Regulation, Organizations, and Politics examines the evolution of regulation at the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The ICC has probably had the most profound impact on any federal agency on the way social scientists view politics. From a perspective based in modern political economy, the author develops an analysis that improves our understanding of the determinants of bureaucratic performance and clarifies the conditions under which organizations are likely to have a substantial influence.
Employing a variety of techniques, Regulation, Organizations, and Politics explains how motor carriers, particularly the larger truckers who controlled the American Trucking Association, were unable to control public policy once the chief executive decided to expand substantial political resources on reforming the motor carrier system. The author shows that this failure was rooted in the carriers’ inability to offer the requisite rewards and sanctions required to influence those with power over the outcome. This work thus demonstrates that an integrated approach to the intersections of rational, if often incompletely informed, actors can help us to understand phenomena that seem puzzling at first consideration.
Regulation, Organizations, and Politics examines the evolution of regulation at the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The ICC has probably had the most profound impact on any federal agency on the way social scientists view politics. From a perspective based in modern political economy, the author develops an analysis that improves our understanding of the determinants of bureaucratic performance and clarifies the conditions under which organizations are likely to have a substantial influence.
Employing a variety of techniques, Regulation, Organizations, and Politics explains how motor carriers, particularly the larger truckers who controlled the American Trucking Association, were unable to control public policy once the chief executive decided to expand substantial political resources on reforming the motor carrier system. The author shows that this failure was rooted in the carriers’ inability to offer the requisite rewards and sanctions required to influence those with power over the outcome. This work thus demonstrates that an integrated approach to the intersections of rational, if often incompletely informed, actors can help us to understand phenomena that seem puzzling at first consideration.
A major study of federal regulation
A major study of federal regulation
