| Preface |
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iii | |
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xi | |
| Summary |
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xiii | |
| Acknowledgments |
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xxv | |
| Abbreviations |
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xxvii | |
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1 | (10) |
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1 | (1) |
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What Is "Political Warfare"? |
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2 | (4) |
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Research Approach and Organization of Study |
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6 | (5) |
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Chapter Two History of U.S. Political Warfare |
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11 | (30) |
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American Political Warfare's Early History |
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12 | (3) |
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The Cold War and Political Warfare's Coming of Age |
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15 | (14) |
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17 | (2) |
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19 | (4) |
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23 | (4) |
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27 | (2) |
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U.S. Political Warfare after the Cold War |
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29 | (3) |
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32 | (2) |
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References--Chapters 1 and 2 |
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34 | (7) |
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Chapter Three Case Study: Russia |
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41 | (84) |
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Russian Understanding of Political Warfare |
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42 | (12) |
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Sources of Russian Views of Political Warfare |
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48 | (6) |
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Russian Organizations That Pursue "Political Warfare" |
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54 | (31) |
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56 | (5) |
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61 | (8) |
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69 | (2) |
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71 | (5) |
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76 | (2) |
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78 | (5) |
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83 | (2) |
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Russia's Political Warfare in Estonia |
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85 | (11) |
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86 | (3) |
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The "Bronze Night" as an Example of Russian Political Warfare |
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89 | (1) |
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90 | (3) |
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93 | (3) |
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Current Russian Means of Influence in Estonia |
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96 | (6) |
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96 | (3) |
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99 | (1) |
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99 | (1) |
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100 | (1) |
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100 | (2) |
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102 | (2) |
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Russian Political Warfare Is a Response to Western Political Warfare |
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102 | (1) |
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Russian Political Warfare Stokes Conflict and Capitalizes on Crises |
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103 | (1) |
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Russian Political Warfare Depends on the Geographic and Political Context |
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103 | (1) |
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104 | (21) |
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Chapter Four Case Study: Iran |
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125 | (46) |
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Iran's Views of Political Warfare |
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126 | (3) |
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Methods and Agencies of Political Warfare |
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129 | (6) |
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Iran's Political Warfare in Iraq |
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135 | (14) |
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136 | (3) |
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139 | (1) |
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Support for Iraqi Militias |
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140 | (4) |
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Religious and Ideological Propaganda |
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144 | (4) |
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The Iraqi Nationalist Challenge |
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148 | (1) |
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Iran's Political Warfare in Syria |
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149 | (8) |
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Training the National Defense Force |
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150 | (1) |
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Religious Appeals to Shi'a Fighters |
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151 | (3) |
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154 | (2) |
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156 | (1) |
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157 | (2) |
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159 | (12) |
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Chapter Five Case Study: ISIL |
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171 | (48) |
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171 | (1) |
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172 | (10) |
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173 | (6) |
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Economic Subversion and Control |
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179 | (1) |
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180 | (2) |
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ISIL's Application of Political Warfare Tactics |
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182 | (16) |
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182 | (2) |
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Economic Subversion and Control |
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184 | (2) |
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Military and Intelligence |
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186 | (4) |
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190 | (8) |
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Examining How ISIL Messaging Varies Across Language Platforms |
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198 | (9) |
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199 | (1) |
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Lexical Analysis of ISIL Propaganda in Arabic and English |
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200 | (7) |
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207 | (2) |
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209 | (10) |
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215 | (1) |
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Cited Items from the Primary Source Archive |
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216 | (3) |
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Chapter Six Attributes of Modern Political Warfare |
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219 | (36) |
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1 Nonstate actors can conduct political warfare with unprecedented reach |
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219 | (2) |
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2 Political warfare employs all the elements of power |
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221 | (2) |
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3 Political warfare relies heavily on proxy forces and means |
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223 | (3) |
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4 The information arena is an increasingly contested battleground, where perceptions of success can be determinative |
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226 | (3) |
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5 Information operations create effects in various ways by amplifying, obfuscating, and, at times, persuading. Factual evidence supplied in a timely manner is the best antidote to disinformation |
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229 | (4) |
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6 Detecting early-stage political warfare requires a heavy investment of intelligence resources |
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233 | (1) |
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7 Political warfare can generate unintended consequences |
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234 | (1) |
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8 Economic leverage is increasingly the preferred tool of the strong |
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235 | (5) |
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9 Political warfare often exploits ethnic or religious bonds or other internal seams |
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240 | (2) |
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10 Political warfare extends, rather than replaces, traditional conflict and can achieve effects at lower cost |
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242 | (5) |
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245 | (2) |
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247 | (8) |
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Chapter Seven Influence Communications: Lessons for the United States |
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255 | (22) |
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1 Leadership must empower communicators to quicken response times and take risks |
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258 | (3) |
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260 | (1) |
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2 Unattributed communications may have counterproductive effects that should be anticipated and mitigated |
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261 | (1) |
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3 The use of third-party influencers is a critical requirement for both the GEC and MISO |
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262 | (4) |
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265 | (1) |
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4 MISO requires both increased manpower and new media training |
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266 | (1) |
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267 | (1) |
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5 Interagency coordination remains a fundamental challenge |
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267 | (5) |
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269 | (3) |
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272 | (5) |
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Chapter Eight Effective Statecraft and Integration of Measures Short of War |
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277 | (42) |
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Strategic Requirements for Effective Offense and Defense in Political Warfare |
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277 | (3) |
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Organizational Requirements and the Leading Role of State |
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280 | (2) |
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Designating State as the Lead |
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282 | (4) |
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Operational Requirements to Fill Seams and Gaps in the U.S. Government |
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286 | (8) |
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Partnership Requirements for Coordinated Action with Other Countries |
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294 | (13) |
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Estonia as an Exemplar of Host-Nation Considerations |
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295 | (4) |
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Coalitions and the Evolving Role of SOF |
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299 | (3) |
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Britain as a Political Warfare Innovator |
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302 | (5) |
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Recommendations for Military and SOF Support to an Integrated Approach |
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307 | (9) |
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316 | (3) |
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319 | (2) |
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320 | (1) |
| Appendix A Defining Political Warfare |
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321 | |
