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Restructured Electric Power Systems: Analysis of Electricity Markets with Equilibrium Models [Kõva köide]

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  • Sari: IEEE Press Series on Power and Energy Systems
  • Ilmumisaeg: 20-Jul-2010
  • Kirjastus: Wiley-IEEE Press
  • ISBN-10: 0470260645
  • ISBN-13: 9780470260647
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Restructured Electric Power Systems: Analysis of Electricity Markets with Equilibrium ModelsSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 330 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 244x163x24 mm, kaal: 621 g, Charts: 50 B&W, 0 Color; Graphs: 50 B&W, 0 Color
  • Sari: IEEE Press Series on Power and Energy Systems
  • Ilmumisaeg: 20-Jul-2010
  • Kirjastus: Wiley-IEEE Press
  • ISBN-10: 0470260645
  • ISBN-13: 9780470260647
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9780470260647.html
Märksõnad:
The latest practical applications of electricity market equilibrium models in analyzing electricity markets Electricity market deregulation is driving the power energy production from a monopolistic structure into a competitive market environment. The development of electricity markets has necessitated the need to analyze market behavior and power. Restructured Electric Power Systems reviews the latest developments in electricity market equilibrium models and discusses the application of such models in the practical analysis and assessment of electricity markets.

Drawing upon the extensive involvement in the research and industrial development of the leading experts in the subject area, the book starts by explaining the current developments of electrical power systems towards smart grids and then relates the operation and control technologies to the aspects in electricity markets. It explores:





The problems of electricity market behavior and market power



Mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) and equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPEC)



Tools and techniques for solving the electricity market equilibrium problems



Various electricity market equilibrium models



State-of-the-art techniques for computing the electricity market equilibrium problems



The application of electricity market equilibrium models in assessing the economic benefits of transmission expansions for market environments, forward and spot markets, short-term power system security, and analysis of reactive power impact





Also featured are computational resources to allow readers to develop algorithms on their own, as well as future research directions in modeling and computational techniques in electricity market analysis. Restructured Electric Power Systems is an invaluable reference for electrical engineers and power system economists from power utilities and for professors, postgraduate students, and undergraduate students in electrical power engineering, as well as those responsible for the design, engineering, research, and development of competitive electricity markets and electricity market policy.

Arvustused

"Restructured Electric Power Systems is an invaluable reference for electrical engineers and power system economists from power utilities and for professors, postgraduate students, and undergraduate students in electrical power engineering, as well as those responsible for the design, engineering, research, and development of competitive electricity markets and electricity market policy." (PR-inside.com, 28 October 2010)

