Preface |
|
iii | |
|
|
vi | |
|
|
vii | |
Summary |
|
viii | |
Acknowledgments |
|
x | |
Abbreviations |
|
xi | |
|
|
1 | (9) |
|
Emerging Concepts for Multidomain Operations |
|
|
2 | (5) |
|
|
7 | (1) |
|
Organization of This Report |
|
|
8 | (2) |
|
2 Potential Command-and-Control Impediments to Multidomain Operations |
|
|
10 | (6) |
|
Aspirations for Joint All-Domain Command and Control |
|
|
10 | (1) |
|
Command-and-Control Characteristics That Could Impede Multidomain Operation |
|
|
11 | (2) |
|
|
13 | (3) |
|
3 Potential Legal and Regulatory Impediments to Multidomain Operations |
|
|
16 | (20) |
|
Laws, Regulations, and Doctrine |
|
|
17 | (2) |
|
Key Elements of the Current Legal Framework |
|
|
19 | (3) |
|
|
22 | (12) |
|
|
34 | (2) |
|
4 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses: Challenges to Planning and Executing Multidomain Operations |
|
|
36 | (13) |
|
Multidomain Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses |
|
|
37 | (1) |
|
Planning for a Contingency |
|
|
38 | (3) |
|
Planning During a Contingency |
|
|
41 | (5) |
|
|
46 | (2) |
|
|
48 | (1) |
|
5 Integrating Offensive Cyber Operations into Multidomain Operations |
|
|
49 | (12) |
|
Planning for a Contingency |
|
|
49 | (7) |
|
Planning During a Contingency |
|
|
56 | (2) |
|
|
58 | (1) |
|
|
59 | (2) |
|
6 Integrating Offensive Space Control Operations into Multidomain Operations |
|
|
61 | (6) |
|
Planning for a Contingency |
|
|
61 | (2) |
|
Planning During a Contingency |
|
|
63 | (2) |
|
|
65 | (1) |
|
|
65 | (2) |
|
7 Air and Missile Defense: Command-and-Control Enablers of Multidomain Operations |
|
|
67 | (10) |
|
Notional Multidomain Air-and-Missile-Defense Scenario |
|
|
68 | (1) |
|
Planning for a Contingency |
|
|
69 | (2) |
|
Planning During a Contingency |
|
|
71 | (2) |
|
|
73 | (2) |
|
|
75 | (2) |
|
8 Summary of Findings on Potential Command-and-Control Impediments to Multidomain Operations |
|
|
77 | (3) |
|
9 Alternative Joint All-Domain Command-and-Control Constructs |
|
|
80 | (21) |
|
Other Command-and-Control Challenges in a Conflict with a Near-Peer Adversary |
|
|
80 | (3) |
|
Generating Alternative Command-and-Control Concepts |
|
|
83 | (1) |
|
Incremental-Change Joint All-Domain Command-and-Control Construct |
|
|
84 | (4) |
|
Alternative Command-and-Control Construct: Air, Space, and Cyber Component |
|
|
88 | (3) |
|
Combatant Commander-Centric Joint All-Domain Command-and-Control Construct |
|
|
91 | (3) |
|
Line-of-Effort Joint All-Domain Command-and-Control Construct |
|
|
94 | (3) |
|
Comparison of Alternative Joint All-Domain Command-and-Control Constructs |
|
|
97 | (4) |
|
10 A Framework for Assessing Alternative Joint All-Domain Command-and-Control Concepts |
|
|
101 | (10) |
|
Facilitates Planning, Execution, and Assessment of Multidomain Operations |
|
|
102 | (1) |
|
Has Reasonable Span of Control for Operational Commanders |
|
|
103 | (1) |
|
Minimizes Organizational Transition from Peacetime to Wartime |
|
|
104 | (1) |
|
Allows Redistribution of Forces Within the Geographic Combatant Command as Priorities Change |
|
|
105 | (1) |
|
Enables Unity of Effort During Communications Disruptions |
|
|
106 | (1) |
|
Leverages Existing Organizations and Processes |
|
|
107 | (1) |
|
|
108 | (1) |
|
|
109 | (2) |
|
|
111 | (9) |
|
|
111 | (2) |
|
|
113 | (6) |
|
|
119 | (1) |
References |
|
120 | |