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Software Fault Injection: Innoculating Programs Against Errors [Kõva köide]

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  • Formaat: Hardback, 416 pages, kõrgus x laius: 240x193 mm, kaal: 879 g, Illustrations
  • Ilmumisaeg: 11-Feb-1998
  • Kirjastus: John Wiley & Sons Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0471183814
  • ISBN-13: 9780471183815
Teised raamatud teemal:
Software Fault Injection: Innoculating Programs Against ErrorsSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 416 pages, kõrgus x laius: 240x193 mm, kaal: 879 g, Illustrations
  • Ilmumisaeg: 11-Feb-1998
  • Kirjastus: John Wiley & Sons Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0471183814
  • ISBN-13: 9780471183815
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9780471183815.html
Märksõnad:
Builds on the concepts presented in Friedman and Voas's book Software Assessment: Reliability, Safety, Testability by looking at several real applications of fault injection. Introduces the terminology and definitions necessary for the application of this relatively new technology, offers several techniques for its implementation, and deals with the issues of software mutation and safety, information security, and maintenance and reuse. Concludes with a chapter on inoculating real- world software. The CD-ROM contains the SafetyNet fault injection tool with an accompanying HTML tutorial and Mothra, a software mutation tool. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

This book is the first to describe the unique benefits and challenges associated with fault injection methods. Using real world case-studies and applications data, the authors explain fault injection to the programmer and the developer. CD-ROM includes demo versions of fault injection tools and some basic algorithms for the reader to customize.
CHAPTER 1 Software Assurance
1(28)
1.1 Software Quality
1(5)
1.1.1 Software Behavior
1(4)
1.1.2 The Impossibility of Exhaustive Testing
5(1)
1.2 Measuring Software
6(6)
1.2.1 Achieving Quality Is Easier Than Measuring Quality
6(2)
1.2.2 Direct and Indirect Measurement
8(1)
1.2.3 Structural Metrics
9(1)
1.2.4 Static and Dynamic Analyses
10(2)
1.3 The Process and Product Debate
12(6)
1.3.1 Industry Process Standards
12(2)
1.3.2 Clean Pipes and Dirty Water
14(3)
1.3.3 Why Measure Product?
17(1)
1.4 Fault Injection and Software Assessment
18(11)
1.4.1 Traditional Process Improvement
19(1)
1.4.2 Predicting Future Quality
20(1)
1.4.3 Fault Injection in the Physical World
21(2)
1.4.4 Fault Injection in the Virtual World
23(3)
1.4.5 Software Inoculation
26(3)
CHAPTER 2 Setting the Stage
29(16)
2.1 History
29(5)
2.1.1 Early Pioneers
29(1)
2.1.2 Fault Injection in Hardware Design Languages
30(3)
2.1.3 Low-Level Software Fault Injection
33(1)
2.2 Basic Definitions and Relations
34(11)
2.2.1 Fault Injection as Nontraditional Testing
34(2)
2.2.2 Absolute Correctness Is a Red Herring
36(1)
2.2.3 Defining Some Terms
37(8)
CHAPTER 3 Fault-Injection Fundamentals
45(32)
3.1 The Three Fundamentals
45(8)
3.1.1 Inputs
45(2)
3.1.2 Outputs
47(3)
3.1.3 Propagation
50(1)
3.1.4 Atomic Operators and Data Spaces
50(3)
3.2 Anomalies
53(10)
3.2.1 Theorizing about Anomaly Spaces
53(7)
3.2.2 Using Software Standards to Partition the "All Problems" Space
60(3)
3.2.3 Simulating Distributed Faults
63(1)
3.3 Implementation Issues
63(12)
3.3.1 When to Apply Fault Injection
64(1)
3.3.2 Pseudorandom Number Generation
64(2)
3.3.3 Instrumentation
66(5)
3.3.4 Propagation
71(3)
3.3.5 Statistics and Result Collection
74(1)
3.4 Summary
75(2)
CHAPTER 4 Software Mutation
77(40)
4.1 Getting the Most from Software Testing
77(3)
4.2 Code Mutation versus State Mutation
80(4)
4.3 Compiling or Interpreting Mutants
84(2)
4.4 Assembly and Object Language Mutation
86(1)
4.5 Creating Mutation Operators
86(5)
4.6 Ada83 Mutation
91(21)
4.6.1 Syntactically Incorrect Mutants
92(1)
4.6.2 Operand Replacement Operators
93(2)
4.6.3 Statement Modification Operators
