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xi | |
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xv | |
Note about the Chilean Constitution |
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xvii | |
Acknowledgments |
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xix | |
Glossary of Some Key Terms for Argentina and Chile Most Relevant to This Book |
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xxi | |
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1 | (34) |
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Part I Defining Hyperpresidentialism and Presenting My Question |
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2 | (4) |
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Part II The Weak Explanatory Powers of Constitutional Presidential Powers for Determining Presidential Powers in Practice |
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6 | (5) |
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Part III Introducing the Theoretical Argument Behind the Emergence of Hyperpresidentialism |
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11 | (5) |
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Part IV How My Book Fits into the Literature |
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16 | (8) |
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Part V Structure of the Book and Roadmap of the Argument |
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24 | (1) |
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Part VI Modern Political History of Argentina and Chile |
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25 | (10) |
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2 Comparing Presidential Power in Theory versus Presidential Power in Practice in Argentina and Chile |
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35 | (63) |
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Part I Formal Presidential Power in Argentina |
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36 | (2) |
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Part II Hyperpresidentialism in Practice in Argentina |
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38 | (23) |
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Part III Formal Presidential Power in Chile |
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61 | (5) |
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Part IV No Hyperpresidentialism in Practice in Chile |
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66 | (32) |
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89 | (9) |
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3 The Impact of the Strength of State Institutions on Presidential Power |
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98 | (51) |
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Exploring the Causal Relationship Between the Dependent Variable in Chapter 2 and the First Independent Variable in Chapter 3 |
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99 | (2) |
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Part I Argentina---A Case of Severe Institutional Weakness |
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101 | (18) |
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Part II Chile---A Case of Institutional Strength |
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119 | (13) |
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Part III Generalizing the Theory Through a Large-N Analysis |
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132 | (17) |
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143 | (6) |
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4 The Impact of the Size of the President's Party in Congress on Presidential Power |
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149 | (39) |
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Part I Argentina---A Case of Strong Majoritarianism |
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150 | (14) |
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Part II Chile---A Case of Weak Majoritarianism |
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164 | (11) |
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Part III Reinforcing the Importance of Majoritarianism for Hyperpresidentialism Using the Case of Mexico |
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175 | (4) |
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Part IV Three Institutional Mechanisms That Reduce Hyperpresidentialism |
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179 | (9) |
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182 | (6) |
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5 The Impact of Economic Crises on Presidential Power |
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188 | (24) |
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Part I Theoretical Analysis of the Role of Economic Crises in Helping a President Concentrate Power |
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189 | (3) |
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Part II Assessing the Role of Economic Crises in Promoting Hyperpresidentialism in Argentina |
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192 | (11) |
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Part III Growth Patterns in Post-democratic Chile and the Non-emergence of Hyperpresidentialism |
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203 | (3) |
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Part IV Using a Survey to Understand Whether the First and Third Independent Variables in This Book Work Through a Bottom-Up or High-Level Process |
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206 | (6) |
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209 | (3) |
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212 | (15) |
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212 | (1) |
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Main Contributions to the Literature |
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213 | (4) |
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217 | (5) |
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Future Areas of Research Stemming from This Book |
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222 | (2) |
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224 | (3) |
Appendix: Using Different Measurements Than the Corruption Perceptions Index to Illustrate the Correlation Between Institutional Strength and Presidential Power |
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227 | (7) |
Interviews Cited |
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234 | (9) |
Index |
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243 | |