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Market Power in EU Antitrust Law [Kõva köide]

  • Formaat: Hardback, 368 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 234x156x21 mm, kaal: 789 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 02-Dec-2011
  • Kirjastus: Hart Publishing
  • ISBN-10: 1841135283
  • ISBN-13: 9781841135281
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Market Power in EU Antitrust LawSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 368 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 234x156x21 mm, kaal: 789 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 02-Dec-2011
  • Kirjastus: Hart Publishing
  • ISBN-10: 1841135283
  • ISBN-13: 9781841135281
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9781841135281.html
Märksõnad:
The notion of market power is central to antitrust law. Under EU law, antitrust rules refer to appreciable restrictions of competition (Article 101(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ex Article 81(1) EC Treaty), the elimination of competition for a substantial part of the market (Article 101 (3) TFEU, ex Article (81(3) EC), dominant positions (Article 10 (2) TFEU, ex Article 82 EC), and substantial impediment to effective competition, in particular by creating or reinforcing a dominant position (Article 2 of the EU Merger Regulation). At first sight, only the concept of dominant position relates to market power, but it is the aim of this book to demonstrate that the other concepts are directly linked to the notion of market power. This is done by reference to the case law of the EU Courts and the precedents of the European Commission. The author goes on to argue that for very good reasons (clarity and enforceability, among others) the rules should be interpreted in this way.

Beginning with market definition, the book reviews the different rules and the different degrees of market power they incorporate. Thus it analyses the notion of 'appreciable restriction of competition' to find a moderate market power obtained by agreement among competitors to be the benchmark for the application of Article 101 TFEU, ex Article 81 EC. It moves on to the concept of dominance under Article 102 TFEU (ex Article 82 EC), which is equivalent to substantial (or sgnificant) market power, and then focuses on the old and new tests for EU merger control. Finally, it addresses the idea of elimination of competition in respect of a substantial part of the market (Article 101 (3) TFEU, ex Article 81 (3) (b) EC), in which the last two types of market power (Article 102 TFEU, ex Article 82 EC and EU Merger Regulation) converge. To exemplify this, an in-depth study of the notion of collective dominance is conducted.

The book concludes that a paradigm of market power exists under the EU antitrust rules that both fits with past practice and provides for a useful framework of analysis for the general application of the rules by administrative and even more importantly judicial authorities in the Member States, under conditions of legal certainty.

Arvustused

As the European Commission's enforcement policy moves towards an economic approach, the identification of market power and how to deal with it is of immense importance. Market Power in EU Antitrust provides a comprehensive, timely and significant contribution to this difficult task by presenting a series of intriguing ideas. ...a very welcome addition to the literature. The book delves beneath the surface to offer new insights into the deeper issues of the principles below. While the scope of the book is limited to market power across the main European competition law provisions and the merger regulation, it has all the qualities one would hope to find in a first-rate modern legal treatise: it is scholarly, opinionated, thorough, clear and authoritative. -- Liza Lovdahl Gormsen * European Competition Journal, Volume 9, Number 3 * ...a valuable contribution for the enforcers of EU competition rules, ultimately the judicial authorities, which need not be expert economists. -- Vasiliki Brisimi * European Law Review, Volume 38(2) * The book contains a wealth of material and details...A very great deal of care has clearly been invested in the book and it is easy to find the relevant place. It is most welcome. -- Valentine Korah * World Competition Law and Economics Review *

