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Putting Properties First: A Platonic Metaphysics for Natural Modality [Kõva köide]

(Associate Professor, Durham University)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 288 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 240x160x20 mm, kaal: 570 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 07-Jul-2022
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198855109
  • ISBN-13: 9780198855101
Teised raamatud teemal:
Putting Properties First: A Platonic Metaphysics for Natural ModalitySuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 288 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 240x160x20 mm, kaal: 570 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 07-Jul-2022
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198855109
  • ISBN-13: 9780198855101
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9780198855101.html
Märksõnad:
Putting Properties First considers the metaphysics of natural science. It develops and defends a contemporary metaphysical theory of natural modality called 'Modal Platonism', which puts properties first in the metaphysical hierarchy. According to this theory, natural properties-such as mass
and charge-are fundamental entities which ground the laws of nature and the behavioural dispositions of physical things. This theory differs from other 'properties-first' approaches in two main ways. First, it views properties as Platonic universals, which exist even if they are not instantiated by
anything. Second, the theory rejects the popular idea that properties are identical with, or essentially dependent upon, dispositions. Instead, Modal Platonism views properties as qualities which necessarily ground dispositions and other modal phenomena. This theory solves a range of philosophical
puzzles regarding dispositions and laws. Given that laws of nature are a necessary precondition for scientific enquiry, Modal Platonism promises to provide a plausible metaphysical framework for all natural science.
Acknowledgements xi
1 The Scope and Aims of This Book: Properties, Laws, and Dispositions
1(40)
1.1 Introduction
1(3)
1.2 The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism
4(16)
1.2.1 Properties and Predicates
4(3)
1.2.2 Qualities and Dispositions
7(3)
1.2.3 Existence, Actuality, and Realization
10(2)
1.2.4 Metaphysical Grounding
12(1)
1.2.5 Grounding as a Worldly Relationship
13(1)
1.2.6 Grounding Does Not Entail Reduction
14(2)
1.2.7 Grounding Occurs with Metaphysical Necessity
16(1)
1.2.8 Ground, Necessity, and Essence
16(2)
1.2.9 The Methodology of Ground Theorizing
18(2)
1.3 The Rival Approaches to Natural Modality
20(7)
1.3.1 The Mosaic View
21(1)
1.3.2 The Law-Driven Account
22(2)
1.3.3 Property-Driven Approaches to Natural Modality
24(3)
1.4 Modal Platonism in More Detail
27(7)
1.4.1 Defending Platonism
28(2)
1.4.2 The Grounding Theory of Natural Modality
30(4)
1.5 The Big Picture
34(7)
PART I THE CORE THEORY: MODAL PLATONISM
2 The Platonic Theory of Dispositional Directedness
41(26)
2.1 Introduction
41(1)
2.2 Two Metaphysical Principles about Dispositions
42(3)
2.3 Properties as Tropes or Universals?
45(9)
2.4 The Aristotelian versus Platonic View of Universals
54(5)
2.5 Alternative Accounts of Dispositional Directedness
59(6)
2.5.1 Manifestations as Parts: The Conjunctive Property Proposal
59(2)
2.5.2 Manifestations as Structural Constituents: The Diachronic Property Proposal
61(1)
2.5.3 Directedness as a Higher-Order Monadic Property
62(3)
2.6 Conclusions
65(2)
3 Against Dispositional Essentialism: A Grounding Theory of Natural Modality
67(29)
3.1 Introduction
67(1)
3.2 Two Kinds of Internal Relation
68(5)
3.3 Against the Bradlean Conception of Dispositional Directedness
73(5)
3.4 Jaag's Formulation of the Problem Facing Dispositional Essentialism
78(3)
3.5 The Leibnizian Approach: Universals as Qualities Which Ground Natural Modality
81(5)
3.6 The Logical Form of Dispositional Predication
86(5)
3.7 Comparison with Other Theories of Dispositions
91(4)
3.8 Conclusions
95(1)
4 Solving the Entailment and Governance Problems
96(11)
4.1 Introduction
96(1)
4.2 The Entailment Problem
96(1)
4.3 What Second-Order Law Statements Do Not Entail
97(4)
4.4 What Second-Order Law Statements Do Entail
101(2)
