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Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: The Regulator and the Class Action in Australias Continuous Disclosure Regime [Kõva köide]

(University of New South Wales, Australia)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 312 pages, kõrgus x laius: 244x169 mm, kaal: 699 g
  • Sari: Civil Justice Systems
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Feb-2022
  • Kirjastus: Hart Publishing
  • ISBN-10: 1509941517
  • ISBN-13: 9781509941513
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  • Formaat: Hardback, 312 pages, kõrgus x laius: 244x169 mm, kaal: 699 g
  • Sari: Civil Justice Systems
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Feb-2022
  • Kirjastus: Hart Publishing
  • ISBN-10: 1509941517
  • ISBN-13: 9781509941513
"This book undertakes unique case studies, including interviews with participants, as well as empirical analysis, of public and private enforcement of Australian securities laws addressing continuous disclosure. Enforcement of laws is crucial to effective regulation. Historically, enforcement was the province of a government regulator with significant discretion (public enforcement). However, more and more citizens are being expected to take action themselves (private enforcement). Consistent with regulatory pluralism, public and private enforcement exist in parallel, with the capacity to both help and hinder each other, and the achievement of the goals of enforcement in a range of areas of regulation. The rise of the shareholder class action in Australia, backed by litigation funding or lawyers, has given rise to enforcement overlapping with that of the government regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. The ramifications of overlapping enforcement are explained based on detailedanalysis. The analysis is further bolstered by the regulator's approach to enforcement changing from a compliance orientation to a "Why not litigate?" approach. The analysis and ramifications of the Australian case studies involve matters of regulatory theory and practice that apply across jurisdictions. The book will appeal to practitioners, regulators and academics interested in regulatory policy and enforcement, and the operation of regulators and class actions, including their interaction"--

This book undertakes unique case studies, including interviews with participants, as well as empirical analysis, of public and private enforcement of Australian securities laws addressing continuous disclosure.

Enforcement of laws is crucial to effective regulation. Historically, enforcement was the province of a government regulator with significant discretion (public enforcement). However, more and more citizens are being expected to take action themselves (private enforcement). Consistent with regulatory pluralism, public and private enforcement exist in parallel, with the capacity to both help and hinder each other, and the achievement of the goals of enforcement in a range of areas of regulation.

The rise of the shareholder class action in Australia, backed by litigation funding or lawyers, has given rise to enforcement overlapping with that of the government regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. The ramifications of overlapping enforcement are explained based on detailed analysis. The analysis is further bolstered by the regulator's approach to enforcement changing from a compliance orientation to a “Why not litigate?” approach.

The analysis and ramifications of the Australian case studies involve matters of regulatory theory and practice that apply across jurisdictions. The book will appeal to practitioners, regulators and academics interested in regulatory policy and enforcement, and the operation of regulators and class actions, including their interaction.

