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Perception: First Form of Mind [Kõva köide]

(Flint Professor of Philosophy, UCLA)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 898 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 252x175x50 mm, kaal: 1818 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 13-May-2022
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198871007
  • ISBN-13: 9780198871002
  • Formaat: Hardback, 898 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 252x175x50 mm, kaal: 1818 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 13-May-2022
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198871007
  • ISBN-13: 9780198871002
In Perception: First Form of Mind, Tyler Burge develops an understanding of the most primitive type of representational mind: perception. Focusing on its form, function, and underlying capacities, as indicated in the sciences of perception, Burge provides an account of the representational
content and formal representational structure of perceptual states, and develops a formal semantics for them. The account is elaborated by an explanation of how the representational form is embedded in an iconic format. These structures are then situated in current theoretical accounts of the
processing of perceptual representations, with an emphasis on the formation of perceptual categorizations. An exploration of the relationship between perception and other primitive capacities-conation, attention, memory, anticipation, affect, learning, and imagining-clarifies the distinction between
perceiving, with its associated capacities, and thinking, with its associated capacities. Drawing on a broad range of historical and contemporary research, rather than relying on introspection or ordinary talk about perception, Perception: First Form of Mind is a scientifically rigorous and
agenda-setting work in the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of science.
Preface xi
Animal Eyes xxi
Figures
xxii
Abbreviations xxiv
PART I PERCEPTION
1 Introduction
3(16)
Biological Function, Action, Sensing, and Perception--The Emergence of Mind
3(7)
Principal Aims of the Book
10(5)
The Fregean Source of Key Semantical Notions for Perception
15(4)
2 Perception
19(45)
Perceptual States as Sensory States
20(1)
Representation and Information Registration
21(7)
Representation and Veridicality Conditions
28(2)
Representations and Representational Contents
30(6)
The Three Fundamental Representational Constituents in Perceptual States
36(13)
The Basic Representational Form of Perceptual States
49(1)
Perception as Objedification
50(10)
Perceptual Constancy-- First Mark of Representational Mind
60(4)
3 Perceptual Constancy: A Central Natural Psychological Kind
64(45)
Scientific Practice Demarcates Perceptual Constancies from Other Invariances
65(5)
Two Misguided Ways of Thinking About Perceptual Constancies
70(4)
Even Non-Perceptual Invariances Contribute to the Fitness of Individuals that Sense
74(2)
Efference Copy: An Example of a Non-Perceptual Invariance
76(2)
Path Integration: Another Non-Perceptual Invariance
78(2)
Very Simple Perceptual Color and Lightness Constancies
80(2)
Retinal Image Contour Registration and Surface Contour Perception
82(8)
Visual Spatial Property and Relation Constancies
90(1)
Visual Body Categorization
91(3)
Visual Spatial Perceptual Constancies and Body Categorization
94(5)
Visual Temporal Perceptual Constancies
99(10)
PART II FORM
4 Some Basics about Perceptual Systems
109(22)
Principles Governing Transitions Contrasted with Representational Contents
109(2)
Perception, Computation, and the Language-of-Thought Hypothesis
111(7)
Representational-Dependence Hierarchies in Perceptual Attribution
118(2)
Two Methodological Points About Natural-Kind and Functional Attributives
120(4)
Taxonomic Hierarchies in Perception
124(7)
5 Perceptual Reference Requires Perceptual Attribution
131(25)
Basic Form of Perceptual Contents
131(2)
Perceptual Reference is Partly Guided by Perceptual Attribution
133(1)
Support for (AA1)
134(9)
Support for (AA2)
143(3)
General Remarks on Attributives and Perceptual Discrimination
146(2)
Criticism of Two Attempted Rejections of (AA1) and (AA2)
148(8)
6 Form and Semantics of Representational Contents of Perceptual States
156(52)
Review of Basic Form of Perceptual Representation
156(3)
Perception of Property-Instances
159(10)
Betokening and Four Types of Perceptual Attribution
169(6)
Perceptual Attribution of Relations
175(4)
Scope Hierarchies in Perceptual Content
179(6)
Scope and Modificational Attribution Hierarchy
185(5)
Absence in Perception of Negations, Conditionals, Disjunctions, Quantifiers
190(11)
Perceptual Contents, Propositions, and Noun Phrases
201(7)
7 Perceptual Attributives and Referential Applications in Perceptual Constancies
208(47)
Perceptual Constancies and Frege's Sense-Bedeutung Distinction: Similarities
208(5)
Perceptual Constancies and Frege's Sense-Bedeutung Distinction: Differences
213(1)
Minimalism: Defocus and Color Constancy
214(5)
Minimalism and Iconic Representation in a Spatial Coordinate System
219(14)
Perceptual Units in Packages in Iconic Visual Spatial Representation
233(4)
Linkage of Different Perceptual Attributives in Perceptual Constancies
237(4)
The Form of Perceptual Attributives in Linkages
241(3)
Accuracy Conditions for Perceptual Attributives in Perceptual Constancies
244(4)
Referential Applications in Accuracy Conditions for Tracking Particulars
248(7)
8 Egocentric Indexing in Perceptual Spatial and Temporal Frameworks
255(38)
Egocentric Spatial Indexes in Perception
255(9)
Egocentric Temporal Frameworks and Perceptual Representation of Motion
264(11)
Is Temporal Representation Constitutive to Perceptual Representation?
