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Norms and Necessity [Kõva köide]

4.75/5 (16 hinnangut Goodreads-ist)
(Daniel P. Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, Dartmouth College)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 252 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 147x211x25 mm, kaal: 408 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 21-Jul-2020
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0190098198
  • ISBN-13: 9780190098193
Teised raamatud teemal:
Norms and NecessitySuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 252 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 147x211x25 mm, kaal: 408 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 21-Jul-2020
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0190098198
  • ISBN-13: 9780190098193
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9780190098193.html
Märksõnad:
Claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible have long played a central role in metaphysics and other areas of philosophy. Such claims are traditionally thought of as aiming to describe a special kind of modal fact or property, or perhaps facts about other possible worlds. But that assumption leads to difficult ontological, epistemological, and methodological puzzles. Should we accept that there are modal facts or properties, or other possible worlds? If so, what could these things be? How could we come to know what the modal facts or properties are? How can we resolve philosophical debates about what is metaphysically necessary or possible?

Norms and Necessity develops a new approach to understanding our claims about metaphysical possibility and necessity: Modal Normativism. The Normativist rejects the assumption that modal claims aim to describe modal features or possible worlds, arguing instead that they serve as useful ways of conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules and their consequences. By dropping the descriptivist assumption, the Normativist is able to unravel the notorious ontological problems of modality, and provide a clear and plausible story about how we can come to know what is metaphysically necessary or possible. Most importantly, this approach helps demystify philosophical methodology. It reveals that resolving metaphysical modal questions does not require a special form of philosophical insight or intuition. Instead, it requires nothing more mysterious than empirical knowledge, conceptual mastery, and an ability to explicitly convey and renegotiate semantic rules.

Arvustused

Thomasson's brand of normativism is formally introduced with a structural methodology that highlights the historical problematics of early non-descriptivist assumptions and how she avoids some of these historical problematics by showing how her brand of modal normativism remains stable in embedded contexts to avoid the Frege-Geach expressivist problem of unasserted contexts. * Jason Wakefield, Avello Publishing Journal * Norms and Necessity is an ambitious and important philosophical work, written in Thomasson's characteristically clear and lucid writing style. It is destined to have a huge impact not only on contemporary debates about modality, but also on our general self-understanding as philosophers. * Sybren Heyndels, Philosophical Quarterly * This is an excellent book. Thomasson's articulation and defense of modal expressivism is a significant and novel contribution to the metaphysics of modality, and a must-read for anyone interested in the topic. * Karen Bennett, Rutgers University * I read Norms and Necessity with high expectations. It managed to exceed them. It shows the same excellent qualities as Thomasson's earlier books - in other words, it is beautifully clear, very topical and well focussed, and always very well judged - but somehow to an even greater degree. It's an important book, and it will have a big impact. * Huw Price, University of Cambridge * Thomasson is a gifted writer and philosopher, with a distinctive voice and a forceful message. Norms and Necessity is important and timely, making a strong contribution to one of philosophy's central problems. In support of that verdict I would say that it is the clearest and best-researched work on the nature of modality--the philosophical problems surrounding notions of necessity and possibility--to appear since Saul Kripke and David Lewis put modality back into the centre of the philosophical landscape some fifty years ago. It marks a radical departure from the tradition that they inspired, which makes it especially important. * Simon Blackburn, University of Cambridge (retired), and the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill *

Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1(6)
1 Problems for the Descriptivist Assumption
7(8)
2 The Attractions of the Normativist Approach
15(3)
3 The Plan of This Book
18(2)
1 The Rise and Fall of Early Non-Descriptive Approaches
20(32)
1.1 The Pre-History: Challenges for Empiricism
21(3)
1.2 Conventionalism and Its Motives
24(3)
1.3 Criticisms of Conventionalism
27(4)
1.4 Later Non-Descriptivism and the Normative Function of Modal Discourse
31(5)
1.5 Why the Non-Descriptivist Approach Was Lost
36(8)
1.6 New Barriers to Modal Non-Descriptivism
44(4)
1.7 A Non-Descriptivist Revival
48(3)
1.8 Where Do We Go from Here?
51(1)
2 The Function of Modal Discourse
52(25)
2.1 Games, Necessities, and the Advantages of Modal Terminology
59(4)
2.2 The Function of Metaphysical Modal Terminology
63(5)
2.3 Uses of Metaphysical Modal Claims
68(3)
2.4 How Should We Understand the Semantic Rules?
71(6)
3 The Meaning of Modal Discourse
77(15)
3.1 The Relation between Function and Use
78(4)
3.2 The Content of Modal Terms
82(3)
3.3 Modal Propositions and Modal Truth
85(3)
3.4 Avoiding the Criticisms of Conventionalism
88(2)
3.5 Conclusion
90(2)
4 Handling De Re and A Posteriori Modal Claims
92(21)
4.1 Rules for Names and Natural Kind Terms
95(10)
4.2 De Re Modal Claims
105(3)
4.3 A Posteriori Modal Claims
108(3)
4.4 The Contingent A Priori
111(1)
4.5 Conclusion
112(1)
5 Other Objections to Modal Normativism
113(16)
5.1 Putative Counterexamples
114(4)
5.1.1 Rules without Necessities?
114(1)
5.1.2 Necessities without Rules?
115(1)
5.1.3 Necessary Existents
115(2)
5.1.4 Modal Demonstratives
117(1)
5.2 Circularity Worries
118(6)
5.3 Does It Rely on a Heavyweight Understanding of Logical Necessity?
124(4)
5.4 Conclusion
128(1)
6 Ontological Advantages
129(18)
6.1 Modal Facts and Properties
129(3)
6.2 Possible Worlds
132(5)
6.3 What We Gain
137(6)
6.4 Classificatory (and Other Forms of) Conventionalism
143(4)
7 Epistemological Advantages
147(38)
7.1 The Integration Challenge
150(7)
7.2 The Reliability Challenge
157(4)
7.3 Meeting the Integration Challenge
161(4)
7.4 Meeting the Reliability Challenge
165(5)
7.5 Does the Challenge Arise Again?
170(5)
7.6 The Unexplained Coincidence Problem
175(7)
7.7 Conclusion
182(3)
8 Methodological Advantages
185(24)
8.1 Justifying the Use of Intuition in Metaphysical Modal Debates
187(2)
8.2 A Defense of the Relevance of Traditional Methods
189(2)
8.3 Resolving Internal Metaphysical Modal Disputes
191(5)
8.4 Objections to Conceptual Analysis
196(2)
8.5 Limits to Detail and Precision
198(2)
8.6 Understanding External Metaphysical Modal Disputes
200(6)
8.7 Conclusion
206(3)
Conclusion 209(8)
Bibliography 217(12)
Index 229
Amie L. Thomasson is the Daniel P. Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy at Dartmouth College. She is the author of Ontology Made Easy (Oxford University Press, 2015), Ordinary Objects (Oxford University Press, 2007), and Fiction and Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press, 1999), and co-editor (with David W. Smith) of Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University Press, 2005). Her book Ontology Made Easy was awarded the American Philosophical Association's 2017 Sanders Book Prize. She has also published more than 70 book chapters and articles on topics in metaphysics, metaontology, fiction, philosophy of mind and phenomenology, the philosophy of art, and social ontology. She has twice held Fellowships with the National Endowment for the Humanities.