Preface xiii
Contributors xvii
1 Fundamentals of Electric Power Systems
1(52)
Xiao-Ping Zhang
1.1 Introduction of Electric Power Systems
1(1)
1.2 Electric Power Generation
2(5)
1.2.1 Conventional Power Plants
2(1)
1.2.1.1 Fossil Fuel Power Plants
2(1)
1.2.1.2 CCGT Power Plants
3(1)
1.2.1.3 Nuclear Power Plants
3(1)
1.2.2 Renewable Power Generation Technologies
4(1)
1.2.2.1 Wind Energy Generation
4(1)
1.2.2.2 Ocean Energy Generation
5(1)
1.2.2.3 Photovoltaic Generation Systems
6(1)
1.2.2.4 Bioenergy
6(1)
1.2.2.5 Geothermal Energy
7(1)
1.2.2.6 Hydrogen
7(1)
1.3 Structure of Electric Power Systems
7(4)
1.3.1 Structure
7(2)
1.3.2 Benefits of System Interconnection
9(2)
1.4 Ultra-High Voltage Power Transmission
11(6)
1.4.1 The Concept of Ultra-High Voltage Power Transmission
11(2)
1.4.2 Economic Comparison of Extra-High Voltage and Ultra-High Voltage Power Transmission
13(1)
1.4.3 Ultra-High Voltage AC Power Transmission Technology
14(1)
1.4.4 Ultra-High Voltage DC Technology
14(1)
1.4.5 Ultra-High Voltage Power Transmission in China
15(2)
1.4.6 Ultra-High Voltage Power Transmission in the World
17(1)
1.5 Modeling of Electric Power Systems
17(3)
1.5.1 Transmission Lines
17(1)
1.5.2 Transformers
18(1)
1.5.3 Loads
19(1)
1.5.4 Synchronous Generators
20(1)
1.5.5 HVDC Systems and Flexible AC Transmission Systems (FACTS)
20(1)
1.6 Power Flow Analysis
20(6)
1.6.1 Classifications of Buses for Power Flow Analysis
20(1)
1.6.1.1 Slack Bus
20(1)
1.6.1.2 PV Buses
21(1)
1.6.1.3 PQ Buses
21(1)
1.6.2 Formulation of Load Flow Solution
21(1)
1.6.3 Power Flow Solution by Newton-Raphson Method
22(2)
1.6.4 Fast Decoupled Load Flow Method
24(1)
1.6.5 DC Load Flow Method
25(1)
1.7 Optimal Operation of Electric Power Systems
26(8)
1.7.1 Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch
26(1)
1.7.1.1 Classic Economic Dispatch Without Transmission Network Power Loss
26(2)
1.7.1.2 Security Constrained Economic Dispatch
28(1)
1.7.2 Optimal Power Flow Techniques
28(1)
1.7.2.1 Development of Optimization Techniques in OPF Solutions
28(2)
1.7.2.3 OPF Formulation
30(1)
1.7.2.4 Optimal Power Row Solution by Nonlinear Interior Point Methods
31(3)
1.8 Operation and Control of Electric Power Systems---SCADA/EMS
34(5)
1.8.1 Introduction of SCADA/EMS
34(2)
1.8.2 SCADA/EMS of Conventional Energy Control Centers
36(1)
1.8.3 New Development Trends of SCADA/EMS of Energy Control Centers
37(1)
1.8.3.1 New Environments
37(1)
1.8.3.2 Advanced Software Technologies
38(1)
1.9 Active Power and Frequency Control
39(5)
1.9.1 Frequency Control and Active Power Reserve
39(1)
1.9.2 Objectives of Automatic Generation Control
40(1)
1.9.3 Turbine-Generator-Governor System Model
40(2)
1.9.4 AGC for a Single-Generator System
42(1)
1.9.5 AGC for Two-Area Systems
43(1)
1.9.6 Frequency Control and AGC in Electricity Markets
43(1)
1.10 Voltage Control and Reactive Power Management
44(4)
1.10.1 Introduction of Voltage Control and Reactive Power Management
44(1)
1.10.2 Reactive Power Characteristics of Power System Components
45(1)
1.10.3 Devices for Voltage and Reactive Power Control
45(2)
1.10.4 Optimal Voltage and Reactive Power Control
47(1)
1.10.5 Reactive Power Service Provisions in Electricity Markets
47(1)