275(18)
9 The Iconic Nature of Perception
293(74)
Noun-Phrase-Like Structure and Iconic Representation in Perception
296(8)
Iconic Aspects of Perceptual Spatial Representation
304(8)
Temporal, Qualitative, and Packaging Iconic Aspects of Visual Perception
312(2)
Iconic Visual Perception and Maps or Pictures
314(1)
Some Ways Not to Think about Iconic Representation
315(16)
Iconic Perception, Iconic Concepts, Iconic Representation in Propositional Thought
331(3)
Part-Whole Representation in Pictures and Visual Perception
334(13)
Compositionality in Iconic Perceptual Representation
347(3)
Spatial Mapping in Visual Perception Again: The Non-Planar Surface of the Scene
350(5)
Relations Between Iconic Format and Representational Content
355(5)
The Tractability of Iconic Attributional Complexity
360(7)
10 First-Formed Perception: Its Richness and Autonomy
367(42)
What are First-Formed Perceptual States Like?: Three Limitative Views
367(5)
Framework
372(6)
Marr's 2Vi-D Sketch
378(2)
Change Detection
380(3)
Treisman's Binding Theory
383(8)
Two Lines of Empirical Criticism of Treisman's Theory
391(10)
Philosophical Views Influenced by Treisman's Binding Theory
401(4)
Two Types of First-Formed Perception
405(4)
11 Intra-Saccadic Perception and Recurrent Processing
409(24)
Two Changes in Scientific Understanding of Perception-Formation
409(4)
Some Main Brain Areas Involved in Visual Processing
413(7)
Timing of Visual Processing; Some Main Types of Representation
420(3)
Categorization and Timing
423(4)
Levels of Specificity in Perceptual Categorization
427(4)
Perceptual Constancies in Categorization Processing
431(2)
12 Further Attributives: Primitive Attribution of Causation, Agency
433(50)
Methodology for Finding Perceptual Attributives
433(13)
Primitive Attribution of Mechanical Causation
446(20)
Primitive Attribution of Agency
466(9)
Attribution of Further Structural Elements of Agency
475(8)
PART IV SYSTEM
13 Perceptual-Level Representation and Categorization
483(19)
Perceptual Categorization is Perceptual
487(6)
Richer Perceptual Categorization and Perceptual Processing that Contributes to It
493(9)
14 Conation: Relatively Primitive, Perceptually Guided Action
502(29)
Action Imperialism
502(2)
Relatively Primitive Action
504(4)
Form of Relatively Primitive Conative States
508(4)
Broader Structure of Conation in Causing Relatively Primitive Action
512(14)
Summary: Philosophical Issues
526(5)
15 Perceptual Attention
531(36)
Forms of Perceptual Attention
532(5)
Attention and Accuracy
537(8)
Sources and Levels of Attention
545(2)
Perceptual-Level Attention Commands and Guidance of Saccades
547(9)
The Executive Control System and Prepositional Drivers
556(9)
Supra-Perceptual Effects on Perceptual-Level Operations: An Example
565(2)
16 Perceptual Memory I: Shorter Term Systems
567(42)
Perceptual Memory and Consciousness
569(1)
Priming and Memory
570(2)
Visual Sensory Memory
572(3)
Fragile Visual Short-Term Memory
575(1)
Trans-Saccadic Memory
576(8)
Visual Working Memory
584(15)
Conceptual Short-Term Memory
599(10)
17 Perceptual Memory II: Visual Perceptual Long-Term Memory
609(16)
Overview
609(4)
Ability-General Long-Term Visual Perceptual Memory
613(6)
Episodic Visual Memory; De Re Long-Term Non-Episodic Visual Memory
619(3)
Perceptual and Conceptual Attributives in Long-Term Memory
622(1)
Summary of Relations Among Major Types of Visual Perceptual Memory
623(2)
18 Perceptual Learning, Perceptual Anticipation, Perceptual Imagining
625(22)
Perceptual Learning
625(5)
Perceptual Anticipation
630(11)
Perceptual Imagining
641(6)
19 Perception and Cognition
647(88)
The Original Epistemic Grounds for Reflecting on Cognitive Influence on Perception
649(6)
Fodor and Pylyshyn's Conceptions of Modularity; The Visual System as a Module
655(7)
Uses and Misuses of the Term `Cognition'
662(15)
The Issue of Cognitive Penetration
677(3)
Framework Issues
680(4)
Conceptions of Penetration
684(9)
The Cognitive Penetration Controversy
693(8)
A Computational Construal of Modularity
701(9)
Psychological Systems and Psychological Kinds
710(4)
The Empiricist Model of Perception and Conception: Degrees of Abstraction
714(8)
What Should Count as Cognition?
722(13)
20 Conclusion
735(14)
Emergence of Representational Mind
735(3)
Empirical Characteristics of First-Formed Perceptions
738(2)
Changes in the Science; Reading the Changes Philosophically
740(4)
Perception: Form and Representational Content
744(2)
Perception: The Seed of New Things to Live and Die For
746(3)
Bibliography 749(64)
Author Index 813(26)
Subject Index 839
Tyler Burge is Flint Professor of Philosophy, UCLA, where has taught since 1971. He has held visiting positions at Harvard, MIT, Stanford, Munich, Bayreuth, Bologna, and Zurich. He has delivered numerous named lecture series, including the Locke Lectures, Dewey Lectures, Whitehead Lectures, Kant Lectures, Petrus Hispanus Lectures, and Nicod Lectures. His work has made contributions to philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychologyepistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and the history of philosophy. He has published four books with OUP: Origins of Objectivity (2010) and three volumes of essays, Truth, Thought, Reason (2005), Foundations of Mind (2007), and Cognition through Understanding (2013).