This title explores the under-examined theoretical foundations of contemporary Chinese philosophical discourse on human rights. Through an interpretive, critical, and constructive approach, it analyzes key elements of the broader theoretical context and offers a new framework for understanding Chinese approaches to human rights.
This title explores the under-examined theoretical foundations of contemporary Chinese philosophical discourse on human rights. Through an interpretive, critical, and constructive approach, it analyzes key elements of the broader theoretical context and offers a new framework for understanding and engaging with Chinese approaches to human rights.
The book addresses a significant gap in scholarship by exploring the tendency of major Chinese human rights theories to neglect the background assumptions that inform their approaches. Through a systematic analysis of selected Chinese theories of moral reasoning and their underlying conceptions of moral normativity, the author identifies a possible framework for human rights theorizing. On this basis, the author outlines an alternative approach to human rights that emerges from Chinese discourse while differing from the human rights theories that sparked the inquiry. By bridging relevant Anglo-European debates, this book also contributes to global philosophy and addresses human rights beyond the Chinese philosophical context.
It is essential reading for advanced students, researchers, and anyone interested in the potential of Chinese human rights theory and contemporary philosophical developments in China.
Acknowledgements
Notes on the Text
Introduction
Chapter 1: Preliminaries: Normativity, Moral Reasoning, and Human Rights
1.1 (Moral) Normativity
1.2 From Normativity to Moral Reasoning, and From Moral Reasoning to Human
Rights
1.3 A Road Map
Chapter 2: Normativity and Moral Reasons
2.1 Practical Normativity
2.2 Moral Normativity
Chapter 3: Engaging with the Emerging Conception of Moral Normativity
3.1 The Conception of Practical Reasons: The Intrapersonal Level
3.2 The Interpersonal Level: Resilience, Second-Order Recognition, and
Accountability
3.3 Moral Normativity: The Stability of the Moral Order and the Authority of
Moral Demands
Chapter 4: Moral Reasoning
4.1 Three Accounts of Moral Reasoning
4.2 Dialogical Approaches to Moral Reasoning
4.3 Reasoning from the First-Person Plural Standpoint
Chapter 5: The First-Order Level: Human Rights
5.1 The Existence Conditions of (Human) Rights
5.2 The Content of Human Rights
5.3 Conclusion: Refining the Map
Bibliography
Philippe Brunozzi is a Privatdozent at the Institute of Philosophy and Political Science at TU Dortmund University. His research focuses on contemporary Western and classical Chinese accounts of agency, as well as contemporary Chinese social and political philosophy.