4.5 Does the Reverse Entailment Hold?
103(1)
4.6 The Question of Governance
104(1)
4.7 Why Leibnizian Relations of Directedness Do Not Govern
105(2)
5 Dissolving the Problem of Latent Dispositions
107(21)
5.1 Introduction: The Problem of Latent Dispositions
107(3)
5.2 Mumford's and Bird's Dispositionalist Accounts of Latent Dispositions
110(5)
5.3 Identity Theory to the Rescue?
115(2)
5.4 Psillos's Regress Problem
117(1)
5.5 Marmodoro's Pure Powers Response
118(2)
5.6 Bauer's Pure Powers Response
120(7)
5.7 Conclusions
127(1)
6 Objections and Replies
128(37)
6.1 Introduction
128(1)
6.2 Really Realist?
128(3)
6.3 Multiple Realization?
131(4)
6.4 Act of Faith?
135(2)
6.5 Humean?
137(5)
6.6 Can Qualities Explain Dispositions?
142(3)
6.7 Meta-Grounding?
145(6)
6.8 Exclusion Problem?
151(3)
6.9 Qualities Collapse into Powers?
154(2)
6.10 Why Not Tropes?
156(1)
6.11 What Is Directedness?
157(2)
6.12 Not Naturalistic?
159(2)
6.13 Un-Eleatic?
161(4)
PART II PUTTING PLATONISM TO WORK
7 Instantiation and Repeatability: A Platonic Approach
165(19)
7.1 Introduction
165(2)
7.2 The Explanatory Instability of Aristotelianism
167(3)
7.3 The Explanatory Role of Platonic Universals: A Traditional View of Instantiation
170(8)
7.4 Is There a Simpler Explanation?
178(2)
7.5 Armstrong's Aristotelian Account of Instantiation and One over Many
180(3)
7.6 Conclusions
183(1)
8 Probabilistic Laws
184(17)
8.1 Introduction: Laws and Probabilistic Strength
184(1)
8.2 Armstrong on Irreducible Probabilistic Laws
185(2)
8.3 Resisting Probabilistic Causation
187(3)
8.4 Armstrong's Preferred Account
190(1)
8.5 The Problem of Probabilistic Failures
191(3)
8.6 The Merits of Modal Platonism
194(3)
8.7 Further Considerations: Van Fraassen's Criticisms of Armstrong's Probabilistic Laws
197(3)
8.8 Conclusions
200(1)
9 Determinable Laws
201(17)
9.1 Introduction: The Challenge of Accounting for Functional Laws
201(3)
9.2 The Problem of Functional Laws in More Detail
204(1)
9.3 Determinable Laws
205(5)
9.4 The Overdetermination Problem
210(3)
9.5 Solving the Overdetermination Problem
213(4)
9.6 Conclusions
217(1)
10 Extending Modal Platonism
218(27)
10.1 Introduction: Modality in General
218(1)
10.2 Non-Natural Modality
218(1)
10.3 Possibility and Necessity: Platonism versus the Dominant Possible-Worlds Approach
219(4)
10.4 The Richness of Modal Platonism
223(2)
10.5 Platonic Modal Relations
225(5)
10.6 Modal Platonism and the Argument from Unrealized Possibility
230(9)
10.7 Alien Possibility and Natural Science
239(2)
10.8 Further Work
241(3)
10.9 Conclusions
244(1)
11 Summary
245(8)
Appendix I: Logical Proofs of
Chapter 4		 253(2)
References 255(14)
Index of Names 269(2)
Index of Concepts 271
Matthew Tugby is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Durham University. Before moving to Durham in 2013, he was Teaching Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham. Matthew's research focuses on issues at the intersection of contemporary metaphysics and the philosophy of science, including the topics of properties, dispositions, laws, causation, and modality. He was co-editor of Metaphysics and Science (OUP, 2013) and has published over 20 articles in academic journals such as Analysis, Mind, Philosophical Studies, and Synthese. In 2015 Matthew was the winner of the Mind Association Research Fellowship.