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Regulatory Failure and Renewal: The Evolution of the Natural Monopoly Contract, Second Edition Second edition [Pehme köide]

Introduction by , , Foreword by
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 168 pages, kõrgus x laius: 267x206 mm
  • Sari: Carleton Library Series
  • Ilmumisaeg: 31-May-2022
  • Kirjastus: McGill-Queen's University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0228011825
  • ISBN-13: 9780228011828
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  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 168 pages, kõrgus x laius: 267x206 mm
  • Sari: Carleton Library Series
  • Ilmumisaeg: 31-May-2022
  • Kirjastus: McGill-Queen's University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0228011825
  • ISBN-13: 9780228011828
Teised raamatud teemal:
Using the transaction-cost literature pioneered by Oliver Williamson, John Baldwin examines contractual failure in Canada in natural monopoly cases, asking why initial forms of contracts between the state and private enterprise failed, and why this failure so often resulted in the use of public enterprise rather than regulatory tribunals.


Regulatory Failure and Renewal develops a framework to understand the choice of regulatory instrument used in Canada for natural monopolies such as telephone companies, water utilities, streetcars, hydroelectricity, and railways from the 1880s to the 1930s. Using the transaction-cost literature pioneered by Oliver Williamson, John Baldwin examines the nature of contractual failure in Canada in natural monopoly cases, asking why initial forms of contracts between the state and private enterprise failed and why this failure so often resulted in the use of public enterprise. Baldwin outlines early attempts to deal with natural monopolies – from the use of a franchise contract to regulatory tribunals and finally to public enterprise – and compares Canadian experiences to US approaches, which turned more frequently to regulatory tribunals. This difference is due to Canada’s more limited constraints on the state’s ability to exercise coercive power, which sometimes leads to contractual failure that results in replacing franchise and regulatory frameworks with public enterprise. Regulatory Failure and Renewal demonstrates that public enterprise arose not so much as part of a purposive choice but because of reoccurring failures in the contractual process between the Canadian state and private enterprise.

Muu info

How the failure to protect private property from the coercive power of the state in Canada has led to a breakdown in regulation and in the creation of public enterprises.
Foreword to the New Edition vii
Stanley Winer
Introduction to the New Edition xi
Ian Keay
Preface xxxv
Foreword xxxvii
Judith Maxwell
1 Introduction
1(4)
2 A Theory of Natural Monopoly Regulation
5(6)
Natural Monopoly and the Need for a Regulatory Agent
5(1)
The Cause of Transactions Failures
6(1)
Transactions Failure and Regulation
7(2)
Conclusion
9(2)
3 The Transition from Franchise Contract to Regulatory Tribunal in the United States
11(10)
The Emergence of the Utility Sector
11(2)
The Early Evolution of the Regulatory System
13(1)
Regulation as a Contract
13(2)
Flexible Regulatory Contracts
15(1)
Property Rights and the Role of the Judiciary
16(3)
Conclusion
19(2)
4 Public Enterprise in the Canadian Railway Industry
21(16)
The Conventional View
22(1)
The Contractual Process and Transactions Failure
22(1)
Moral Hazard and Regulatory Failure
23(3)
The Demise of the Grank Trunk
26(7)
Confiscation During the Expropriation Process
33(1)
Conclusion
34(3)
5 Judicial Constraints in Canada and the Evolution of the Regulatory Process
37(16)
The Role of the Judiciary in Canada
37(1)
Common Law and Confiscation
38(1)
The Evolution of Rulings on Regulation and Confiscation
38(2)
The Evolution of Regulation via Independent Tribunal
40(1)
Nova Scotia
41(8)
New Brunswick
49(1)
Alberta
50(1)
Conclusion
51(2)
6 The Evolution of the Regulatory Contract in the Nineteenth Century
53(10)
Water and Municipalization
53(3)
Voluntary Regulation in the Gas Industry
56(2)
Tramways and Regulation by Contract
58(2)
Conclusion
60(3)
7 British Columbia: Honour and Circumstance; Regulation by Independent Tribunal Avoided
63(6)
Historical Development (1896--1917)
63(2)
Renegotiation of the Regulatory Contract
65(1)
Conclusion
66(3)
8 Bell Canada: Business Strategy and Federal Protection
69(4)
Historical Development
69(3)
Conclusion
72(1)
9 Manitoba: Public Enterprise Accompanied by Regulation
73(10)
The Expropriation of Bell Canada's Manitoba Operations
73(2)
Competition between Private and Public Utilities in the Electrical Industry
75(4)
Conclusion
79(4)
10 The Creation of Ontario Hydro: The Franchise Contract Repudiated
83(12)
Historical Development
83(1)
The Demise of the Franchise Contract
83(3)
The Private Sector
86(1)
Emergence of Ontario Hydro
87(1)
Opportunism
88(1)
The Conmee Clause
88(1)
The Power Generating Clause
89(1)
Protection from Judicial Review
90(1)
The Disposition of the Toronto Electric Light Company and the Toronto Railway Company
91(2)
Conclusion
93(2)
11 Utilities in Quebec from 1890 to 1935: Unfettered Development in Electricity Accompanied by Cost of Service Regulation for the Transit Industry
95(8)
Historical Developments in Montral
95(2)
Regulatory History
97(1)
The Evolution of the Montreal Tramways Contract
98(1)
Quebec City: 1929--35
99(1)
Conclusion
100(3)
12 Conclusion
103(6)
The Choice of Regulatory Instrument
103(2)
The Theory of Instrument Choice
105(4)
Notes 109(8)
List of Tables 117(2)
Bibliography 119
John R. Baldwin taught in the economics department at Queens University, worked at the Economic Council of Canada, and is the former head of the Economic Analysis Research Group at Statistics Canada.