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xi | |
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xiii | |
| Foreword |
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xv | |
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| Acknowledgements |
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xvii | |
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1 | (6) |
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I Research Methodology for This Book |
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5 | (2) |
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2 Foreclosure: At What Cost and to Whom? |
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7 | (16) |
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8 | (3) |
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II Theoretical Framework and Principles That Inform Deeper Consideration of the Foreclosure Issues |
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11 | (8) |
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III A Focus on African Americans as Specific Targets of Predatory Lending |
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19 | (4) |
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3 Predatory Lending Practices Prior to the Global Financial Crisis |
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23 | (46) |
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I Collusion by Market Players |
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24 | (1) |
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II "Redlining" and Discriminatory Zoning Set the Stage for Predatory Lending |
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25 | (2) |
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III Careless and Predatory Lending Commenced Prior to the Global Financial Crisis |
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27 | (24) |
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27 | (7) |
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34 | (2) |
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3 Predatory Refinancing and Loss of Equity |
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36 | (1) |
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4 Securitization as a Significant Cause of the Sub-prime Meltdown |
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36 | (5) |
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5 Collateralization Offloaded Risk |
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41 | (7) |
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6 Third-party Mortgage Servicers Engaged in Egregious Conduct |
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48 | (3) |
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IV The Sub-prime Mortgage Market Collapse |
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51 | (18) |
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1 The Shadow Banking Sector Seriously Exacerbated the Misconduct |
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54 | (2) |
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2 The Complicity of Credit Rating Agencies |
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56 | (2) |
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3 The Role of the Government-sponsored Entities in the Sub-prime Meltdown |
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58 | (3) |
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4 Failure of Regulatory Oversight |
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61 | (8) |
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4 Predatory Lending Targeted African Americans |
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69 | (47) |
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I The Targeting of African Americans |
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69 | (26) |
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1 Qualified for Traditional Mortgages but Were Steered Inappropriately |
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71 | (5) |
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76 | (2) |
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3 Historical Context Helps Explain Why African Americans Were Targeted |
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78 | (13) |
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4 Overt Racism Continues Today |
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91 | (4) |
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II The Narrative That Blames the Individuals Victimized by Predatory Lending |
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95 | (14) |
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1 Judicial Contributions to "Victim-blaming" |
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101 | (8) |
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109 | (3) |
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IV Continued Victimization: Why No Help for Predatory Lending Targets? |
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112 | (4) |
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5 The Implications; of the Collapse of the Mortgage-backed Securities Market for Consumer Borrowers |
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116 | (8) |
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I The Widening Wealth Gap |
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120 | (1) |
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II Lack of Relationship with Lenders Exacerbates Financial Hardship |
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121 | (3) |
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124 | (7) |
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I Bankruptcy Reform Could Have Provided a Vitally Important Safety Net |
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125 | (6) |
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7 Financial Crisis Reforms Woefully Inadequate |
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131 | (20) |
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I An Inadequate Legislative Agenda to Address Predatory Lending |
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131 | (20) |
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1 Home Affordable Modification Program Created Incentives for Further Egregious Behaviour |
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132 | (9) |
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2 Short Sales and Transfers of Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Exacerbated Inappropriate Incentives |
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141 | (1) |
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3 Reform Measures Not Sufficient |
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141 | (10) |
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8 Incomplete Justice: Legal Actions against Predatory Lenders |
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151 | (57) |
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I Settlements of Lawsuits for Predatory Lending Brought by the U.S. Department of Justice and State Attorneys General |
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152 | (10) |
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1 National Mortgage Settlements |
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155 | (1) |
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2 Understanding the Terms of Settlement |
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156 | (6) |
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II The Bank of America Settlements |
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162 | (15) |
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1 The Conduct of Bank of America, Countrywide Financial and Merrill Lynch |
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162 | (4) |
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2 Relief to Bank of America's Consumer Borrowers |
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166 | (11) |
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III The Citigroup Settlements |
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177 | (2) |
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1 The Conduct of Citigroup |
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178 | (1) |
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2 Relief to Citigroup's Consumer Borrowers |
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178 | (1) |
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IV The Goldman Sachs Settlement |
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179 | (2) |
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V The JP Morgan Chase & Co Settlements |
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181 | (2) |
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1 Relief to JP Morgan Chase & Co Mortgage Borrowers |
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182 | (1) |
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2 Consumer Relief under the NMS |
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182 | (1) |
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VI The Wells Fargo Settlements |
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183 | (3) |
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184 | (1) |
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2 Wells Fargo's Relief to Mortgage Borrowers |
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185 | (1) |
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VII The Ocwen Financial Corporation Settlement |
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186 | (1) |
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VIII The Deutsche Bank Settlements |
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187 | (1) |
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IX The Credit Suisse Settlements |
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188 | (2) |
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1 Credit Suisse's Conduct |
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189 | (1) |
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2 Relief to Credit Suisse's Mortgage Borrowers |
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190 | (1) |
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X The Ally Financial, ResCap, and GMAC Settlements |
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190 | (1) |
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XI The Morgan Stanley Settlements |
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191 | (1) |
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XII The SunTrust Settlement |
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192 | (2) |
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193 | (1) |
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2 Relief to SunTrust's Mortgage Borrowers |
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193 | (1) |
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3 SunTrust Misconduct Regarding Home Affordable Modification Program |
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193 | (1) |
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XIII The HSBC Settlements |
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194 | (1) |
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195 | (1) |
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XV No Way to Tell if Consumer Borrowers Received Any Principal Forgiveness |
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196 | (2) |
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1 Professionals within the Banks, Brokerages, and Servicing Companies Test Their Own Compliance with the Lawsuit Settlement |
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197 | (1) |
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XVI Lawsuits against Predatory Lenders Brought under Anti-discrimination Law |
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198 | (4) |
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XVII Settlement Means No Admission or Finding of Liability |
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202 | (6) |
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9 A Sub-prime Loan by Any Other Name Is Just as Predatory |
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208 | (29) |
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I Non-prime Mortgages - the New Sub-prime |
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208 | (4) |
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II "One Mod" - the Latest Iteration of Private Sector "Loss Distribution Strategy" |
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212 | (4) |
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III Mortgage Modification Still a Scam |
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216 | (2) |
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IV Other Predatory Lending |
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218 | (19) |
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1 Non-prime Home Equity Loans |
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218 | (1) |
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219 | (3) |
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222 | (1) |
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4 Continuing Discriminatory Practices |
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223 | (6) |
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229 | (2) |
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6 Public Sector Predation |
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231 | (6) |
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10 "Forgiveness" rather than Forbearance or Foreclosure |
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237 | (24) |
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I Effective Structural Reform Is Only Possible if There Is Widespread Recognition of the Permanence of Racism |
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238 | (6) |
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II Impose Rigorous Limits on the Type and Nature of Products and Services |
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244 | (6) |
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III Effective Corporate Governance and Oversight Is Needed as Well |
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250 | (5) |
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1 Worker-sponsored Capital Could Press for Enhanced Corporate Governance and Protection of African-American and Other Consumer Borrowers |
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251 | (3) |
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2 Tax Incentives Could Also Assist |
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254 | (1) |
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3 Finding Innovative Ways of Delivering Mortgage and Banking Services |
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255 | (1) |
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255 | (6) |
| Appendix |
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261 | (42) |
| Index |
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303 | |