Muu info

This book addresses the development and ramifications of public (government regulator) and private enforcement (class actions) of law, drawing on original case studies and empirical analysis of securities regulation in Australia.
Preface vii
Acknowledgements ix
Abbreviations xvii
Table of Cases
xix
1 Introduction
1(11)
I Research Questions
1(1)
II Structure of the Text
2(2)
A Background (Chapter Two)
2(1)
B Analytical Framework (Chapter Three)
3(1)
C Case Studies (Chapter Four)
3(1)
D Application of the Analytical Framework (Chapter Five)
3(1)
E Effectiveness and Coexistence of Regulatory Enforcement and Class Actions (Chapter Six)
3(1)
F Public and Private Enforcement Recalibrated (Chapter Seven)
4(1)
G Coordination of Public and Private Enforcement (Chapter Eight)
4(1)
III Scope of Study and Text
4(1)
IV Case Studies
5(1)
V Key Findings
6(5)
A Outcomes -- Deterrence and Compensation
7(2)
B Regulatory Process
9(1)
C Public and Private Enforcement Recalibrated
10(1)
D Coordination of Public and Private Enforcement
10(1)
VI Conclusion
11(1)
2 Background
12(33)
I Introduction
12(1)
II Continuous Disclosure
12(10)
A Background
12(3)
B Stock Exchange Listing Rules
15(1)
C Corporations Act, Ch 6CA
16(2)
D Public Enforcement
18(3)
E Private Cause of Action for Compensation
21(1)
III Misleading or Deceptive Conduct
22(4)
A Background
22(1)
B Securities and Misleading Conduct
23(2)
C Public Enforcement
25(1)
D Private Cause of Action for Compensation
25(1)
IV ASIC Enforcement
26(7)
A ASIC's Approach to Enforcement
26(1)
B Responsive Regulation - The Enforcement Pyramid
27(2)
C ASIC and Enforcement of the Continuous Disclosure Regime
29(4)
V Shareholder Class Actions
33(10)
A Background
33(1)
B The Role of Class Actions
34(2)
C Federal Court of Australia Act, Part IVA
36(5)
D Typical Shareholder Class Action
41(1)
E Litigation Funding
41(2)
VI Conclusion
43(2)
3 Analytical Framework
45(43)
I Introduction
45(1)
II Deterrence
46(13)
A Definition
46(1)
B Why is it an Objective?
46(2)
C Dimensions of Deterrence
48(2)
D What Makes Deterrence Effective?
50(5)
E Limitations of the Sanctions Approach to Deterrence
55(4)
III Compensation
59(12)
A Definition
59(1)
B Why is it an Objective?
59(4)
C How should Compensation be Accessed?
63(2)
D When is Compensation Achieved?
65(1)
E Limits on Achieving Complete Compensation
66(5)
IV The Regulatory Process
71(15)
A Why Assess the Regulatory Process?
71(1)
B Legislative Authority
72(3)
C The Public Interest
75(3)
D Accountability
78(5)
E Efficiency
83(3)
V Conclusion
86(2)
4 Case Studies
88(22)
I Introduction
88(1)
II Methodology
88(5)
A Why Case Studies?
88(1)
B Selection of Case Studies
89(2)
C Documentary Analysis
91(1)
D Interviews
91(1)
E Limitations of the Methodology
92(1)
III Telstra
93(3)
A ASIC Action
93(2)
B Class Action
95(1)
IV Multiplex
96(4)
A ASIC Action
96(1)
B Class Actions
97(3)
V Centra
100(5)
A ASIC Action
100(3)
B Class Actions
103(2)
VI Leighton
105(2)
A ASIC Action
105(1)
B Class Action
106(1)
VII Conclusion -- Summary of Case Studies
107(3)
5 Application of the Analytical Framework to the Case Studies
110(39)
I Introduction
110(1)
II Application of the Analytical Framework -- Deterrence
111(16)
A Dimensions of Deterrence
111(7)
B Effectiveness and Limitations of Deterrence
118(9)
III Application of the Analytical Framework -- Compensation
127(8)
A Accessing Compensation
127(2)
B Limitations on Achieving Full Compensation
129(6)
IV Application of the Analytical Framework -- Regulatory Process
135(12)
A Legislative Authority
135(1)
B The Public Interest
136(4)
C Accountability
140(4)
D Efficiency
144(3)
V Conclusion
147(2)
6 Effectiveness and Coexistence of Regulatory Enforcement and Class Actions
149(30)
I Introduction
149(1)
II Effectiveness of ASIC Enforcement and Class Actions
149(16)
A ASIC and Deterrence -- Reputation
150(2)
B ASIC and Deterrence -- Direct Sanctions
152(2)
C ASIC and Deterrence -- Indirect Costs
154(1)
D Class Actions and Incidental Deterrence
154(1)
E Deterrence without Findings of Contravention?
155(2)
F Class Actions and Compensation
157(3)
G ASIC and Compensation
160(1)
H Individuals Rarely Pursued
161(2)
I The Paradox of Insurance
163(1)
J Summary of the Effectiveness of ASIC Enforcement and Class Actions
164(1)
III Ramifications of ASIC Enforcement and Class Actions Coexistence
165(9)
A Regulatory Pluralism
166(1)
B What is the Public Interest?
166(1)
C Regulator Discretion and the Enforcement Pyramid
167(4)
D Accountability
171(1)
E Efficiency
172(1)
F Summary of ASIC Enforcement and Class Actions Coexistence
173(1)
IV Conclusion
174(5)
A Effectiveness of ASIC Enforcement and the Class Action -- Outcomes
174(3)
B Ramifications of ASIC Enforcement and Class Actions Coexistence -- Process
177(2)
7 Public and Private Enforcement Recalibrated
179(39)
I Introduction
179(1)
II ASIC's Enforcement Approach Revisited
179(11)
A ASIC's Approach to Misconduct and Choice of Enforcement Tools
180(6)
B Industry Funding of ASIC
186(1)
C Increased Penalties and Powers
187(3)
III Class Actions Revisited
190(12)
A ALRC Inquiry into Class Actions and Litigation Funding
190(4)
B First Continuous Disclosure Class Action Judgment
194(1)
C Regulation of Litigation Funding
195(2)
D Group Costs Orders in Victoria
197(2)
E Second Continuous Disclosure Class Action Judgment
199(1)
F Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services
200(2)
IV Reformulating the Continuous Disclosure Laws
202(6)
A ALRC Inquiry into Class Actions and Litigation Funding
202(1)
B Requiring Intention or Fault for Liability -- Interim Measures
203(2)
C Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services
205(1)
D Requiring Intention or Fault for Liability -- Permanent Measures
205(3)
V ASIC Enforcement and Continuous Disclosure Class Actions Post-2017
208(8)
A ASIC Enforcement
208(5)
B Continuous Disclosure Class Actions
213(3)
VI Conclusion
216(2)
8 Coordination of Public and Private Enforcement
218(27)
I Introduction
218(1)
II Why Coordination?
218(3)
A Overlapping Deterrence and Compensation
219(1)
B A Regulatory Process Perspective
220(1)
C Regulatory Pluralism and Coordination
220(1)
III Existing Coordination Mechanisms
221(5)
A Case Management
221(3)
B Intervention
224(1)
C Res Judicata, Estoppel and Abuse of Process
225(1)
D Access to ASIC Investigations
226(1)
IV Coordination in Other Regulatory Regimes
226(9)
A Environmental Law Citizen Suits
226(3)
B Employment Discrimination Claim
229(1)
C Qui Tam
230(2)
D Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
232(2)
E Taxonomy of Coordination Mechanisms
234(1)
V Concerns with Coordination
235(1)
VI Coordination Strategies for Securities Regulation
236(7)
A Information-sharing Approach
237(2)
B Gatekeeper Approach
239(4)
VII Conclusion
243(2)
Appendix 1
245(19)
I Interview Questions for ASIC
245(1)
II Interview Questions for Class Action Applicants, Litigation Funders and their Lawyers
245(1)
III Interview Questions for Regulated Entity/Class Action Respondents' Directors/Officers and their Lawyers
246(1)
IV Summary of Interviews
247(1)
V Interviews with Short Title
247(2)
Appendix 2
249(1)
Table 1 Continuous disclosure infringement notices from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2021
249(2)
Table 2 Continuous disclosure enforceable undertakings -- 1998 to 30 June 2021
251(3)
Table 3 Continuous disclosure class actions -- 2002 to 30 June 2021
254(10)
Bibliography 264(17)
Index 281
Michael Legg is Professor of Law at the University of New South Wales, Australia.