1.11 Applications of Power Electronics to Power System Control
48(5)
1.11.1 Flexible AC Transmission Systems (FACTS)
48(1)
1.11.2 Power System Control by FACTS
49(1)
References
50(3)
2 Restructured Electric Power Systems and Electricity Markets
53(46)
Kwok W. Cheung
Gary W. Rosenwald
Xing Wang
David I. Sun
2.1 History of Electric Power Systems Restructuring
53(5)
2.1.1 Vertically Integrated Utilities and Power Pools
54(1)
2.1.2 Worldwide Movement of Power Industry Restructuring
54(1)
2.1.2.1 Nordic Countries
55(1)
2.1.2.2 Great Britain
55(1)
2.1.2.3 Continental Europe
55(1)
2.1.2.4 New Zealand
56(1)
2.1.2.5 Australia
56(1)
2.1.2.6 United States
57(1)
2.2 Structure of Electricity Markets
58(7)
2.2.1 Stakeholders
58(2)
2.2.2 Market Evolution
60(2)
2.2.3 Market and Reliability Coordination
62(2)
2.2.4 The SMD Framework
64(1)
2.2.4.1 Transmission Service
64(1)
2.2.4.2 Energy Market
64(1)
2.2.4.3 Ancillary Service Market
64(1)
2.2.4.4 Market Monitoring and Mitigation
64(1)
2.3 Design of Electricity Markets
65(7)
2.3.1 Market Design Objectives
65(1)
2.3.1.1 Secure and Reliable Operation of Power System
65(1)
2.3.1.2 Risk Management Facilities for Market Participants
65(1)
2.3.1.3 Open and Transparent Market Performance
66(1)
2.3.1.4 Phased Implementation of Market Migration
66(1)
2.3.2 Market Design Principles
66(1)
2.3.2.1 Establish Trading Mechanisms for Energy Resources
67(1)
2.3.2.2 Establish Open Access for Transmission Services
67(1)
2.3.2.3 Harmonize System Operation with Market Operation
68(1)
2.3.3 Energy Market Design
68(1)
2.3.4 Financial Transmission Rights Market Design
69(1)
2.3.5 Ancillary Service Market Design
70(2)
2.4 Operation of Electricity Markets
72(9)
2.4.1 Criteria for Successful Market Operation
72(1)
2.4.1.1 Power System Reliability
72(1)
2.4.1.2 Market Transparency
73(1)
2.4.1.3 Financial Certainty
73(1)
2.4.1.4 Operational Market Efficiency
74(1)
2.4.2 Typical Business Processes Timeline
75(1)
2.4.2.1 New Zealand Electricity Market
75(3)
2.4.2.2 PJM Markets
78(3)
2.5 Computation Tools for Electricity Markets
81(14)
2.5.1 SCED and Associated Market Business Functions
83(1)
2.5.1.1 Classic OPF
83(1)
2.5.1.2 SCED for Market Clearing
84(1)
2.5.1.3 Joint Optimization of Energy and Ancillary Services
85(1)
2.5.1.4 SCED Formulation Example
86(2)
2.5.2 Optimization-Based Unit Commitment
88(1)
2.5.2.1 Market-Oriented Unit Commitment Problem
88(1)
2.5.2.2 Advances in Unit Commitment Methods
89(2)
2.5.2.3 SCUC Example Problem: Reliability Commitment
91(1)
2.5.2.4 SCUC Performance Consideration
92(1)
2.5.3 System Implementation
93(1)
2.5.4 Future Direction
94(1)
2.6 Final Remarks
95(4)
References
96(3)
3 Overview of Electricity Market Equilibrium Problems and Market Power Analysis
99(40)
Xiao-Ping Zhang
3.1 Game Theory and its Applications
99(1)
3.2 Electricity Markets and Market Power
100(3)
3.2.1 Types of Electricity Markets
100(1)
3.2.1.1 Bid-Based Auction Pool / PoolCo / Spot Market
100(1)
3.2.1.2 Bilateral Agreements, Forward Contracts, and Contracts for Differences
101(1)
3.2.2 Competition Types
102(1)
3.2.2.1 Perfect Competition
102(1)
3.2.2.2 Imperfect or Oligopolistic Competition
103(1)
3.3 Market Power Monitoring, Modeling, and Analysis
