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Modeling Terrorism Risk to the Air Transportation System: An Independent Assessment of Tsa's Risk Management Analysis Tool and Associated Methods [Pehme köide]

  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 168 pages, kõrgus x laius: 229x152 mm
  • Ilmumisaeg: 16-Dec-2012
  • Kirjastus: RAND
  • ISBN-10: 083307685X
  • ISBN-13: 9780833076854
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 168 pages, kõrgus x laius: 229x152 mm
  • Ilmumisaeg: 16-Dec-2012
  • Kirjastus: RAND
  • ISBN-10: 083307685X
  • ISBN-13: 9780833076854
RAND evaluated a terrorism risk modeling tool developed by the Transportation Security Administration and Boeing to help guide program planning for aviation security. This tool, the Risk Management Analysis Tool, or RMAT, is used by TSA to estimate the terrorism risk-reduction benefits attributable to new and existing security programs, technologies, and procedures. RMAT simulates terrorist behavior and success in attacking vulnerabilities in the domestic commercial air transportation system, drawing on estimates of terrorist resources, capabilities, preferences, decision processes, intelligence collection, and operational planning. It describes how the layers of security protecting the air transportation system are likely to perform when confronted by more than 60 types of attacks, drawing on detailed blast and other physical modeling to understand the damage produced by different weapons and attacks, and calculating expected loss of life and the direct and indirect economic consequences of that damage.This report describes RAND's conclusions about the validity of RMAT for TSA's intended uses and its recommendations for how TSA should perform cost-benefit analyses of its security programs.

Preface iii
Figure and Tables
ix
Summary xi
Acknowledgments xix
Abbreviations xxi
Chapter One Introduction
1(12)
Rmat and Its Current Use
3(3)
Validation of Rmat
6(4)
Requirements Development and Validation
10(1)
Approach to Validating Rmat
11(2)
Chapter Two Rmat Adversary Model
13(20)
Overview of the Rmat Adversary Model
13(5)
Organizational Characteristics
14(1)
Learning
15(1)
Attack-Planning
15(2)
Behavior
17(1)
Assessment of the Implicit Theory of Adversary Behavior and Decisionmaking in Rmat
18(10)
Organizational Characteristic Propositions
19(1)
Adversary Learning Propositions
20(2)
Attack-Planning Propositions
22(4)
Adversary Behavior Propositions
26(1)
Summary of Select Propositions
26(2)
Adversary Model: Satisfaction of TSA Requirements
28(2)
Recommendations
30(3)
Chapter Three Rmat Defender Model
33(28)
Overview
33(3)
Model Scope and the Rmat World
33(1)
Blue Agents
34(1)
Instruments
34(1)
Credentials
35(1)
Action Outcomes and Decision Points
35(1)
Validation
36(20)
Key Assumptions in the Rmat Defender System
37(5)
World Analysis
42(6)
Attack Consequences
48(8)
Defender Model: Satisfaction of TSA Requirements
56(2)
Recommendations for Revisions to the Rmat Defender Model
58(3)
Chapter Four Rmat Data Requirements and Sources
61(16)
Quantity and Types of Data
61(2)
Validation
63(2)
Adequacy of Sources
65(8)
How Rmat Uses Expert Elicitations
67(1)
Expert Elicitation Best Practices
68(3)
Comparing Rmat Elicitations to Best Practices
71(2)
Rmat Data: Satisfaction of TSA Requirements
73(1)
Observations and Recommendations
73(4)
Chapter Five Rmat Model Performance and Management
77(18)
Code Inspection
78(3)
Sensitivity Analysis
81(8)
Design of the Analysis
82(3)
Results
85(2)
Summary of Sensitivity Analysis Findings
87(2)
Verification of Attack Attractiveness
89(1)
Configuration Change Management and Testing
89(1)
Rmat Software and Management: Satisfaction of Requirements
90(2)
Conclusions and Recommendations
92(3)
Chapter Six Supporting TSA Management and Investment Decisions with Rmat
95(28)
Modeling and Simulation for Decision Support
96(2)
Understanding and Communicating Rmat Methods and Assumptions
98(8)
Risk Assessment for Decision Support: Satisfaction of Requirements
106(7)
Recommendations: Improving the Use of Rmat and the Interpretation of Its Results
113(10)
Chapter Seven Conclusions
123(8)
Rmat Key Strengths and Weaknesses for TSA Decision Support
124(5)
Rmat Validity
129(2)
Appendix Requirements for a TSA Risk Assessment 131(4)
Bibliography 135