| Preface |
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xi | |
| The Decline-of-War Thesis |
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xvi | |
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3 | (18) |
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The Spread of Peace and the Spread of War |
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3 | (2) |
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5 | (2) |
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7 | (7) |
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9 | (5) |
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Explaining Systemic Trends in Warfare |
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14 | (7) |
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II Reasons for Skepticism |
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2 Reasons for Skepticism, Part I: Data |
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21 | (26) |
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Trends in Conflict Initiation |
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22 | (2) |
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24 | (5) |
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29 | (4) |
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The Pacifying Effects of Civilization |
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33 | (6) |
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39 | (5) |
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The Pitfalls of Per Capita |
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42 | (2) |
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44 | (1) |
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45 | (2) |
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3 Reasons for Skepticism, Part II: Explanation |
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47 | (28) |
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The Complexity of International Behavior |
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48 | (10) |
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Dispositions and Situations |
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49 | (5) |
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54 | (2) |
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56 | (2) |
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The Spread of Enlightenment Humanism |
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58 | (7) |
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The Dark Side of the Enlightenment |
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59 | (3) |
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Just War and Perpetual Peace |
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62 | (2) |
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The Study of WEIRD People |
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64 | (1) |
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65 | (7) |
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Randomness in Thick-Tailed Distributions |
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68 | (4) |
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72 | (3) |
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III What the Data Tell Us |
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4 Is International Conflict Going out of Style? |
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75 | (25) |
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Three Measures of Warfare |
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76 | (1) |
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Measuring International Conflict |
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77 | (6) |
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Measuring the Rate of Conflict Initiation |
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83 | (1) |
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Trends in the Rate of Conflict Initiation |
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84 | (7) |
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91 | (2) |
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93 | (6) |
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93 | (2) |
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What About Unreciprocated Uses of Force? |
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95 | (1) |
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What About Other Kinds of International Wars? |
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96 | (3) |
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99 | (1) |
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99 | (1) |
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5 Is International Conflict Getting Less Deadly? |
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100 | (31) |
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Measuring the Deadliness of War |
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101 | (3) |
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What We Already Know: Wars Got Deadlier 250 Years Ago |
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104 | (2) |
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Wars Haven't Gotten Less Intense Since Then |
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106 | (8) |
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Wars Haven't Gotten Less Severe, Either |
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114 | (3) |
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War Prevalence Has Changed |
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117 | (5) |
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But the Danger of Escalation Hasn't Changed |
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118 | (2) |
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And That's What Really Matters |
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120 | (2) |
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Caveat: Militaries Don't Keep Up With Population Growth |
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122 | (2) |
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124 | (6) |
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130 | (1) |
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6 Are the Causes of International Conflict Becoming Less Potent? |
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131 | (12) |
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The Potency of the Causes of War |
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131 | (2) |
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133 | (2) |
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135 | (2) |
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137 | (2) |
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139 | (4) |
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IV Making Sense of the Data |
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143 | (35) |
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145 | (14) |
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149 | (7) |
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The Sources of Legitimacy |
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156 | (1) |
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157 | (2) |
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Order and the Sources of Systemic Conflict |
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159 | (15) |
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160 | (2) |
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162 | (3) |
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165 | (2) |
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167 | (1) |
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168 | (3) |
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171 | (2) |
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173 | (1) |
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174 | (4) |
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8 History and International Order |
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178 | (37) |
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Nineteenth-Century Europe |
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179 | (20) |
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179 | (5) |
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The Mid-Nineteenth Century |
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184 | (2) |
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186 | (6) |
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192 | (7) |
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199 | (3) |
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202 | (4) |
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206 | (2) |
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208 | (2) |
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210 | (5) |
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9 Conclusion and Implications |
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215 | (10) |
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218 | (7) |
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War Isn't Getting Less Deadly |
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218 | (1) |
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International Orders Foster Peace... |
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219 | (1) |
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220 | (1) |
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221 | (1) |
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221 | (2) |
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223 | (2) |
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225 | (24) |
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225 | (11) |
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225 | (7) |
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What About Political Relevance? |
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232 | (1) |
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What About the Correlates of War Data? |
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232 | (2) |
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What About a Poisson Test? |
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234 | (2) |
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236 | (7) |
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236 | (2) |
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A Formal Test for Differences in the Slopes of Power-Law Distributions |
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238 | (5) |
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243 | (6) |
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243 | (6) |
| Notes |
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249 | (20) |
| Bibliography |
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269 | (26) |
| Index |
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295 | |