Preface v
Table of Cases
xvii
Table of Legislation
lv
1 Defining the Relevant Market in European Competition Law
1(19)
1.1 Introduction
1(3)
1.2 One or Several Definitions of the Concept of Reference Market in Competition Cases
4(11)
1.3 Factors Used in the Analysis of Relevant Market
15(5)
2 Economic Power under Article 101(1) TFEU: Quantitative Evaluation of the `Appreciable' Nature of a Restriction on Competition and Trade between Member States
20(26)
2.1 Introduction
20(1)
2.2 The Requirement that Competition within the Internal Market is Restricted
21(6)
2.3 The Requirement that Trade between Member States is Affected
27(1)
2.4 The Requirement that the Restriction on Competition and the Effect on Trade between Member States be Appreciable: `Qualitative Appreciability' and `Quantitative Appreciability'
28(10)
2.5 Restatement: The Qualitative and Quantitative Elements of Article 101(1) TFEU
38(8)
3 Economic Power under Article 102 TFEU: Establishment of Dominant Position
46(22)
3.1 Introduction: The Concept of Dominant Position. Dominance, Superdominance and the New `Article 102(3)'
46(7)
3.2 Structure of Supply: Market Share and the Structure and Resources of Undertakings
53(6)
3.3 Potential Competition and Barriers to Entry
59(3)
3.4 Structure of Demand: Countervailing Power, Demand Elasticity and Market Maturity
62(2)
3.5 Behaviour of Undertakings
64(1)
3.6 Economic Dependence
65(3)
4 Economic Power in the European Merger Regulation: Significant Impediment to Effective Competition, in Particular as the Result of the Creation or Strengthening of a Dominant Position
68(30)
4.1 Introduction: Article 2 of the European Merger Regulation
68(14)
4.2 Structure of Supply: Market Share (Temporal Evolution and Degree of Concentration)
82(6)
4.3 Potential Competition
88(3)
4.4 Structure of Demand: Phase of the Market, Countervailing Power, Degree of Concentration
91(4)
4.5 Conclusions regarding the Establishment of a Significant Market Power in Merger Control Cases
95(3)
5 Economic Power under Article 101(3)(b) TFEU: The Condition of Not Eliminating Competition in Respect of a Substantial Part of the Market
98(27)
5.1 Introduction: General Questions concerning Article 101(3) TFEU
98(16)
5.2 General Questions regarding the Fourth Condition of Article 101(3) TFEU
114(2)
5.3 Outline of the Concept of the Elimination of Competition in the Case Law of the EU Courts
116(3)
5.4 Analysis of Article 101(3)(b) TFEU
119(6)
6 Assessment of Economic Power under Article 101(3)(b)(II)
125(21)
6.1 The Importance of Internal Competition: Agreements with Limited Content
125(4)
6.2 Structure of Supply: Market Share and Degree of Concentration
129(12)
6.3 Potential Competition under Article 101(3)(b) TFEU
141(1)
6.4 Countervailing Power of Clients as a Means of Avoiding the Elimination of Effective Competition
142(2)
6.5 Behaviour of Undertakings Participating in a Restrictive Agreement as an Indication of their Market Power
144(2)
7 Collective Dominant Position in General
146(27)
7.1 Introduction
146(2)
7.2 Analysis of `Collective Position'
148(13)
7.3 The Problem of Internal Competition between Undertakings in a Collective Dominant Position
161(7)
7.4 Analysis of Market Power in Situations where a Collective Dominant Position Exists
168(5)
8 Oligopolistic Interdependence and Dominant Oligopolistic Position in Relation to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and Regulation 139/2004(I)
173(27)
8.1 Oligopolies and Oligopolistic Competition
173(3)
8.2 Collective Monopolies and Non-Competitive Oligopolies
176(2)
8.3 `Tacit Collusion' and `Tacit Coordination'
178(5)
8.4 Evolution of the Concept of Oligopolistic Collective Dominant Position in EU Merger Control
183(8)
8.5 Parallel Behaviour and Non-Competitive Oligopolistic Interdependence: Collusion (Express or Tacit) as a Defining Criterion. Possibility, Ease or Probability Compared to Rational Certainty or Automatism of Non-Competitive Parallel Behaviour between Oligopolists
191(9)
9 Oligopolistic Interdependence and Dominant Oligopolistic Position in Relation to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and Regulation 139/2004 (II)
200(45)
9.1 The Adoption of a New Substantive Test to Cover Certain Unilateral Effects of Concentrations. Coordinated Effects and Unilateral Effects in the European Control of Concentrations
200(22)
9.2 Application of Article 101 TFEU to `Tacit Coordination' and its Limitations: The Other `Blind Spot' of Oligopolies in Competition Law and the Possible Boundary between Competitive and Non-Competitive Oligopolies
222(8)
9.3 Tackling Non-Competitive Oligopolies by Applying the Concept of Collective Dominant Position under Article 102
230(11)
9.4 A Graphic Representation of the Possible Classification of Parallel Behaviour with respect to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the Second `Oligopoly Blind Spot'
241(1)
9.5 Restatement: Differences between the Traditional Collective Dominant Position and the Oligopolistic Collective Dominant Position
242(3)
10 Expressly Collusive or Pure Collusive Dominant Position in European Competition Law
245(35)
10.1 Introduction: The Pure or Expressly Collusive Dominant Position as a Type of Traditional or Cooperative Dominant Position
245(3)
10.2 Relationship between Articles 101(3) and 102 TFEU
248(8)
10.3 Theories concerning Thresholds of Market Power in European Competition Law and the Concepts of `Dominant Position' and `Elimination of Competition in Respect of a Substantial Part of the Market'
256(20)
10.4 Limits on the Acceptance of Agreements Restricting Competition between Companies and the Complete Incompatibility of Pure Collusive Dominant Positions with Article 101(3)(B) TFEU
276(4)
Epilogue: A Paradigm of Market Power in EU Competition Law 280(9)
Bibliography 289(16)
Index 305
Luis Ortiz Blanco is a partner with Garrigues and a Visiting Professor of EU Competition and Trade Procedures at the College of Europe (Bruges).