95(7)
4.6.4 Expression Modification Operators
102(5)
4.6.5 Coverage Operators
107(1)
4.6.6 Tasking Operators
108(1)
4.6.7 Comparison of Ada, C, and Fortran-77 Operators
109(3)
4.7 Selective Mutation
112(2)
4.8 Summary
114(3)
CHAPTER 5 Software Testability
117(42)
5.1 Defining Testability
117(4)
5.2 Reliability versus Testability
121(1)
5.3 Fault Tolerance versus Testability
122(1)
5.4 Testability Anomaly Spaces
122(2)
5.5 Fault Injection-Based Testability: The PIE Algorithm
124(18)
5.5.1 Propagation Analysis
125(9)
5.5.2 Infection Analysis
134(3)
5.5.3 Execution Analysis
137(3)
5.5.4 Understanding the Results of PIE
140(1)
5.5.5 Using PIE to Generate "Better" Test Cases
140(1)
5.5.6 PIE versus Formal Verification
141(1)
5.6 Timing and Ordering Fault-Injection Mechanisms
142(7)
5.7 Miscellaneous Parameters Affecting Testability Analysis and Mutation Testing
149(6)
5.7.1 Few Test Cases
150(2)
5.7.2 Test-Case Ordering
152(3)
5.8 Summary
155(4)
CHAPTER 6 Software Safety
159(46)
6.1 Making Software More Tolerant of Faults
162(15)
6.1.1 Recovery Blocks
162(2)
6.1.2 N-Version Programming
164(4)
6.1.3 Consensus Recovery Block
168(1)
6.1.4 Analyzing Software for Fault Tolerance with Fault Trees
169(5)
6.1.5 Software Wrappers
174(1)
6.1.6 Safety-Critical Partitioning
175(2)
6.2 Software Tolerance Measurement with EPA
177(8)
6.2.1 Extended Propagation Analysis(EPA)
177(8)
6.3 Simulating Diverse Faulty Components
185(6)
6.3.1 Simulating a Faulty Specification for N-Version Systems
188(2)
6.3.2 Simulating Ambiguous Specifications for N-Version Systems
190(1)
6.4 EPA-Based Fault-Injection Tool Architecture
191(5)
6.5 Mutation-Based Fault-Injection Tool Architecture
196(1)
6.6 Process-Based, Debugger-Based, and Processor-Based Fault Injection
196(1)
6.7 Electromagnetic Radiation Perturbation Functions for EPA
197(3)
6.8 EPA as a Redesign Heuristic
200(1)
6.9 Summary
200(5)
CHAPTER 7 Applied Safety Assessment
205(22)
7.1 Ariane 5 Flight 501
206(2)
7.2 Therac-25
208(4)
7.3 Magneto Stereotaxis System
212(4)
7.4 Advanced Automated Train Control System
216(2)
7.5 OECD Halden Reactor Project, Norway
218(6)
7.6 Summary
224(3)
CHAPTER 8 Information Security
227(26)
8.1 The State of Security Assessment
229(4)
8.2 AVA Theoretical Model
233(5)
8.2.1 Simulating Code Weaknesses
234(1)
8.2.2 Test-Case Generation
234(1)
8.2.3 Specifying Intrusions Using Predicates
235(1)
8.2.4 Limiting the Information Available from AVA
236(2)
8.3 httpd Security Analysis Results
238(6)
8.3.1 Discussion
243(1)
8.4 Buffer Overflow with AVA
244(4)
8.4.1 Buffer Overflow
245(3)
8.4.2 An AVA Perturbation for Buffer Overflow
248(1)
8.5 Information Warfare
248(5)
CHAPTER 9 Maintenance and Reuse
253(36)
9.1 Software Maintenance
253(8)
9.1.1 Program Slicing
254(1)
9.1.2 Parnas's Uses Hierarchy
255(1)
9.1.3 The Year 2000 Problem
256(4)
9.1.4 COTS and Life Expectancy
260(1)
9.2 Software Reuse
261(24)
9.2.1 Applying Fault Injection to Legacy Code Testing
262(4)
9.2.2 Applying Fault Injection to COTS Systems
266(14)
9.2.3 Software Component Composition
280(1)
9.2.4 Interface Propagation Analysis
281(3)
9.2.5 Why Not Fault Inject Straight into Executables?
284(1)
9.3 Summary
285(4)
CHAPTER 10 Advanced Fault Injection
289(30)
10.1 Profiles and Environments: The Keys to Good Behavior
290(5)
10.1.1 Operational Profiles
290(1)
10.1.2 Inverted Operational Profiles
291(2)
10.1.3 Modified Operational Profiles
293(2)
10.2 Assertions
295(20)
10.2.1 Testability-Based Assertion Localization
299(4)
10.2.2 Cleansing Assertions
303(12)
10.3 Summary
315(4)
CHAPTER 11 Inoculating Real-world Software
319(20)
11.1 Selling Management on Fault Injection
319(5)
11.2 Developing a Winning Game Plan
324(10)
11.2.1 Avoid the Fruit Mix-up
324(1)
11.2.2 Consider the Life Cycle
325(4)
11.2.3 Software Standards
329(1)
11.2.4 Regulations and Certification
330(1)
11.2.5 Liability
331(3)
11.3 Five Steps to Getting Started with Fault Injection
334(1)
11.4 What's the Bottom Line?
335(1)
11.5 Conclusion
336(3)
Appendix 339(8)
Index 347