103(6)
3.3.1 The Concept of Market Power
103(1)
3.3.2 Techniques for Measuring Market Power
104(1)
3.3.2.1 The Price-Cost Margin Index
104(1)
3.3.2.2 The Herfindahl-Hirschan Index
104(1)
3.3.2.3 Estimation of Pricing Behavior Through Simulation Analysis
105(1)
3.3.2.4 Oligopoly Equilibrium Analysis
105(1)
3.3.3 Oligopolistic Equilibrium Models
105(1)
3.3.3.1 Bertrand Equilibrium
106(1)
3.3.3.2 Cournot Equilibrium
106(1)
3.3.3.3 Supply Function Equilibrium
106(1)
3.3.3.4 Stackelberg Equilibrium
107(1)
3.3.3.5 Conjectured Supply Function Equilibrium
107(1)
3.3.4 Market Power Modeling Using Equilibrium Models
107(2)
3.4 Application of the Equilibrium Models in the Electricity Markets
109(6)
3.4.1 Bertrand Equilibrium Model
109(1)
3.4.2 Cournot Equilibrium Model
109(2)
3.4.3 Supply Function Equilibrium Models in Electricity Markets
111(1)
3.4.3.1 Application of Supply Function Equilibrium Models
111(2)
3.4.3.2 Electricity Network Modeling
113(1)
3.4.3.3 Modeling of Contracts
114(1)
3.4.3.4 Choosing the Appropriate Strategic Variable
114(1)
3.4.3.5 Conjecture Supply Function Equilibrium Models
114(1)
3.4.4 Conjectural Variation and CSF Equilibrium Models
115(1)
3.5 Computational Tools for Electricity Market Equilibrium Modeling and Market Power Analysis
115(6)
3.5.1 Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC)
116(1)
3.5.2 Bilevel Programming
117(1)
3.5.3 Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC)
117(1)
3.5.3.1 Formulation of Single-Leader-Follower Games as an MPEC
117(2)
3.5.3.2 Formulation of Multi-Leader-Follower Games as an EPEC
119(1)
3.5.4 NCP Functions for MPCCs
120(1)
3.5.4.1 The Fischer-Burmeister Function
120(1)
3.5.4.2 The Min-Function
120(1)
3.5.4.3 The Chen-Chen-Kanzow Function
120(1)
3.6 Solution Techniques for MPECs
121(4)
3.6.1 SQP Methods
121(1)
3.6.2 Interior Point Methods
121(1)
3.6.2.1 Interior Point Methods with Relaxed Complementarity Constraints
121(1)
3.6.2.2 Interior Point Methods with Two-Sided Relaxation
122(1)
3.6.2.3 Interior Point Methods with Penalty
123(1)
3.6.3 Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP) Methods
124(1)
3.6.4 Artificial Intelligence Approach
124(1)
3.7 Solution Techniques for EPECs
125(3)
3.7.1 Diagonalization Solution Methods
126(1)
3.7.1.1 Nonlinear Jacobi Method
126(1)
3.7.1.2 Nonlinear Gauss-Seidel Method
126(1)
3.7.2 Simultaneous Solution Methods
127(1)
3.8 Technical Challenges for Solving MPECs and EPECs
128(1)
3.9 Software Resources for Large-Scale Nonlinear Optimization
129(10)
References
132(7)
4 Computing the Electricity Market Equilibrium: Uses of Market Equilibrium Models
139(28)
Ross Baldick
4.1 Introduction
139(1)
4.2 Model Formulation
140(11)
4.2.1 Transmission Network Model
141(1)
4.2.1.1 Physical Model
141(1)
4.2.1.2 Commercial Network Model
142(3)
4.2.1.3 Economic Model
145(1)
4.2.2 Generator Cost Function and Operating Characteristics
146(1)
4.2.2.1 Physical Model
146(1)
4.2.2.2 Economic Model
147(1)
4.2.3 Offer Function
147(1)
4.2.3.1 Commercial Model
147(1)
4.2.3.2 Economic Model
148(1)
4.2.4 Demand
149(1)
4.2.4.1 Physical Model
149(1)
4.2.4.2 Commercial Model
149(1)
4.2.4.3 Economic Model
149(1)
4.2.5 Uncertainty
150(1)
4.2.5.1 Physical Model
