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Presidential Power in Latin America: Examining the Cases of Argentina and Chile [Kõva köide]

(York University, Canada)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 250 pages, kõrgus x laius: 229x152 mm, kaal: 453 g, 25 Tables, black and white; 43 Line drawings, black and white; 43 Illustrations, black and white
  • Sari: Routledge Studies in Latin American Politics
  • Ilmumisaeg: 24-Dec-2021
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0367690551
  • ISBN-13: 9780367690557
  • Formaat: Hardback, 250 pages, kõrgus x laius: 229x152 mm, kaal: 453 g, 25 Tables, black and white; 43 Line drawings, black and white; 43 Illustrations, black and white
  • Sari: Routledge Studies in Latin American Politics
  • Ilmumisaeg: 24-Dec-2021
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0367690551
  • ISBN-13: 9780367690557
"What explains variance in presidential power between countries? In Presidential Power in Latin America, Dan Berbecel provides a general, systematic theory for explaining presidential power in practice as opposed to presidential power in theory. Using expert survey data from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) alongside interviews with high-level figures in politics, the judiciary, the public administration, NGOs, and academia in Argentina and Chile, Berbecel argues that constitutional presidential power (formal power) is a very poor predictor of presidential power in practice (informal power). Given the poor predictive value of formal rules, he provides an explanation why hyperpresidentialism emerges in some countries but not in others. Berbecel attributes the root causes of hyperpresidentialism to three independent variables (weak state institutions, the size of the president's party in congress, and a history of economic crises) which together determine how likely it is that a president will be able to concentrate power. Presidential Power in Latin America will be of key interest to scholars and students of executive politics, Latin American politics and more broadly comparative politics"--

What explains variance in presidential power between countries? In Presidential Power in Latin America Dan Berbecel provides a general, systematic theory for explaining presidential power in practice as opposed to presidential power in theory.

Arvustused

Dan Berbecels book is an excellent contribution to the literatures on presidentialism, how to limit the likelihood of executive takeovers of democracy, and Latin American politics. It shows that presidents de facto powers diverge markedly from their constitutional powers. The book is well researched and written.

Scott Mainwaring, Eugene and Helen Conley Professor of Political Science, Notre Dame

List of Figures
xi
List of Tables
xv
Note about the Chilean Constitution xvii
Acknowledgments xix
Glossary of Some Key Terms for Argentina and Chile Most Relevant to This Book xxi
1 Introduction
1(34)
Part I Defining Hyperpresidentialism and Presenting My Question
2(4)
Part II The Weak Explanatory Powers of Constitutional Presidential Powers for Determining Presidential Powers in Practice
6(5)
Part III Introducing the Theoretical Argument Behind the Emergence of Hyperpresidentialism
11(5)
Part IV How My Book Fits into the Literature
16(8)
Part V Structure of the Book and Roadmap of the Argument
24(1)
Part VI Modern Political History of Argentina and Chile
25(10)
2 Comparing Presidential Power in Theory versus Presidential Power in Practice in Argentina and Chile
35(63)
Part I Formal Presidential Power in Argentina
36(2)
Part II Hyperpresidentialism in Practice in Argentina
38(23)
Part III Formal Presidential Power in Chile
61(5)
Part IV No Hyperpresidentialism in Practice in Chile
66(32)
Chapter Summary
89(9)
3 The Impact of the Strength of State Institutions on Presidential Power
98(51)
Exploring the Causal Relationship Between the Dependent Variable in
Chapter 2 and the First Independent Variable in
Chapter 3
99(2)
Part I Argentina---A Case of Severe Institutional Weakness
101(18)
Part II Chile---A Case of Institutional Strength
119(13)
Part III Generalizing the Theory Through a Large-N Analysis
132(17)
Chapter Summary
143(6)
4 The Impact of the Size of the President's Party in Congress on Presidential Power
149(39)
Part I Argentina---A Case of Strong Majoritarianism
150(14)
Part II Chile---A Case of Weak Majoritarianism
164(11)
Part III Reinforcing the Importance of Majoritarianism for Hyperpresidentialism Using the Case of Mexico
175(4)
Part IV Three Institutional Mechanisms That Reduce Hyperpresidentialism
179(9)
Chapter Summary
182(6)
5 The Impact of Economic Crises on Presidential Power
188(24)
Part I Theoretical Analysis of the Role of Economic Crises in Helping a President Concentrate Power
189(3)
Part II Assessing the Role of Economic Crises in Promoting Hyperpresidentialism in Argentina
192(11)
Part III Growth Patterns in Post-democratic Chile and the Non-emergence of Hyperpresidentialism
203(3)
Part IV Using a Survey to Understand Whether the First and Third Independent Variables in This Book Work Through a Bottom-Up or High-Level Process
206(6)
Chapter Summary
209(3)
6 Conclusion
212(15)
Summary of Argument
212(1)
Main Contributions to the Literature
213(4)
Alternative Explanations
217(5)
Future Areas of Research Stemming from This Book
222(2)
Final Thoughts
224(3)
Appendix: Using Different Measurements Than the Corruption Perceptions Index to Illustrate the Correlation Between Institutional Strength and Presidential Power 227(7)
Interviews Cited 234(9)
Index 243
Dan Berbecel is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at York University (the Glendon Campus) in Toronto, Canada. His main area of research interest is Comparative Politics, with a focus on Latin American Politics.