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Political Economy, Oligopoly and Experimental Games: The Selected Essays of Martin Shubik Volume One [Kõva köide]

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This book presents the most important published articles of Martin Shubik who has made a path-breaking contribution to game theory and political economy. The volume shows how game theory can be used to explore fundamental problems in economics, political science and operations research.The book opens with an introduction to the career of Martin Shubik and the influences which have shaped his research. In this, and the chapters which follow, Martin Shubik stresses the importance of formulative models as playable games and the treatment of information to describe decision making among individuals, using examples from industrial organization. He demonstrates that games are a fruitful way to extend our knowledge of competition among the few. In addition, he considers the importance of gaming in economics and business suggesting that experimental games can be used to illustrate problems and principles in multi-person decision making.

This book will be welcomed by economists, game theorists, political scientists, and operations researchers.

Arvustused

'Martin Shubik has been one of the great pioneers in the application of game theory to economic problems. His work sheds considerable light on fundamental institutions such as the price system and money.'

Acknowledgements ix
Introduction xiii
PART I POLITICAL ECONOMY
`A Business Cycle Model with Organized Labor Considered', Econometrica, 20(2), April 1952, pp. 284--94
3(11)
`Information, Theories of Competition, and the Theory of Games', Journal of Political Economy, 60, February--December 1952, pp. 145--50 (reset)
14(7)
`Information, Risk, Ignorance and Indeterminacy', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 68, November, 1954, pp. 629--40
21(12)
`Market Form, Intent of the Firm and Market Behavior', Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 17(2), 1957, pp. 186--96
33(11)
`Simulation of the Industry and the Firm', American Economic Review, 50(5), December 1960, pp. 908--19
44(12)
`Approaches to the Study of Decision-Making Relevant to the Firm', The Journal of Business of the University of Chicago, 34(2), April 1961, pp. 101--18
56(18)
`Objective Functions and Models of Corporate Optimization', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75(3), August 1961, pp. 345--75
74(31)
`Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing', Management Science, 8(3), April 1962, pp. 325--43
105(19)
`Ownership and the Production Function' (with L.S. Shapley), The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 81, February 1967, pp. 88--111
124(24)
`A Curmudgeon's Guide to Microeconomics', The Journal of Economic Literature, 8(2), June 1970, pp. 405--34
148(30)
`On Different Methods for Allocating Resources', Kyklos, 23(2), 1970, pp. 332--7
178(6)
`The ``Bridge Game'' Economy: An Example of Indivisibilities', Journal of Political Economy, 79(4), July--August 1971, pp. 909--12
184(4)
`A Note on the Shape of the Pareto Optimal Surface' (with G. Bradley), Journal of Economic Theory, 8(4), August 1974, pp. 530--38
188(9)
`On the Role of Numbers and Information in Competition', Revue Economique, 26(4), 1975, pp. 605--21
197(17)
`An Example of a Trading Economy with Three Competitive Equilibria' (with L.S. Shapley), Journal of Political Economy, 85(4), August 1977, pp. 873--5
214(3)
`On Concepts of Efficiency', Policy Sciences, 9, 1978, pp. 121--6 (reset)
217(6)
`Information Conditions, Communication and General Equilibrium' (with P. Dubey), Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(2), May 1981, pp. 186--9
223(4)
`The Many Approaches to the Study of Monopolistic Competition', European Economic Review, 27, 1985, pp. 97--114
227(20)
PART II OLIGOPOLY
`A Comparison of Treatments of a Duopoly Situation' (with J. P. Mayberry and J. F. Nash), Econometrica, 21, January 1953, pp. 141--54
247(14)
`A Comparison of Treatments of a Duopoly Problem (Part II)', Econometrica, 23(4), October 1955, pp. 417--31
261(15)
`Games of Economic Survival' (with G.L. Thompson), Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 6(2), June 1959, pp. 111--23
276(13)
`Price Strategy Oligopoly with Product Variation' (with L.S. Shapley), Kyklos, 22(1), 1969, pp. 30--44
289(15)
`Price Strategy Oligopoly: Limiting Behavior with Product Differentiation', Western Economic Journal, 8(3), September 1970, pp. 226--32
304(7)
`Price Variation Duopoly with Differentiated Products and Random Demand' (with R. Levitan), Journal of Economic Theory, 3(1), March 1971, pp. 23--39
311(17)
`Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints' (with R. Levitan), International Economic Review, 13(1), February 1972, pp. 111--22
328(12)
`Duopoly with Price and Quantity as Strategic Variables' (with R. Levitan), International Journal of Game Theory, 7(1), 1978, pp. 1--11
340(11)
`Noncooperative Oligopoly with Entry' (with K. Nti), Journal of Economic Theory, 24(2), April 1981, pp. 187--204
351(20)
PART III GAMING
`Some Experimental Non-Zero Sum Games with Lack of Information about the Rules', Management Science, 8(2), January 1962, pp. 215--34
371(20)
```So Long Sucker'' -- A Four Person Game' (with M. Hausner, J. Nash and L.S. Shapley), in Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior, M. Shubik (ed.), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964, pp. 359--61
391(3)
`A Note on a Simulated Stock Market', Decision Sciences, 1, January--April 1970, pp. 129--41
394(13)
`An Artificial Player for a Business Market Game' (with G. Wolf and S. Lockhart), Simulation and Games, March 1971, pp. 27--43
407(17)
`The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation', The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15(1), 1971, pp. 109--11
424(3)
`On the Scope of Gaming', Management Science, 18(5), January Part 2, 1972, pp. 20--36
427(17)
`Some Experiences with an Experimental Oligopoly Business Game' (with G. Wolf and H.B. Eisenberg), General Systems, 17, 1972, pp. 61--75 (reset)
444(24)
`Perception of Payoff Structure and Opponent's Behavior in Related Matrix Games' (with G. Wolf and B. Poon), Journal of Conflict Resolution, 18(4), December 1974, pp. 646--55
468(10)
`Teams Compared to Individuals in Duopoly Games with an Artificial Player' (with G. Wolf), Southern Economic Journal, 41(4), April 1975, pp. 635--48
478(14)
`Cooperative Game Solutions: Australian, Indian, and U.S. Opinions', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 30(1), March 1986, pp. 63--76
492(17)
PART IV GAME THEORY AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH
`Solutions of N-Person Games with Ordinal Utilities' (with L.S. Shapley), Econometrica, 21(2), April 1953, pp. 348
509(1)
`A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System' (with L.S. Shapley), The American Political Science Review, 43(3), September 1954, pp. 787--92
510(6)
`Does the Fittest Necessarily Survive?', in Readings in Game Theory and Political Behavior, M. Shubik (ed.), New York: Doubleday, 1954, pp. 43--6
516(4)
`The Assignment Game I: The Core' (with L.S. Shapley), International Journal of Game Theory, 1(2), 1971, pp. 111--30 (reset from RAND paper R-874-RC, October 1971, pp. 1--41)
520(19)
`What is an Application and When is Theory a Waste of Time?', Management Science, 33(12), December 1987, pp. 1511--22
539(12)
Name index 551


The late Martin Shubik, formerly Seymour H. Knox Professor of Mathematical Institutional Economics, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, US