This book offers an analysis of the United States’ conventional military buildup during the final decade of the Cold War.
Departing from a historiography largely focused on strategic arms and summit diplomacy, the work examines how the modernization of non-nuclear forces formed an integral part of Ronald Reagan’s broader Cold War strategy. It shows that the revitalization of conventional forces was not ancillary to diplomacy but a central pillar of a policy that sought to negotiate from strength while enhancing deterrence. Spanning the late 1970s and 1980s, the book explores how the armed forces were rebuilt after the post-Vietnam downturn. It highlights well-known and illustrative case studies—including the M1 Abrams tank, advanced tactical aircraft, naval expansion, precision-guided munitions, and new command-and-control systems—to demonstrate how doctrine, technology, and personnel reforms were closely linked. Methodologically grounded in defence budgets, congressional debates, official reports, and service doctrines, the study argues that the conventional buildup played a significant yet underappreciated role in shaping the Cold War’s final phase. By strengthening deterrence, reassuring allies, and intensifying economic and technological competition, these reforms contributed to pressures that influenced Soviet policy choices and reforms, leaving an enduring imprint on the Cold War’s outcome and the post-Cold War world.
This book will be of much interest to students of US political history, Cold War Studies, strategic studies and International Relations.
This book offers an analysis of the United States’ conventional military buildup during the final decade of the Cold War.