150(1)
4.2.5.2 Commercial Model
150(1)
4.2.5.3 Economic Model
150(1)
4.3 Market Operation and Price Formation
151(1)
4.3.1 Physical Model
151(1)
4.3.2 Commercial Model
151(1)
4.3.3 Economic Model
152(1)
4.4 Equilibrium Definition
152(2)
4.5 Computation
154(6)
4.5.1 Analytical Models
154(2)
4.5.2 Numerical Solution
156(1)
4.5.3 Fictitious Play
157(3)
4.5.4 Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints and Equilibrium Program with Equilibrium Constraints
160(1)
4.5.5 Specialized Solution Methods
160(1)
4.6 Difficulties with Equilibrium Models
160(1)
4.7 Uses of Equilibrium Models
161(2)
4.7.1 Market Rules Regarding the Changing of Offers
162(1)
4.7.2 Single Clearing Price Versus Pay-as-Bid Prices
162(1)
4.7.3 Divestitures
163(1)
4.8 Conclusion
163(4)
Acknowledgment
163(1)
References
164(3)
5 Hybrid Bertrand-Cournot Models of Electricity Markets With Multiple Strategic Subnetworks and Common Knowledge Constraints
167(26)
Jian Yao
Shmuel S. Oren
Benjamin F. Hobbs
5.1 Introduction
167(3)
5.2 Role of the ISO
170(3)
5.3 The Hybrid Subnetwork Model
173(7)
5.3.1 Two Existing Models
173(1)
5.3.1.1 The Pure Cournot Model
173(1)
5.3.1.2 The Pure Bertrand Model
174(1)
5.3.2 The Hybrid-Bertrand-Cournot Model
175(1)
5.3.2.1 The Firms' Problems
175(1)
5.3.2.2 The Market Equilibrium Conditions
176(2)
5.3.2.3 Computational Properties
178(2)
5.4 Numerical Example for the Subnetworks Model
180(3)
5.5 Bertrand Model with Common Knowledge Constraints
183(5)
5.5.1 The Firm's Problems
183(4)
5.5.2 The Market Equilibrium Conditions
187(1)
5.6 Numerical Example of Equilibrium with Common Knowledge Constraints
188(2)
5.7 Concluding Remarks
190(3)
Acknowledgments
191(1)
References
191(2)
6 Electricity Market Equilibrium With Reactive Power Control
193(48)
Xiao-Ping Zhang
6.1 Introduction
193(1)
6.2 AC Power Flow Model in the Rectangular Coordinates
194(1)
6.3 Electricity Market Analysis Using AC Optimal Power Flow in the Rectangular Coordinates
195(7)
6.3.1 Modeling of Power System Components in Optimal Power Flow
195(1)
6.3.1.1 Modeling of Transmission Line
195(1)
6.3.1.2 Modeling of Transformer Control
196(1)
6.3.1.3 Modeling of Generating Units
197(1)
6.3.1.4 Generator Reactive Power Capability
197(1)
6.3.1.5 Modeling of Loads
198(1)
6.3.1.6 Bus Voltage Constraints
199(1)
6.3.2 Electricity Market Analysis
199(3)
6.4 Electricity Market Equilibrium Analysis
202(3)
6.4.1 Nash Supply Function Equilibrium Model
202(1)
6.4.2 Assumptions for the Supply Function Equilibrium Electricity Market Analysis
202(2)
6.4.3 Parameterization Methods for Linear Supply Functions in Electricity Market Equilibrium Analysis
204(1)
6.4.3.1 Intercept Parameterization
204(1)
6.4.3.2 Slope Parameterization
205(1)
6.4.3.3 Slope-Intercept Parameterization
205(1)
6.4.3.4 Linear Slope-Intercept Parameterization
205(1)
6.5 Computing the Electricity Market Equilibrium with AC Network Model
205(11)
6.5.1 Objective Function for the Social Welfare for Imperfect Competition
205(1)
6.5.2 Objective Function for the Maximization of Profit of the Generating Firm
206(1)
6.5.3 Formulation of Market Equilibrium Model
206(1)
6.5.3.1 ISO's Optimization Problem
206(2)
6.5.3.2 Nonlinear Complementarity Constraints
