers
159(4)
5.3.1 Debt Policy #1
160(1)
5.3.2 Debt Policy #2
161(1)
5.3.3 Government Pensions---Fully Funded
162(1)
5.3.4 Government Pensions---Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG)
162(1)
5.4 Capital Accumulation in an Open Economy
163(4)
5.4.1 Low International Interest Rates
164(1)
5.4.2 Open Capital Markets and Growth in Developing Countries
165(2)
5.5 The Fiscal Crisis
167(4)
5.5.1 The Fundamentals
169(1)
5.5.2 The Politics
170(1)
5.6 Generational Accounting
171(2)
5.7 Fiscal Crises, Financial Crises, and Recessions
173(1)
5.8 Ten Important Results from Economic Theory
174(1)
5.9 Exercises
175(10)
Appendix
181(2)
References
183(2)
6 Politics, Corruption, and Economic Growth
185(36)
6.1 Government: Benevolent Dictator or Kleptocrat?
188(7)
6.2 Wagner's Law and Interest Groups
195(6)
6.3 Tax Evasion
201(1)
6.4 A Benchmark Economy without Corruption-Evasion
202(4)
6.5 An Economy with Corruption and Evasion
206(8)
6.6 Conclusion
214(1)
6.7 Exercises
215(6)
References
217(4)
7 Corruption and Public Debt
221(28)
7.1 Theories of Government Debt
222(2)
7.2 Corruption and Altruism in the Two-Period Model
224(4)
7.3 A Benchmark Economy without Corruption and Evasion
228(5)
7.4 An Economy with Corruption and Evasion
233(8)
7.5 Empirical Evidence
241(4)
7.6 Conclusion
245(1)
7.7 Exercises
245(4)
References
247(2)
8 The Political Economy of Fiscal Reforms
249(42)
8.1 Economic Fundamentals
250(23)
8.1.1 Aging and Rising Health Care Costs
250(3)
8.1.2 Slowing Long-Run Economic Growth
253(6)
8.1.3 Rising Wage Inequality
259(3)
8.1.4 Policies Addressing the Economic Fundamentals
262(11)
8.2 Politics
273(8)
8.2.1 Corruption, Tax Evasion, and Public Debt
274(1)
8.2.2 Interest Groups and Public Debt
275(1)
8.2.3 Transparency
275(4)
8.2.4 Budget Process and Rules
279(1)
8.2.5 Polarization
280(1)
8.2.6 Summary
281(1)
8.3 Reforming Foreign Aid
281(3)
8.3.1 Needed: Accountants without Borders
281(1)
8.3.2 Alternative Pre-conditions for Aid
282(1)
8.3.3 Multi-lateral Aid
282(1)
8.3.4 A Knowledge Bank of Development Projects
283(1)
8.3.5 Deal with Corruption First
283(1)
8.4 Exercises
284(7)
References
286(5)
9 Conclusion
291(34)
9.1 Summary
291(4)
9.1.1 Why Does Sustained Modern Economic Growth Fail to Take-Off?
291(1)
9.1.2 Why Does Foreign Aid to Governments of Developing Countries Fail to Generate Growth?
292(1)
9.1.3 Why Does Long-Run Growth Eventually Slow?
292(1)
9.1.4 Why Is Income Inequality on the Rise?
293(1)
9.1.5 Why Have Fiscal Crises Become Commonplace, Threatening the Prosperity of most Developed Countries?
294(1)
9.2 The Big Four?---Climate Change
295(4)
9.2.1 The Science
295(1)
9.2.2 Economic Effects
296(1)
9.2.3 The Policy Response
297(1)
9.2.4 The Climate Crisis and the Fiscal Crisis
298(1)
9.2.5 Summary
299(1)
9.3 The Big Four?---Robots
299(6)
9.3.1 Smart Machines and the Future of Work
301(1)
9.3.2 A Model with Robots
302(1)
9.3.3 Comments
303(2)
9.4 The Big Four?---Pandemics
305(5)
9.4.1 Short-Run Economic Effects
306(2)
9.4.2 Long-Run Economic Effects
308(1)
9.4.3 New Generational Tensions
309(1)
9.5 Is Government Failure Inevitable?
310(2)
9.6 Historical Lessons?
312(9)
9.6.1 Is the United States, Rome?
313(4)
9.6.2 Other Empires
317(4)
9.7 Suggestions for Further Reading and Study
321(4)
References
322(3)
A Technical Appendix
325(16)
A.1 Two Useful Functions
325(3)
A.2 Optimization
328(4)
A.3 Nonnegativity Constraints and Corner Solutions
332(2)
A.4 Total Differentials and Linear Approximations
334(1)
A.5 L'Hospital's Rule
335(1)
A.6 Expected Utility
336(2)
A.7 Game Theory and Nash Equilibrium
338(1)
A.8 Quadratic Equations
338(1)
A.9 Infinite Series
339(2)
Index 341
Maksym Ivanyna is a Senior Economist at the Joint Vienna Institute, which he joined in 2011. He holds Doctors degrees in Economics from Regensburg University (Germany) and Michigan State University (USA). Apart from teaching at the JVI and other training centers, Maksym has served as a consultant to the IMF, World Bank, European Commission, German Institute for Development, and Centre for EU Enlargement.  





Alex Mourmouras is division chief in the Asia and Pacific department of the IMF where he has served as mission chief for Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia. He was previously division chief in the IMF Institute for Capacity Development and economist in the Funds Policy Development and Review and Fiscal Affairs Departments. He holds a Ph.D in economics from the University of Minnesota and a BA degree from Harvard College (US).





Peter Rangazas is Professor and Masters Program Director, Economics at Indiana UniversityPurdue University Indianapolis (US). He regularly publishes in academic economics journals including the American Economic Review, Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Monetary Economics, and Journal of Economic Growth.  He is coauthor of Economic Growth and Development: A Dynamic Dual Economy Approach, also published by Springer.