208(1)
6.5.4 Formulation of the Optimization Market Equilibrium Problem as EPEC
208(1)
6.5.5 Lagrange Function for the EPEC Optimization Problem
209(2)
6.5.6 Newton Equation for the EPEC Problem
211(4)
6.5.7 Modeling of Reactive Power and Voltage Control
215(1)
6.6 Implementation Issues of Electricity Market Equilibrium Analysis with AC Network Model
216(2)
6.6.1 Initialization of the Optimization Solution
216(1)
6.6.2 Updating the Optimization Solution
217(1)
6.6.3 Solution Procedure
217(1)
6.7 Numerical Examples
218(10)
6.7.1 Reactive Power and Voltage Control
218(1)
6.7.1.1 Description of the Test Systems
218(1)
6.7.1.2 Test Results of the 3-Bus System
218(2)
6.7.1.3 The IEEE 14-Bus System
220(1)
6.7.1.4 Discussions
221(1)
6.7.2 Transformer Control
222(1)
6.7.2.1 Description of the Test Systems
222(1)
6.7.2.2 Test Results on the 5-Bus System
222(3)
6.7.2.3 Test Results on the IEEE 30-Bus System
225(2)
6.7.3 Computational Performance
227(1)
6.8 Conclusions
228(1)
6.9 Appendix
229(12)
6.9.1 Second Derivatives for Power Mismatches in Rectangular Coordinates
229(1)
6.9.2 Second Derivatives for Transmission Line Constraints in Rectangular Coordinates
229(1)
6.9.3 Second Derivatives in Rectangular Coordinates
230(4)
6.9.4 Second Derivatives of Transmission Line Constraints in Rectangular Coordinates
234(1)
6.9.5 Third Derivatives of Power Mismatches with Transformer Control
234(1)
6.9.6 Third Derivatives of Transmission Line Constraints
235(2)
Acknowledgments
237(1)
References
237(4)
7 Using Market Simulations for Economic Assessment of Transmission Upgrades: Application of the California Iso Approach
241(30)
Mohamed Labib Awad
Keith E. Casey
Anna S. Geevarghese
Jeffrey C. Miller
A. Farrokh Rahimi
Anjali Y. Sheffrin
Mingxia Zhang
Eric Toolson
Glenn Drayton
Benjamin F. Hobbs
Frank A. Wolak
7.1 Introduction
241(1)
7.2 Five Principles
242(8)
7.2.1 First Principle: Benefit Framework
243(2)
7.2.2 Second Principle: Full Network Representation
245(1)
7.2.3 Third Principle: Market Prices
246(1)
7.2.4 Fourth Principle: Explicit Uncertainty Analysis
247(2)
7.2.5 Fifth Principle: Interactions with Other Resources
249(1)
7.3 Palo Verde-Devers NO. 2 Study
250(16)
7.3.1 Market Model: PLEXOS
250(2)
7.3.2 Project Description
252(1)
7.3.3 Input Assumptions
253(1)
7.3.3.1 Transmission
253(1)
7.3.3.2 Loads
253(1)
7.3.3.3 Generation
253(2)
7.3.3.4 Uncertainty Cases
255(1)
7.3.3.5 Market Price Derivation
256(3)
7.3.4 Results
259(1)
7.3.4.1 Benefit Category 1: Energy Savings
259(2)
7.3.4.2 Uncertainty in Energy Benefit Estimates
261(3)
7.3.4.3 Benefit Category 2: Operational Benefits
264(1)
7.3.4.4 Benefit Category 3: Capacity Benefit
264(1)
7.3.4.5 Benefit Category 4: Loss Savings
265(1)
7.3.4.6 Benefit Category 5: Emissions
265(1)
7.3.4.7 Summary of Results
265(1)
7.3.5 Resource Alternatives
266(1)
7.4 Recent Applications of Team to Renewables
266(1)
7.5 Conclusion
267(4)
Acknowledgments
268(1)
References
268(3)
Index 271
Xiao-Ping Zhang, PhD, is a reader and director of the Institute for Energy Research and Policy at the University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. He is a senior member of the IEEE, as well as an IEEE PES Distinguished Lecturer.